We are fallible, and knowledge of our fallibility has normative implications. But these normative implications appear to conflict with other compelling epistemic norms. We therefore appear to face a choice: reject fallibility-based norms or reject these other epistemic norms. I argue that there is a plausible third option: reconcile these two sets of norms. Once we properly understand the nature of each of these norms, we aren’t forced to reject either.

This paper applies the theory of networks to the problem of how agents should assign weights to other agents in the Lehrer-Wagner model for consensus formation. The Lehrer- Wagner theory of consensus is introduced, and the problem of weight assignment is highlighted as one of the open prob- lems for the theory. The paper argues that the application of the theory of networks to the Lehrer-Wagner model con- stitutes an interesting and fruitful option, among others, for the problem of weight (...) assignment. (shrink)

Disagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-life case study of expert disagreement, where disagreement is gradually (...) transformed into consensus. An analysis of Delphi shows that moderate conciliatory views are descriptively more adequate than rival views. However, it also casts doubt on whether the debate in social epistemology is explanatory relevant vis-à-vis real life cases of expert disagreement, where consensus replaces truth, and acceptance is more explanatorily relevant than belief. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the possibility of applying the methods and results of Judgement Aggregation to the problem of logical disagreement. I develop and evaluate different ways in which individuals who logically disagree can generate a collective logic. I prove a version of the discursive paradox, where the majority voting of a group of structural logicians can give rise to a substructural logic; then I develop a more general impossibility result. After this, I analyze different ways to avoid the (...) paradox, in particular some methods which appeal to domain restrictions. Finally, I consider the application of these results to the discussion on semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

How should one's beliefs be affected by one's knowing that other people, who are equally well-informed, rational, and intelligent – in other words, persons who are epistemic, or intellectual, peers – believe differently? In this thesis I look at a certain answer to this question. Richard Feldman argues that when two persons who have the same level of intelligence and who are equally well-informed disagree, the only rational response is for both persons to give up their disputed beliefs and suspend (...) judgment. I look at two objections to Feldman’s view, one from Ernest Sosa and the other from Thomas Kelly. In the end, I side with Feldman. Feldman’s call for suspension of judgment is based on an observation of symmetry in peer disagreements. Feldman argues that, in a peer disagreement, the participants should realize that for each thing one of them can say in support of his view, the other can say something analogous in support of the other view. This symmetry removes any rational basis to prefer one’s own view. I conclude that neither Sosa’s nor Kelly’s objections introduce any relevant asymmetries that would justify the disputants in a peer disagreement in sticking to their original beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter is a philosophical survey of some leading approaches in formal epistemology in the so-called ‘Bayesian’ tradition. According to them, a rational agent’s degrees of belief—credences—at a time are representable with probability functions. We also canvas various further putative ‘synchronic’ rationality norms on credences. We then consider ‘diachronic’ norms that are thought to constrain how credences should respond to evidence. We discuss some of the main lines of recent debate, and conclude with some prospects for future research.