The stable core, an inner model of the form $\langle L[S],\in, S\rangle $ for a simply definable predicate S, was introduced by the first author in [8], where he showed that V is a class forcing extension of its stable core. We study the structural properties of the stable core and its interactions with large cardinals. We show that the $\operatorname {GCH} $ can fail at all regular cardinals in the stable core, that the stable core can have a discrete (...) proper class of measurable cardinals, but that measurable cardinals need not be downward absolute to the stable core. Moreover, we show that, if large cardinals exist in V, then the stable core has inner models with a proper class of measurable limits of measurables, with a proper class of measurable limits of measurable limits of measurables, and so forth. We show this by providing a characterization of natural inner models $L[C_1, \dots, C_n]$ for specially nested class clubs $C_1, \dots, C_n$, like those arising in the stable core, generalizing recent results of Welch [29]. (shrink)

We investigate iterating the construction of $C^{*}$, the L-like inner model constructed using first order logic augmented with the “cofinality $\omega $ ” quantifier. We first show that $\left (C^{*}\right )^{C^{*}}=C^{*}\ne L$ is equiconsistent with $\mathrm {ZFC}$, as well as having finite strictly decreasing sequences of iterated $C^{*}$ s. We then show that in models of the form $L[U]$ we get infinite decreasing sequences of length $\omega $, and that an inner model with a measurable cardinal is required for that.

Juliette Kennedy’s new book brims with intriguing ideas. I don’t understand all of them, and I’m not convinced that the ones I do understand all fit together, b.

Often philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians employ a notion of intended structure when talking about a branch of mathematics. In addition, we know that there are foundational mathematical theories that can find representatives for the objects of informal mathematics. In this paper, we examine how faithfully foundational theories can represent intended structures, and show that this question is closely linked to the decidability of the theory of the intended structure. We argue that this sheds light on the trade-off between expressive power (...) and meta-theoretic properties when comparing first-order and second-order logic. (shrink)