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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals

In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563 (1989)

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  1. The foundations of Kaplan's direct reference theory for demonstratives.Lawrence D. Roberts - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):91-116.
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  • Could demonstratives be descriptions?Steven Rieber - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):65-77.
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  • Conventional implicatures as tacit performatives.Steven Rieber - 1997 - Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (1):51-72.
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  • Crazy minimalism.François Recanati - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):21–30.
    Review of Insensitive Semantics, by H. Cappelen and E. Lepore.
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  • Painted leaves, context, and semantic analysis.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):351 - 374.
    This essay aims at neutralizing the contextualist challenge against traditional semantics. According to contextualism, utterances of non-elliptical, non-ambiguous, and non-indexical sentences may be associated with contrasting truth-conditions. In this essay, I grant the contextualist analysis of the sentences in question, and the contextualist assessment of the truth-conditions for the corresponding utterances. I then argue that the resulting situation is by no means incompatible with the traditional approach to semantics, and that the evidence put forth by the contextualists may easily be (...)
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  • Attitudinal opacity.Philip L. Peterson - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (2):159 - 220.
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  • Attitudinal opacity.Philip L. Peterson - 1994 - Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (2):159 - 220.
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  • Context-dependence in human and animal communication.Pietro Perconti - 2002 - Foundations of Science 7 (3):341-362.
    The aim of this paper is to show that humanlanguage is context-dependent in a veryspecific way. In order to support this thesis,a detailed comparison is made between the waysin which verbal expressions depend on thecontext of occurrence and evaluation and animalcommunication systems. The comparisonhighlights a series of analogies anddifferences between human language and thecommunication systems of other animals. Myproposal is to use the term `indexicality' toindicate the characteristic way of using thecontext in human language and to use the moregeneral phrase (...)
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  • (Direct) reference.Ernesto Napoli - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):321 - 339.
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  • The pragmatic circle.Kepa Korta & John Perry - 2008 - Synthese 165 (3):347 - 357.
    Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? Gricean (...)
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  • Possibly turning out and metaphysical possibility.Janine Jones - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):261-276.
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  • Why the tuple theory of structured propositions isn't a theory of structured propositions.Bjørn Jespersen - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):171-183.
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  • Donnellan on neptune.Robin Jeshion - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):111-135.
    Donnellan famously argued that while one can fix the reference of a name with a definite description, one cannot thereby have a de re belief about the named object. All that is generated is meta-linguistic knowledge that the sentence “If there is a unique F, then N is F” is true. Donnellan’s argument and the sceptical position are extremely influential. This article aims to show that Donnellan’s argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellan’s scepticism that the reference-fixer (...)
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  • Two-dimensional adventures.Lloyd Humberstone - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):17--65.
    This paper recalls some applications of two-dimensional modal logic from the 1980s, including work on the logic of Actually and on a somewhat idealized version of the indicative/subjunctive distinction, as well as on absolute and relative necessity. There is some discussion of reactions this material has aroused in commentators since. We also survey related work by Leslie Tharp from roughly the same period.
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  • Craziness and metasemantics.John Hawthorne - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):427-440.
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  • Two conceptions of truth? – Comment.V. Mc Gee - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.
    Following Hartry Field in distinguishing disquotational truth from a conception that grounds truth conditions in a community's usage, it is argued that the notions are materially inequivalent (since the latter allows truth-value gaps) and that both are needed. In addition to allowing blanket endorsements ("Everything the Pope says is true"), disquotational truth facilitates mathematical discovery, as when we establish the Gödel sentence by noting that the theorems are all disquotationally true and the disquotational truths are consistent. We require a more (...)
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  • The inessential quasi-indexical.Peter Alward - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  • Towards a referential analysis of temporal expressions.Mürvet Enç - 1986 - Linguistics and Philosophy 9 (4):405 - 426.
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  • Accepting agent centred norms: A problem for non-cognitivists and a suggestion for solving it.James Dreier - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):409–422.
    Non-cognitivists claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as an expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple and clear agent centred (...)
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  • Giorgione was so-called because of his name.Kent Bach - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:73-103.
    Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.
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  • Individuation and the semantics of demonstratives.Martin Davies - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (3):287 - 310.
    Obsessed by the cases where things go wrong, we pay too little attention to the vastly more numerous cases where they go right, and where it is perhaps easier to see that the descriptive content of the expression concerned is wholly at the service of this function [of identifying reference], a function which is complementary to that of predication and contains no element of predication in itself (Strawson [1974], p. 66).An earlier version of the paper was written during an enjoyable (...)
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  • Would you believe that?Joseph Almog - 1984 - Synthese 58 (1):1 - 37.
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  • Quotation, context sensitivity, signs and expressions.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):43–64.
    Can one and the same quotation be used on different occasions to quote distinct objects? The view that it can is taken for granted throughout the literature (e.g. Goddard & Routley 1966, Christensen 1967, Davidson 1979, Goldstein 1984, Jorgensen et al 1984, Atlas 1989, Clark & Gerrig 1990, Washington 1992, García-Carpintero 1994, 2004, 2005, Reimer 1996, Saka 1998, Wertheimer 1999). Garcia-Carpintero (1994, p. 261) illustrates with the quotation expression ''gone''. He says it can be used to quote any of the (...)
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  • ‘Nobody Loves Me’: Quantification and Context.Claudia Bianchi - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):377 - 397.
    In my paper, I present two competing perspectives on the foundational problem (as opposed to the descriptive problem) of quantifier domain restriction: the objective perspective on context (OPC) and the intentional perspective on context (IPC). According to OPC, the relevant domain for a quantified sentence is determined by objective facts of the context of utterance. In contrast, according to IPC, we must consider certain features of the speaker’s intention in order to determine the proposition expressed. My goal is to offer (...)
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  • Belief in discourse representation theory.Nicholas Asher - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):127 - 189.
    I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, thus combining the (...)
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  • The determination of content.Zoltán Szabó - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):253 - 272.
    I identify a notion of compositionality at the intersection of the different notions philosophers, linguists, and psychologists are concerned with. The notion is compositionality of expression content: the idea that the content of a complex expression in a context of its utterance is determined by its syntactic structure and the contents of its constituents in the contexts of their respective utterances. Traditional arguments from productivity and systematicity cannot establish that the contents of linguistic expressions are compositionally determined in this sense. (...)
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  • Strongde re belief.Torin Alter - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):223-232.
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  • On the objects of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 1996 - In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.
    When I talk about the objects of belief I do not mean, e.g., the sun to which my thought that the sun will rise tomorrow refers; I do not mean the objects we think about. I take objects rather in a general philosophical sense; they simply are the bearers of properties and the relata of relations. I am thus concerned with the objects that are related by the belief relation „_a_ believes that _p_“. In this scheme „ _a _“ represents (...)
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  • Demonstrative thought.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...)
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  • Russellianism and psychological generalizations.David Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  • Holism, relevance, and thought content.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 1999:140-151.
    NB: This paper has been largely displaced by my: “Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism and Self-Knowledge”, in Goldberg, (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 228-247. // -/- While straightforwardly ambiguous words like “bank” and obviously indexical words like “I” are unproblematically treated as referring to different things in different contexts, such variations are displayed by terms that seem neither ambiguous nor indexical. This paper will argue that traditional accounts of word meaning (in which a single fixed (...)
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  • Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
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  • Swampman of la mancha.Deborah J. Brown - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):327-48.
    I was dreaming about Delores when the phone interrupted us. It was the Chief, or ‘Stress,’ as we liked to call him, telling me to get part of my anatomy down to Shakey’s Funeral Parlor. My head ached. I thought I must be the only sucker who gets a hangover from being drunk on life. I got up, put two eggs, a spoonful of wheatgerm, the remains of the scotch, and the phonebill into the blender and fed the whole lot (...)
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  • A-intensions and communication.Frederick Kroon - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):279-298.
    In his 'Why We Need A-Intensions', Frank Jackson argues that "representational content [is] how things are represented to be by a sentence in the communicative role it possesses in virtue of what it means," a type of content Jackson takes to be broadly descriptive. I think Jackson overstates his case. Even if we agree that such representational properties play a crucial reference-fixing role, it is much harder to argue the case for a crucial communicative role. I articulate my doubts about (...)
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  • Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?Pierre Jacob - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
    First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that (...)
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  • Putnam, Searle, and externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
    To sum up, then, both kinds of Putnam's arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searle's discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searle's own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external (...)
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  • Can we believe what we do not understand?François Recanati - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.
    In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject (...)
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  • The haecceity theory and perspectival limitation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):295-305.
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  • Conceivability and possibility: Chalmers on modal epistemology.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):243-260.
    We often decide whether a state of affairs is possible by trying to mentally depict a scenario where the state in question obtains . These mental acts seem to provide us with an epistemic route to the space of possibilities. The problem this raises is whether conceivability judgments provide justification-conferring grounds for the ensuing possibility-claims . Although the question has a long history, contemporary interest in it was, to a large extent, prompted by Kripke's utilization of modal intuitions in the (...)
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  • Questions & Indexicality.Thom van Gessel - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (3):593-621.
    The truth conditions of sentences with indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘here’ cannot be given directly, but only relative to a context of utterance. Something similar applies to questions: depending on the semantic framework, they are given truth conditions relative to an actual world, or support conditions instead of truth conditions. Two-dimensional semantics can capture the meaning of indexicals and shed light on notions like apriority, necessity and context-sensitivity. However, its scope is limited to statements, while indexicals also occur in questions. (...)
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  • On Compulsive Talkers.James Ravi Kirkpatrick - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    This paper reevaluates Kaplan’s (Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–563, 1989b) infamous ‘compulsive talker’ objection to Reichenbach’s (Elements of symbolic logic, AQ1 Macmillan, New York, 1947 ) token-reflexive theory of indexicals. It argues that Kaplan’s objection depends on the modal status of Reichenbachian tokens. On one interpretation, Kaplan’s objection stands. But on another, equally plausible interpretation, the following points hold: (i) Reichenbach’s theory effectively preempts contemporary discussion of rigid definite descriptions, (ii) Kaplan’s own analysis of indexicals in (...)
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  • Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kripke regards as a (...)
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  • Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality.Robert Francescotti - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-16.
    The view that first-person (de se) mental content is essential to the explanation of action in general is a strong essential indexicality thesis. A weaker essential indexicality claim is that de se mental content is an essential ingredient of intentional action. An argument by Bermúdez for the former thesis and an argument from Babb in support of the latter are discussed in Section 2, and for reasons presented there it seems that both arguments are unsound and the conclusions are false (...)
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  • That's not what you said! Semantic constraints on literal speech.Sarah A. Fisher - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    According to some philosophers, a sentence's semantics can fail to constitute a complete propositional content, imposing mere constraints on such a content. Recently, Daniel Harris has begun developing a formal constraint semantics. He claims that the semantic values of sentences constrain what speakers can literally say with them—and what hearers can know about what was said. However, that claim is undermined by his conception of semantics as the study of a psychological module. I argue instead that semantic constraints should be (...)
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  • Ruth Barcan Marcus.Roberta Ballarin - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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