Institutions to address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our duties toward future generations have elicited much recent normative research, which this chapter surveys. It focuses on two prominent institutions: insulating devices, which seek to mitigate short-termist electoral pressures by transferring authority away to independent bodies, and constraining devices, which seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally fair rules from which deviation is costly. The chapter first discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories of our duties toward future (...) generations, and how an excessive focus on the short term in policymaking may hinder that such duties be fulfilled. It then surveys constraining and insulating devices, and inspects their effectiveness to address the epistemic, motivational, and institutional drivers of political short-termism as well as their intra- and intergenerational legitimacy. (shrink)

The political and ethical status of future generations is commonly discussed within conceptual frameworks like intergenerational justice, rights, or welfare. In this article, I argue that the concept of _domination_ can provide a novel perspective on the philosophy of intergenerational relations. To that end, I first advance and defend a (slightly) revised conception of domination, drawing on Philip Pettit’s neorepublican view. Second, I establish a _prima facie_ case for the existence of intergenerational domination and address four major objections to the (...) claim that the present generation dominates future generations: the non-concurrency challenge, a modified version of the non-identity problem, the inescapability objection, and the problem of historical domination. Finally, I explore some implications and conceptual advantages of the framework of intergenerational domination. As a theoretical foundation of a comprehensive analysis of structures of domination, the proposed framework may contribute to identifying and reducing domination within and across generations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the intergenerational problem for relational egalitarianism. It follows Karnein (2023), Nolt (2011), Smith (2013), and others in analysing the issue in terms of intergenerational domination but rejects their claim that the best way to understand the problem is through a group conception of domination involving current generations dominating future generations. My aim in this paper is to replace these existing accounts. I argue that intergenerational domination is better understood structurally via a Role-Based Model, where domination occurs (...) through institutions and social structures. The core idea is that our institutions and social structures created and maintained by earlier generations, enable some future generations to dominate others through and in virtue of their social roles. Because roles are the site where structure meets agency, this Role-Based Model (1) explains how the actions of only some members within a generation – whether from preceding or future generations – contribute to intergenerational domination, and (2) accurately identifies which future individuals or groups are most likely to become victims of intergenerational domination based on their roles and position within these structures. The implication is that social roles are crucial to intergenerational domination. This insight is pertinent to debates on some of the most pressing political and ethical issues of our time such as how to safeguard future generations from the consequences of climate change, antibiotic resistance, and the costs of long-term public debt. Without this Role-Based Model, we risk mischaracterising the problem and implementing ineffective solutions. (shrink)