Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific (...) reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated. (shrink)

Following an idea first proposed by Jerzy Wróblewski, this paperexamines the usefulness of formal logic for comparative legal analysis. Subject of the comparison are the doctrines of mistake and attempt in Germanand English criminal law. These doctrines are distinguished by the interaction of deontic, epistemic and alethic modalities. I propose a purely extensional logic which is based on Leśniewski’s substitutional interpretation ofquantification to analyse differences in the logical structure of the variouscriminal law doctrines.

With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy’s great ...

One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects–sets. On this view claims like ‘some logicians admire only each other’ involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates—substitutional and set-theoretic—only the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired expressive power (given that (...) the nominalist seems committed to the assumption that there can be at most countably many names). To counter this approach I develop a modal-substitutional semantics of plural quantification (on which plural variables, roughly speaking, range over ways names could be) and argue for its nominalistic acceptability. (shrink)