: This paper argues for the consistency of adverse possession in land with a strict Lockean-liberatarian understanding of property rights due to the impermanence of man-made improvements by which unowned property is originally appropriated. This approach to property rights reconciles left- and right-libertarian positions as end points on a continuum of “temporal attitudes” toward property retention. ….

Many libertarians ground their theory of justice in a non-aggression principle. The NAP is often the basis for the libertarian condemnation of state action – that it is necessarily aggressive and therefore unjust. This approach is often criticised insofar as it defines aggression, in part, as the violation of legitimate property rights, and is therefore parasitical upon a prior – and unjustified – theory of property. While it is true that libertarians who defend the NAP sometimes fail to give a (...) satisfactory account of its relationship to libertarian property rights, such an account is in fact available. A commitment to property rights and to non-aggression can both be grounded in a commitment to non-interference. Such a principle, then, brings together the NAP and the theory of property it is parasitical upon, thus saving the unity and austerity of the overall approach. (shrink)

This essay is intended to be a refutation of the main thesis in Against Intellectual Property, Kinsella 2008 (hereafter, K8). Points of agreement, relatively trivial disagreement, and irrelevant issues will largely be ignored, as will much repetition of errors in K8. Otherwise, the procedure is to go through K8 quoting various significantly erroneous parts as they arise and explaining the errors involved. It will not be necessary to respond at the same length as K8 itself.

The present paper investigates the question of whether right-libertarians must accept easements by necessity. Since easements by necessity limit the property rights of the owner of the servient tenement, they apparently conflict with the libertarian homestead principle, according to which the person who first mixes his labor with the unowned land acquires absolute ownership thereof. As we demonstrate in the paper, however, the homestead principle understood in such an absolutist way generates contradictions within the set of rights distributed on its (...) basis. In order to avoid such contradictions, easements by necessity must be incorporated into the libertarian theory of property rights and the homestead principle must be truncated accordingly. (shrink)

This paper defends the Blockian Proviso against its critics, Kinsella in particular, and interprets it as a law of non-contradiction in the theory of just property rights. I demonstrate that one may not lawfully appropriate in such a way as to forestall others from appropriating an unowned land because such appropriation would result in conflict-generating norms, and conflict-generating norms are not rationally justifiable and just norms. The Blockian Proviso, which precludes forestalling, operates therefore at the level of original appropriation and (...) determines, according to the homestead principle of justice in first acquisition, what may and what may not be lawfully appropriated. Hence, the Blockian Proviso is not an add-on to the homestead principle but part and parcel thereof. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el contexto de nuevos cercamientos sobre la naturaleza y la cultura, la cuestión de los derechos de propiedad intelectual ha adquirido una relevancia inusitada, y ha redefinido la cuestión misma de la propiedad. El artículo examina las teorías de J. Locke y D. Hume, para confrontarlas con las posiciones que, desde el liberalismo contemporáneo, defienden o critican la propiedad intelectual. A partir de allí, se busca una línea superadora que trascienda los supuestos liberales sobre la propiedad intelectual en (...) particular y la propiedad privada en general. ABSTRACT In the context of new enclosures of nature and culture, the issue of intellectual property rights has acquired unprecedented relevance and redefined the very question of property. The article examines the theories of J. Locke and D. Hume, in order to contrast them with those positions that either defend or criticize intellectual property from the perceptive of contemporary liberalism. This serves as the basis for a position that transcends liberal assumptions regarding intellectual property, in particular, and private property, in general. (shrink)

The purpose of the following study is that of providing a critical anal‑ ysis of Intellectual Property (IP), with a closer look on copyright, in the context of human rights. My main conjecture is the following : the legal infrastructure stemming from the implications of copyrights which states created has nega‑ tive consequences if we have a closer look at some human rights specified by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). For example, copyrights are, in my view, incompatible with (...) the human rights which specify that (1) hu‑ man beings have a right to freely take part in the cultural and scientific life of the communities which they inhabit and (2) human beings have a right to own property. My main hypothesis is the following : if copyrights are, in fact, more difficult to ground from a moral perspective, then this considerations must trump the provision of the 27th article of the UDHR, which states that creators, be they artists or researchers, have a human right to have their moral and mate‑ rial interests protected with regard to their intellectual products, if this amounts to a justification for a copyright. (shrink)

