Zusammenfassung Personen, die nicht bereits sind, als postmortale Organspender zur Verfügung zu stehen, sollten nachrangig versorgt werden, falls sie selbst einmal ein Organ benötigen, so wird in diesem Aufsatz argumentiert. Postmortale Organspenden sollten demnach grundsätzlich gerichtete Spenden zugunsten von anderen Spendewilligen sein. Diesem Ansatz zufolge sollten Organe nicht als öffentliche Ressource betrachtet werden und der Staat sollte respektieren, dass die Entscheidung darüber, was nach dem Tod mit dem Körper geschehen soll, bei der betreffenden Person selbst liegt. Während einige Formen der (...) gerichteten Spende moralisch problematisch sein können, ist ein allgemeines System von gerichteten Spende an andere Spendewillige diesem Vorschlag zu folge moralisch erlaubt, weil es die Grundsätze der Autonomie- Achtung, der Reziprozität sowie der Solidarität wahrt und niemanden unangemessenen Schwierigkeiten aussetzt, der im Notfall keine schlechteren Aussichten auf ein Spenderorgan haben möchte. (shrink)

It has often been proposed to restrict access to postmortal organs to registered donors, or at least to give them priority on the waiting list. Such proposals are motivated by considerations of fairness: everyone benefits from the existence of a pool of available organs and of an organised system of distributing them and it is unfair that people who are prepared to contribute to this public good are duped by people who are not. This paper spells out this rationale and (...) goes on to discuss the main principled objections that have been brought forward to such proposals. The most fundamental objection is that healthcare resources should be allocated in accordance with need, not with merit. The reply to this objection is that the principle of allocation according to need only holds in cases in which the provision of such resources and the fair distribution of the burdens of contribution are independently secured, as they are in an obligatory insurance system. (shrink)

Should priority in the allocation of organs be given to those who have previously donated or declared their willingness to do so? This article examines the Israeli priority rule in light of two prominent critiques of priority rules, pertaining to failure to reciprocate and unfairness. The scope and content of these critiques are interpreted from the perspective of equality of opportunity. Because the Israeli priority rule may be reasonably criticized for unfairness and failing to reward certain behaviors, the article develops (...) an adjusted priority rule, which removes and adjust the elements in the Israeli priority rule deemed problematic. However, such a priority rule is complex to the extent that it may fail to increase donation rates and furthermore introduce new concerns of fairness, as the better off may be better able to navigate the complex adjusted priority rule. (shrink)