본 논문은 인도불교의 인식•논리학에서 근본 논서로 일컬어지고 있는 디그나가의 『집량론(集量論)』의 귀경게(maṅgalaśloka)와 동아시아 불교에 가장 큰 영향을 끼친 『기신론』의 귀경게를 비교분석한다. 두 논서에서 예경의 대상으로 성스럽게 지칭되는 붓다의 공통점은 대승불교의 근간이라고 할 수 있는 대비(大悲)이다. 각각의 논서에서 다양한 논리로 지칭되고 있고 특징 지워지고 있는 붓다의 명호는 결국 중생 구제라는 최종의 목적을 향하고 있으며, 이를 가능하게 하는 바탕은 붓다의 자비로움이다. 디그나가는 귀경게에서 예경의 대상을 붓다에 한정하며, 이는 PS를 주석한 다르마키르티의 기본 입장도 다르지 않다. 반면 『기신론』의 귀경의 대상은 불법승 삼보로 그 의미가 확대된다. (...) 디그나가나 원효 모두 논서를 저술함에 있어서 두 가지 목표를 지향한다고 할 수 있다. 하나는 그들의 주장이 철학적으로 논리적임을 증명하는 것이고, 또 하나는 최종적으로 자신의 주장이 주석하고자 하는 근본 논서들의 결론과 결코 충돌하지 않음을 논증하고자 한다. 이는 결국 종교적 믿음과 철학적 사유의 구조가 전통의 계승이라는 연속적인 측면과 혁신이라는 새로운 요소를 동시에 내포하고 있다. 디그나가와 원효는 시•공간적인 차이에도 불구하고, 개별적 사상의 계승이라는 측면을 배제하더라도, 종교적 근본 믿음을 위한 토대 구축과 그에 근간한 철학적 논리의 사유 구조를 전개함에서 공통적인 연속성을 엿볼 수 있다. (shrink)

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

In the past decade or so there has been a surge of monographs on the nature of ‘Buddhist Ethics.’ For the most part, authors are concerned with developing and defending explications of Buddhism as a normative ethical theory with an apparent aim of putting Buddhist thought directly in dialogue with contemporary Western philosophical debates in ethics. Despite disagreement among Buddhist ethicists concerning which contemporary normative ethical theory a Buddhist ethic would most closely resemble (if any), 1 it is arguable that (...) all Buddhist ethicists (like all Buddhists) embrace and endorse the Four Noble Truths as a framing assumption. That is, a Buddhist ethic will (1) typically assume that we fallible .. (shrink)

This paper is a critical review of Jonardan Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical India.

I begin by warmly thanking Professors Garfield and Hansen for participating in this dialogue. I greatly value the work of both and appreciate having the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with them. Aside from the many important insights I gain from their replies, I believe that both Garfield and Hansen misrepresent my position. In response, I shall clarify the argument contained in my preceding comment, and will consider the objections as they bear on this clarified position.Both Garfield and Hansen (...) characterize the central argument of my comment as presupposing a relatively mainstream Western account of action. They suggest that, with a mainstream Western account in hand, I challenge Classical Chinese and Indo .. (shrink)

We (relatively few) Western analytic philosophers who also work on classical Indian philosophy commonly encounter puzzlement or suspicion from our colleagues in Western philosophy because of our Indian interests. The ubiquity of these attitudes is itself revealing of Western conceptions of Indian philosophy, though their origins lie in cultural history often unknown to those who hold them. In the first part of this paper I relate a small but significant slice of that history before going on to distinguish and illustrate (...) three different Western conceptions of Indian philosophy associated with three different approaches to India: the magisterial, the exoticist and the curatorial. I argue that none of these three approaches gives us an adequate conception of Indian philosophy: the magisterial approach is overly dismissive, the exoticist approach misrepresents the analytical achievements of Indian philosophy, and the curatorial approach fails to take seriously Indian philosophy's concern with truth. I advocate instead a different Western approach to Indian philosophy, an approach suggested by the Indian philosophers' own discussions of the problem of truth. (shrink)

Two eight-century Jaina contemporaries, a Śvetāmbara philosopher Siddhasena Mahāmati and a Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa revolutionised Jaina epistemology, by radically transforming basic epistemological concepts, which had been based on canonical tradition. The paper presents a brief historical outline of the developments of basic epistemological concepts in Jaina philolosophy such as the cognitive criterion and logical faculties as well as their fourteen typological models which serve as the backdrop of important innovations in epistemology introduced by Siddhasena, Pātrasvāmin and Akalaṅka. An important contribution (...) of these Jaina thinkers was to economize Indian logic and the rules of inference, first, by devising only one kind of logical reason called ‘inexplicability otherwise’, based on the single inseparable connection of the proving property with the inferable property, and, second, by limiting the necessary number of the members of the proof formula merely to two. These two innovations were related to the thinkers’ intention to devise a logic which would not primarily be based on empirical verification but its structural patterns would be valid irrespective of external observation. Further, the paper focuses on the nature of the epistemological shifts which Siddhasena and Akalaṅka introduced independently of each other and on the question how Siddhasena’s and Akalaṅka’s ideas were partly anchored in Buddhist concepts of the pramāṇa school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. With the Buddhist background, Siddhasena sought to define the criteria essential to distinguish true from false cognitions and to provide a novel classification of the pramāṇas. He can further be accredited with formulating the first Jaina descriptive definition of the cognitive criterion. The final section of the paper explains how Akalaṅka applies novel epistemological ideas, first, to construct realistic ontology and objectivity of both the external world and the cognising subject, and, secondly, to combat fundamental Buddhist concepts such as idealism and momentariness. (shrink)

