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  1. Do We Have Relational Reasons to Care About Intergenerational Equality?Caleb Althorpe & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns - manuscript
    Relational egalitarians sometimes argue that a degree of distributive equality is necessary for social equality to obtain among members of society. In this paper, we consider how such arguments fare when extended to the intergenerational case. In particular, we examine whether relational reasons for distributive equality apply between non-overlapping generations. We claim that they do not. We begin by arguing that the most common reasons relational egalitarians offer in favour of distributive equality between contemporaries do not give us reasons to (...)
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  • Intergenerational Justice and Institutions for the Long Term.Inigo Gonzalez-Ricoy - 2024 - In Klaus Goetz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press USA.
    Institutions to address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our duties toward future generations have elicited much recent normative research, which this chapter surveys. It focuses on two prominent institutions: insulating devices, which seek to mitigate short-termist electoral pressures by transferring authority away to independent bodies, and constraining devices, which seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally fair rules from which deviation is costly. The chapter first discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories of our duties toward future (...)
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  • Intergenerational Domination.Luca Hemmerich - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-26.
    The political and ethical status of future generations is commonly discussed within conceptual frameworks like intergenerational justice, rights, or welfare. In this article, I argue that the concept of _domination_ can provide a novel perspective on the philosophy of intergenerational relations. To that end, I first advance and defend a (slightly) revised conception of domination, drawing on Philip Pettit’s neorepublican view. Second, I establish a _prima facie_ case for the existence of intergenerational domination and address four major objections to the (...)
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