Order:
Disambiguations
John R. T. Grey [3]John Grey [2]
See also
John R. T. Grey
Michigan State University
  1. The Metaphysics of Natural Right in Spinoza.John R. T. Grey - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10.
    In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Spinoza argues that an individual’s natural right extends as far as their power. Subsequently, in the Tractatus Politicus (TP), he offers a revised argument for the same conclusion. Here I offer an account of the reasons for the revision. In both arguments, an individual’s natural right derives from God’s natural right. However, the TTP argument hinges on the claim that each individual is part of the whole of nature (totius naturae), and for this reason inherits (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?Catherine Kendig & John Grey - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):359-376.
    The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  75
    Reason and Knowledge in Spinoza.John R. T. Grey - 2015 - In Andre Santos Campos (ed.), Spinoza: Basic Concepts. Exeter: Imprint Academic. pp. 71-83.
    This chapter investigates Spinoza's conception of reason, focusing on (i) the difference between reason and the imagination, and (ii) the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. The central interpretive debate this chapter considers is about the scope of rational cognition. Some commentators have argued that it is only possible to have rational cognition of properties that are universally shared, whereas intuitive knowledge may grasp the essences of particular individuals. Another prominent interpretation is that reason differs from intuition only in virtue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Species and the Good in Anne Conway's Metaethics.John R. T. Grey - 2020 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. New York: Routledge. pp. 102-118.
    Anne Conway rejects the view that creatures are essentially members of any natural kind more specific than the kind 'creature'. That is, she rejects essentialism about species membership. This chapter provides an analysis of one of Anne Conway's arguments against such essentialism, which (as I argue) is drawn from metaethical rather than metaphysical premises. In her view, if a creature's species or kind were inscribed in its essence, that essence would constitute a limit on the creature's potential to participate in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark