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  1. Disagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science.Alexandria Boyle - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):825-847.
    Comparative cognitive science often involves asking questions like ‘Do nonhumans have C?’ where C is a capacity we take humans to have. These questions frequently generate unproductive disagreements, in which one party affirms and the other denies that nonhumans have the relevant capacity on the basis of the same evidence. I argue that these questions can be productively understood as questions about natural kinds: do nonhuman capacities fall into the same natural kinds as our own? Understanding such questions in this (...)
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  • Natural Kinds, Mind-independence, and Unification Principles.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.
    There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those (...)
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  • Unity of Science.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Unity of science was once a very popular idea among both philosophers and scientists. But it has fallen out of fashion, largely because of its association with reductionism and the challenge from multiple realisation. Pluralism and the disunity of science are the new norm, and higher-level natural kinds and special science laws are considered to have an important role in scientific practice. What kind of reductionism does multiple realisability challenge? What does it take to reduce one phenomenon to another? How (...)
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  • Ontology and values anchor indigenous and grey nomenclatures: a case study in lichen naming practices among the Samí, Sherpa, Scots, and Okanagan.Catherine Kendig - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 84:101340.
    Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not (...)
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  • Two Sources of Normativity in Enthusiastic Accounts of Kinds.Riana J. Betzler - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (1):127-152.
    Recent trends in the debate about natural kinds tend towards increasingly permissive and practice-oriented views. I argue that while these accounts—which I characterize using Boyd’s ([1991]) term ‘enthusiasm’—offer several helpful insights, they often lack the normative force that they want to have; that is, they cannot provide an account of what makes something a good or bad, better or worse, kind for scientific pursuits. I argue that such accounts can regain a minimal sense of normativity in two ways. The first, (...)
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  • Ethnobiological kinds and material grounding: comments on Ludwig.Thomas A. C. Reydon & Marc Ereshefsky - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-10.
    In a recent article, David Ludwig proposed to reorient the debate on natural kinds away from inquiring into the naturalness of kinds and toward elucidating the materiality of kinds. This article responds to Ludwig’s critique of a recently proposed account of kinds and classification, the Grounded Functionality Account, against which Ludwig offsets his own account, and criticizes Ludwig’s proposal to shift focus from naturalness to materiality in the philosophy of kinds and classification.
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  • Latent variables, psychological constructs, and the prospect of scientific kinds in psychology.Marion Godman & Martin Bellander - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    In this paper, we consider how latent variables of mainstream quantitative psychology fits with two different models of scientific kinds. On the one hand, there is a good reason to think they fit with taxonomic and predictive success criteria that are popular within an epistemic understanding of scientific kinds. On the other hand, they conflict with widely shared person-based ontological commitments that underwrite psychological kinds because this research rests in large part on between-individual studies. We explore the implications of the (...)
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  • Finding realism in a plurality of situated scientific perspectives. Book forum on Perspectival realism by Michela Massimi.Catherine Kendig - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 102 (C):84-86.
    What sort of realism is perspectival realism, really? Perspectival realism rejects many central commitments associated with traditional accounts of realism. It eschews the mind-independent claim that is often tethered to many realist accounts. For Massimi, mind-independence is not just resisted but inverted in her approach to perspectivist realism. Mindedness—or rather a fully human and culturally situated mindedness—is required for realism. A world that is real is real because it is part-made by our human points of view rather than one whose (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Natural kinds.Emma Tobin & Alexander Bird - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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