This paper aims to address two seemingly independent issues in the field of moral and political philosophy, namely the problem of global justice with elements regarding research ethics. The first section of the paper will be concerned with a short overview of the problem at hand, highlighting the particular way in which research is carried out in the 21st century. While admitting that the matrix of moral issues linked to the current topic is more diverse, I will limit the scope (...) of my analysis to only two elements. First of all, in the second section of my paper I will try to identify an answer to the following question: are researchers from non-native English speaking countries who seek to publish in academic journals from abroad in a position of inequality in relation to their peers from Australia, Great Britain or USA? I will explore the moral relevance of this question at a global level by presenting Philippe Van Parijs’ conception of linguistic justice. My argument will rest upon the fact that the emergence of English as a lingua franca in research publishing has had more positive than negative externalities in relation to researchers from developing countries. The third and final part of my paper will be a critique of the current Intellectual Property system which, in my opinion, hinders the access of researchers from developing countries to new research available in journals indexed in international databases like Wiley-Blackwell, SAGE or JSTOR. (shrink)

In the present paper we argue that besides four traditional methods of property acquisition – that is, homesteading, production, voluntary transfer and rectification of injustice – libertarianism also recognizes a fifth method, namely the method of accession. We contend that not only have some libertarian scholars implicitly embraced the accession principle, but also that if libertarianism wants to distribute exclusive ownership to indivisible things produced from inputs supplied by two or more parties without running into conflict with its own principles (...) of justice, it has to recognize accession as the fifth mode of appropriation. As the main thesis of the paper goes against the received view concerning the very core of libertarianism, that is, its methods of property acquisition, the text indicates some new developments within the libertarian theory of justice. (shrink)

Propertarian justifications of intellectual property postulate the appropriation of various entities, often called patterns, designs, or technologies. These must be immaterial and should not be confused with material structures that embody them. Hence two classes of objects are distinguished. It is convenient to refer to them as types and tokens. The type must involve a condition defining which material structures should be considered its tokens. For an IP regime to be economically meaningful one must necessarily appropriate types in a way (...) which restricts access to wide classes of similar, non-identical material structures. Therefore, type conditions must be general. They must define, with a margin of tolerance, only certain aspects of the structure, leaving others unspecified. Consequently, the relationship between such types and tokens is of many-to-many variety. The recognition of these facts leads to four problems in justifying intellectual property on propertarian grounds. The first problem is to demonstrate possession of the type in the pre-legal situation. The second one is to explain, why boundaries of an appropriated type should be placed in a particular location. The third problem is to avoid claim deadlocks resulting from conflicts of rights generated by separate overlapping types. The fourth problem is to justify why ownership of the type should entail the control over other separate entities—that is tokens. In the propertarian framework grounded in the pre-legal state of nature, satisfactory solutions do not seem to have been proposed for any of these four problems. (shrink)

Part one of this paper considers the question of property rights in general and asks how such rights can be justified, contrasting Consequentialist with other approaches and concludes that it is impossible to avoid a broadly Consequentialist approach. Part two considers the question of intellectual property (IP) and asks how property rights justifications apply to it. The basic economics if IP is indispensable in this discussion. Finally, part three, considers IP in the light of modern technological developments. I conclude that (...) the real dangers lie more in the specific ways government and special interests respond to this technology than from the nature of IP rights themselves. (shrink)

En el contexto de nuevos cercamientos sobre la naturaleza y la cultura, la cuestión de los derechos de propiedad intelectual ha adquirido una relevancia inusitada, y ha redefinido la cuestión misma de la propiedad. El artículo examina las teorías de J. Locke y D. Hume, para confrontarlas con las posiciones que, desde el liberalismo contemporáneo, defienden o criti-can la propiedad intelectual. A partir de allí, se busca una línea superadora que trascienda los supuestos liberales sobre la propiedad intelectual en particular (...) y la propiedad privada en ge-neral. (shrink)

In this article, the author diagnoses the cause of Rand's problematic position on intellectual property. He argues that Rand treats credit as a very thick concept. Rand sees crediting a person with inventing something as granting that person a right to the money embodied in the invention, its sale, and the profits related to licensing reproduction. The author shows that this thick notion of credit leads Rand to make several questionable claims in her arguments for intellectual property rights.