Governments can try to counter obesity through preventive regulations such as sugar taxes, which appear to raise costs or reduce options for consumers. Would the regulations improve the welfare of adult consumers? The regulations might improve choice sets through a mechanism such as reformulation, but the scope for such improvement is limited. Otherwise, a paternalistic argument must be made that preventive regulations would improve welfare despite reducing choice. This paper connects arguments about obesity, health, and choice to a philosophically plausible (...) view of welfare. On the negative side, two errors to avoid are failing to see the limited value of health and thinking that findings of irrationality would alone settle arguments about welfare. On the positive side, preventive regulations could make people better-off if welfare is the satisfaction of preferences and if preventive regulations could better satisfy preferences by overcoming certain forms of irrationality. The leading evidence is from widespread attempts to lose weight. However, at least for the United States, most adults are not trying to lose weight, and that casts doubt on whether they would benefit from preventive regulations. If they would not, that seems a strong albeit not decisive reason against these regulations. (shrink)

Obesity is often considered a public health crisis in rich countries that might be alleviated by preventive regulations such as a sugar tax or limiting the density of fast food outlets. This paper evaluates these regulations from the point of view of equity. Obesity is in many countries correlated with socioeconomic status and some believe that preventive regulations would reduce inequity. The puzzle is this: how could policies that reduce the options of the badly off be more equitable? Suppose we (...) distinguish: (1) the badly off have poor options from (2) the badly off are poor at choosing between their options (ie, have a choosing problem). If obesity is due to a poverty of options, it would be perverse to reduce them further. Some people in public health say that preventive regulations do not reduce options but, I shall argue, they are largely wrong. So the equity case for regulations depends on the worst off having a choosing problem. It also depends on their having a choosing problem that makes their choices against their interests. Perhaps they do. I ask, briefly, what the evidence has to say about whether the badly off choose against their interests. The evidence is thin but implies that introducing preventive regulations for the sake of equity would be at least premature. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate whether states should regulate energy-drink marketing practices targeting gamers. Energy drinks are high-sugar, high-caffeine, non-alcoholic beverages that allegedly improve energy, stamina, cognitive performance, and concentration. First, I define what “gamer” means and identify the market agents that play a crucial role in the gaming community, including the energy-drink industry. In doing so, I analyze energy-drink marketing practices and explore calls for regulating them. Second, I draw parallels between regulation of energy-drink marketing and marketing of products (...) such as video games and comics with explicit violent and sexual content, tobacco, alcohol, and food high in fat, sugar, and salt. Third, I examine arguments to justify regulation of energy-drink marketing practices that target gamers. Lastly, I formulate an autonomy-based argument for regulating such marketing practices. (shrink)

In 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed capping the size of sugary beverages that could be sold in the city’s restaurants, sporting and entertainment facilities and food carts. After a lawsuit and multiple appeals, the proposal died in June 2014, deemed an unconstitutional overreach. In dissecting the saga of the proposed soda cap, we highlight both the political perils of certain anti-obesity efforts and, more broadly, the challenges to public health when issues of consumer choice and the threat (...) of paternalism are involved. (shrink)