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Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality

Frederik Kaufman

Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70 (1994)

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A Framework for Grounding the Moral Status of Intelligent Machines.Michael Scheessele - 2018 - AIES '18, February 2–3, 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA.details I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any moral obligation should be the "functional morality" of Wallach and Allen [20], (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The hard limit on human nonanthropocentrism.Michael R. Scheessele - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):49-65.details There may be a limit on our capacity to suppress anthropocentric tendencies toward non-human others. Normally, we do not reach this limit in our dealings with animals, the environment, etc. Thus, continued striving to overcome anthropocentrism when confronted with these non-human others may be justified. Anticipation of super artificial intelligence may force us to face this limit, denying us the ability to free ourselves completely of anthropocentrism. This could be for our own good. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review.Jamie Harris & Jacy Reese Anthis - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (4):1-95.details Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Weak Panpsychism and Environmental Ethics.John Andrews - 1998 - Environmental Values 7 (4):381-396.details Weak panpsychism, the view that mindlike qualities are wide-spread in nature, has recently been argued for by the prominent ecofeminist Val Plumwood and has been used by her to ground an ethic of respect for nature. This ethic advocates a principle of respect for difference, the rejection of moral hierarchy and the inclusion of plants, mountains, rivers and ecosystems within the moral community. I argue that weak panpsychism cannot, convincingly, justify the rejection of moral hierarchy, as it is compatible with (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The moral status of non-human beings and their ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229.details Environmental ethics is generally searching for the intrinsic value in natural beings. However, there are very few holistic models trying to reflect the various dimensions of the experience-to-be a natural being. We are searching for that intrinsic value, in order to determine which species are holders of rights. In this article, I suggest a set of moral and rational principles to be used for identifying the intrinsic value of a given species and for comparing it to that of other species. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The moral status of non‐human beings and their ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Philosophy and Geography 3 (2):221-229.details Environmental ethics is generally searching for the intrinsic value in natural beings. However, there are very few holistic models trying to reflect the various dimensions of the experience‐to‐be a natural being. We are searching for that intrinsic value, in order to determine which species are holders of rights. In this article, I suggest a set of moral and rational principles to be used for identifying the intrinsic value of a given species and for comparing it to that of other species. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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