In the tradition of Dharmakīrti, perception is, by definition, free from conceptual construction. Insofar as perception is thus, it lacks the nature of determining its object. Without identifying its object, how does perception lead one to a successful action? Perception in isolation would not be pramāṇa unless it is supplemented by perceptual judgement. This paper looks at how Dharamkīrti and his commentators offer solutions to the contradiction between perception’s foundational role and its seeming dependence on conceptual construction. The key point (...) in their proposed solutions is the argument that perception is understood in accordance with two distinct perspectives of the moment and the continuum. Perception from the perspective of the moment has the activities of ‘grasping’ and ‘ascertaining’. The ‘grasping’ induces perceptual awareness to be possessed of the image of an object-moment; the ‘ascertaining’ identifies its object in the form of “this is something.” Perception from the perspective of the continuum, on the other hand, consists of a series of the first moment of sense perception and its subsequent moments of mental perception. It is a continuous process allowing one to attain or avoid a thing that s/he sees. The fulfilment of a purpose is achieved not through a perception-moment but through a perception-continuum. It is worthy stressing, however, that in a very strict sense, the perception-moment alone is ultimately real. Perception from the perspective of the moment is purely epistemological while perception from the perspective of the continuum is pragmatic. (shrink)

In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhijñā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him. The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists (...) in mind. In a third phase, Utpaladeva developed in his Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ) a second theory of error, one that involved the noncognition of non-duality ( abhedākhyāti ) and served to explain both the appearance and perception of multiplicity, despite the strict monism to which all Pratyabhijñā authors subscribe. Abhinavagupta’s treatment of error, then, is significant not only because it was meant to explain all the various theories of error offered by opposing philosophical schools, as Rastogi has shown, but more importantly because it synthesized the thinking of his predecessors on the matter in a single, elegant account of error. (shrink)

This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition ( prameya ) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya , and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya . It inquires into the relationship between validity ( prāmāṇya ), reliability ( avisaṃvāda ) and causal efficacy ( arthakriyā ) and suggests that (...) the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 provides an alternative to an overall “practicalist” reading of Dharmakīrti, practicalist in the sense that pramāṇas are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmakīrti’s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriyā -oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of “non-opposition” ( abādhana ) introduced by Dharmakīrti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects. (shrink)

As the title of the present article shows, it highlights the three philosophically integrated areas – (1) pramāṇa-epistemology (theory of comprehensive knowledge involving both perception and inference), (2) logic (although a part of pramāṇa-epistemology, it has two modes, namely, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning), and (3) language (or semantics, i.e. the double negation theory of meaning, which falls under inference). These are interconnected as well as overlapping within the Buddhist mainstream tradition of the process philosophy as opposed to the substantialist (...) philosophy. The same is the case with the three celebrated Buddhist thinkers – Vasubandhu, Dignāga (also spelt as Diññāṇa), and Dharmakīrti – who develop their radical and critical views focusing on these areas in historical-cum-philosophical order. It is worth noting that within the same mainstream Buddhist tradition, each one of the three thinkers picks up the problematic issues from their predecessors – from the Buddha to their immediate predecessors respectively – for their solutions against the backdrop of the two conflicting mainstream traditions – Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The central focus of these thinkers is first to identify the crucial issues, doctrinal principles, terminology, and methodology in their own ways and conceptual frameworks, which generate not only the mutual conflicts in the course of dialogues but also strengthen their positions by means of their new radical ideas, innovations, terminologies, methodologies, and doctrinal principles. As a result, the three selected areas and their crucial issues are explained, elaborated, and interpretated for better understanding. All of which are rooted in the Buddha’s path of wisdom, ethics, and liberation from the human predicament (duḥkha-nivṛtti). In this grand project of the deepest concerns, the Buddha utilized multiple strategies like understanding and controlling the problematic nature of the mind (Pāli citta, manasa) and its concomitance (Pāli cetasika, dhammā) by means of the concentrative meditation (Pāli jhāna, Sanskrit (hereafter Skt., dhyāna), cultivation of knowledge (Pāli vijjā, Skt. vidyā) and conduct/moral purity (Pāli caraṇa, Skt. ācaraṇa), destruction of afflictions/defilements (Pāli kilesa, Skt. kleśa), critical and logical thinking with valid arguments, and so on. His disciples also treat him as the possessor of valid method, arguments, meaning, practice, and purpose (Skt. pramāṇabhūta, the term used by Dignāga). He believed in the common humanity as the community of sufferers and the autonomy of every human being (Pāli attakāra), but strongly rejected the hierarchy of humanity on the basis of caste, birth, and dogmatic religious identity. For these reasons, following the Buddha and his celebrated followers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, my task in this article is how to clearly and elaborately discuss the above identified issues and theories, first to understand them for myself and then logically prove the whole process of knowledge and the designed purpose through communication to those who have the intention to hear and understand the framework of common language for their benefits. I wish the readers like students and young teachers benefit from my research work. Further, since my learning of the Tibetan language is zero, but comfortable in Sanskrit and Pāli, I have been heavily dependent on three great modern thinkers who have widely written independently and also translated the Buddhist Tibetan texts, which were translated from the original Sanskrit texts now lost, into English in the areas of Buddhist epistemology, logic, and semantics. These modern scholars are Masaaki Hattori, Shoryo Katsura, and Richard Hayes. Besides them, I have also little benefitted from some other scholars who have worked in the same areas. (shrink)

미망사학파의 쿠마릴라와 불교논사 다르마키르티는 비록 생존 연대의 선후 관계에 대해서는 논란이 있지만 동시대의 인물이다. 각각 미망사와 불교의 철학적 논의의 정점을 이끌었다는 평가를 받고 있는 이들의 사상은 지각의 논의에서도 서로 상반된다. 두 사상가 모두 인식을 무모순성이라고 정의하여 유사성을 보이는 듯하나, 쿠마릴라는 무모순성이 내재적 정당성으로 보증된다고 주장하고, 이는 결국 베다의 영원성을 논증할 수 있게 되는 근거가 된다. 반면 다르마키르티는 인식의 무모순성을 인간의 목적 성취로 규정하여 그 지향점이 다르다. 이를 바탕으로 지각에 대한 정의와 논증에서도 이들은 첨예하게 대립한다. 쿠마릴라는 지각은 다르마를 알 수 없는 (...) 것이라고 하고 비분별 지각과 분별적 지각으로 구분한다. 초세간적 능력을 가진 요가행자나 일체지자의 존재를 부정하게 되며, 이는 결국 세간의 경험적 상식적인 수준의 지각을 논의한다. 반면 다르마키르티는 지각의 비분별임을 강조하며 언어와 결합가능성이 배제된 것이라고 정의하며, 개별상만이 지각의 인식대상이라고 한정한다. 그리고 지각을 네 가지로 구분하여, 요가행자의 지각을 인정하며, 일체지자의 존재를 긍정할 수 있는 논리적 근거를 제공한다. 쿠마릴라와 다르마키르티의 지각의 논의는 서로 다른 인식론적 토대 위에서 서로 다른 지향점을 내포하고 있음을 알 수 있다. (shrink)

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual (...) viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: Language is coextensive with external reality. Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality. Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy are examined. Approach, according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhartṛhari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions. (shrink)

다르마끼르띠가 제시하는 ‘바른 지식’(pramāṇa)의 두 가지 조건 가운데 하나인 ‘모순되지 않음’(avisaṃvādin)이라는 조건에 대한 현재의 일반적인 이해에 따르면, 이 조건을 충족시키는 것은 어떤 지(知) 자체의 속성이 아니라 그 지(知)에 기반하여 취해진 행동이 소기의 목적을 달성했다는 결과로서의 사실이다. 즉, 이 조건은 어떤 지(知)에 기반하여 취해진 후속 행동이 소기의 목적을 달성했다는 결과로서의 사실을 통해서 간접적으로 충족되는 것으로 이해되고 있다. 하지만 ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건을 이렇게 이해한다면 지각 및 지각의 대상인 자상과 관련하여 두 가지 심각한 문제가 발생한다. 하나는 지각이 이렇게 이해된 ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건을 충족시키기 (...) 위해서는 ‘분별이 없다’라는 그 자신의 정의를 위배해야 한다는 것이다. 다른 하나는 지각의 대상인 자상이 이렇게 이해된 ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건을 충족하는 지각의 대상이 되기 위해서는 ‘찰나멸한다’라는 그 자신의 정의를 위배해야 한다는 것이다. ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건은 지(知) 자체의 속성을 통해 직접적으로 충족되는 것으로 새롭게 이해될 수 있다. 이때 ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건을 직접적으로 충족시킨다고 볼 수 있는 지(知) 자체의 속성으로는 두 가지가 있다. 그 지(知)에 기반하여 취해진 어떤 행동이 소기의 목적을 달성할 수 있게 하는 ‘능력’이라는 속성, 그리고 ‘실재와의 결합’이라는 속성이 그 두 가지이다. ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건이 지(知) 자체의 이 두 가지 속성을 통해 충족될 수 있다면, 현재의 일반적인 이해에 따라 ‘모순되지 않음’이라는 조건을 이해할 때 발생하는 심각한 문제들을 피할 수 있다. (shrink)