In 1871, the German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller moved from his Basel chair to the much better paid chair in Tartu, and taught there until his untimely death. Besides philosophy, he had studied various disciplines, including the natural sciences. In the preparation of his own philosophy, he explored the history of philosophy for more than twenty years and made pioneering contributions to the history of concepts. Only by the early-1880s did he begin to elaborate his "new philosophy", an original version of (...) personalism, both anti-idealist and anti-materialist. He did this in three major works which built upon each other. Unwritten remained the keystone of his philosophy, the Philosophie des Christentums, in which Teichmüller wanted to show that the philosophical contents of Christianity were encapsulated by his own personalism. One major objective of his philosophy, as I see it, was regaining reality---in particular the reality of the person---after it had been lost in the wake of the failure of modern representationalism. Notwithstanding its coherentist elements, I see Teichmüller's philosophy as a precursor of direct realism. Although he fell into oblivion soon after, his thoughts were received throughout Europe, notably by Friedrich Nietzsche, Aleksey Kozlov and Nicholas Lossky. His extensive literary remains, which are kept in Basel, remain to be explored. (shrink)

Soviet philosophy has no great reputation in the Western philosophical world. Physicists, mathematicians, geographers and geomorphologists, medical scientists and men working in certain branches of history and linguistics have found it profitable to follow the researches of their Soviet counterparts; philosophers have not. Academician Mitin, it is true, told the Soviet Academy of Sciences early in 1943 that ’philosophy has been raised to an unparalleled level in the Soviet Union, making the U.S.S.R. a country of high philosophical culture . Many (...) problems which are being argued by outstanding philosophers abroad have been solved here on the basis of dialectical materialism.” 1 To most non-Communists, Mitin's claim. (shrink)

Finding a way to come to terms with the disvalues in the evolutionary world is a particular challenge in the light of Neo‐Darwinian theories. In this article I trace the shift in Christopher Southgate's work from a focus on theodicy to a theologian of glory. I am critical of his rejection of the tradition of the Fall, his incorporation of disvalues into the work of divine Glory, and the specific theological weight given to scientific content. I offer a critique of (...) Holmes Rolston III's approach to the valuation of nature that I believe has influenced Southgate's theology. Constructively, I offer an alternative that seeks to recover an understanding of the origin of evil and the Adamic event that draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur. I also draw on the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold for an alternative philosophical approach to evolution which opens up a space for a recovery of the concepts of creaturely Sophia and shadow Sophia in the work of Sergius Bulgakov. (shrink)

Sciabarra responds to critics of the second edition of his book, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical: Wendy McElroy, who reviewed the book for The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (July 2015), and Shoshana Milgram and Gregory Salmieri, whose most recent criticisms appear in A Companion to Ayn Rand (2016). Sciabarra defends both his historical and methodological theses, situating the book within a trilogy of works that define and defend “dialectical libertarianism,” which eschews utopian thinking and embraces a fully radical mode (...) of inquiry. Sciabarra argues that dialectics—the art of context-keeping—figures prominently throughout Rand's literary and philosophical corpus. (shrink)

Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the rightly acknowledged (...) differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank’s and Binswanger’s challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith’s proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith’s approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger’s and Husserl’s views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith’s approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. (shrink)

This study examines the notion of antinomy, or unavoidable contradiction, in the work of Pavel Florensky. Many Russian philosophers of the Silver Age shared a common conviction which is yet to receive sufficient attention in critical literature, either in Russia or abroad. This is namely a philosophical and theological dependence on unavoidable contradiction, paradox, or antinomy. The history of antinomy and its Russian reception is introduced here before a new framework for understanding Russian antinomism is defended. This is namely the (...) anticipation of ‘vertical’ antinomies in ‘horizontal’ antinomies. Here, by ‘horizontal’ we suppose an unavoidable contradiction of reason or philosophical reflection, and by ‘vertical’ an unavoidable contradiction of revelation, faith, or a self-contradictory dogma. The study aims to demonstrate that Florensky fails to provide a satisfactory anticipation of vertical antinomies. (shrink)

The two names most closely associated with phenomenology in early twentieth century Russia are Gustav Špet and Aleksej Losev. However, is that judgment warranted with regard to Losev? In just what way can we look on him as a phenomenologist? Losev himself, in the mid-1920s, employed the expression “dialectical phenomenology,” seeing phenomenology as an initial descriptive method to ascertain essences. He was sharply critical of its self-limitation in disavowing all explanation as metaphysical. Yet, earlier that decade Losev approved of Husserl’s (...) opposition to reductionism and of his focus on essences and senses. In this way, the record is unclear: In the short span of a decade he moved from a position of qualified sympathy with phenomenology to an overtly unqualified insouciance. Looking at Losev’s criticisms, however, from the late 20s and early 30s, we find a logical anticipation of Husserl’s own move from a static to a genetic phenomenology. (shrink)