In recent years, the research participant’s family’s need, if not right, to know their disease risk has comprised a great deal of the genetic testing discourse. This most often arises in the context of clinical genetic tests for hereditary cancers, especially colorectal and breast cancer, and other genetic disorders where the presence of a genetic mutation greatly increases the likelihood of the disease’s manifestation. However, this discussion has not led to comprehensive or cohesive guidance for health care professionals or patients. (...) Indeed, various governmental and professional bodies run the gamut of possibilities, from no disclosure to family without the consent of the patient, to recognition that genetic risk information is important enough to the family to allow exception to traditional notions of confidentiality. (shrink)

This article outlines procedures for the feedback of individual research data to participants. This feedback framework was developed in the context of a personalized medicine research project in Canada. Researchers in this domain have an ethical obligation to return individual research results and/or material incidental findings that are clinically significant, valid and actionable to participants. Communication of individual research data must proceed in an ethical and efficient manner. Feedback involves three procedural steps: assessing the health relevance of a finding, re-identifying (...) the affected participant, and communicating the finding. Re-identification requires researchers to break the code in place to protect participant identities. Coding systems replace personal identifiers with a numerical code. Double coding systems provide added privacy protection by separating research data from personal identifying data with a third "linkage" database. A trusted and independent intermediary, the "keyholder", controls access to this linkage database. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEthische Aspekte von Biobanken-basierter Forschung werden zunehmend kontrovers diskutiert. In diesem Artikel wird die Debatte um ethisch angemessene Formen der Einwilligung in Biobanken-basierte Forschung nachgezeichnet. Nach einer Einführung in etablierte Einwilligungsmodelle skizziert der Beitrag kurz die Entwicklung alternativer Ansätze und diskutiert die damit verbundenen ethischen und regulatorischen Herausforderungen. Dabei wird dargestellt, welche ethischen Prinzipien in diesen Diskussionen eine Rolle spielen. Der Beitrag schließt mit einem Ausblick für Deutschland.

Background It has been suggested that researchers are obliged to offer summary findings to research participants to demonstrate respect for persons, and that this may increase public trust in, and awareness of, the research enterprise. Yet little research explores researchers' attitudes and practices regarding the range of initiatives that might serve these ends. Methods Results of an international survey of 785 eligible authors of genetics research studies in autism or cystic fibrosis are reported. Results Of 343 researchers who completed the (...) survey (44% response rate), the majority agreed that their team should (i) inform participants of summary findings (90.7%) and (ii) ensure they gain an awareness of developments in the field (86.9%). Additionally, the majority reported that in practice, their team (i) informs participants of summary findings (69.4%) and (ii) provides other types of relevant non-results information (eg, state of science in the field, opportunities for research participation) (67.9%). Conclusion Researchers endorsed the obligation of communicating with research participants by providing summary findings and other research-related information in equal measure. In light of these findings, it is suggested that while the provision of summary results may contribute to efforts to discharge the obligation of respect for persons, it may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient means to this end. (shrink)

BackgroundWhether and how to disclose genomic findings obtained in the course of genomic clinical practice and medical research has been a controversial global bioethical issue over the past two decades. Although several recommendations and judgment tools for the disclosure of genomic findings have been proposed, none are sufficiently systematic or inclusive or even consistent with each other. In order to approach the disclosure/non-disclosure practice in an ethical manner, optimal and easy-to-use tools for supporting the judgment of physicians/researchers in genomic medicine (...) are necessary.MethodsThe bioethics literature on this topic was analyzed to parse and deconstruct the somewhat overlapping and therefore ill-defined key concepts of genomic findings, such as incidental, primary, secondary, and other findings. Based on the deconstruction and conceptual analyses of these findings, we then defined key parameters from which to identify the strength of duty to disclose (SDD) for a genomic finding. These analyses were then applied to develop a framework with the SDD matrix and systematic decision-making pathways for the disclosure of genomic findings.ResultsThe following six major parameters (axes), along with sub-axes, were identified: Axis 1 (settings and institutions where findings emerge); Axis 2 (presence or absence of intention and anticipatability in discovery); Axis 3 (maximal actionability at the time of discovery); Axis 4 (net medical importance); Axis 5 (expertise of treating physician/researcher); and Axis 6 (preferences of individual patients/research subjects for disclosure). For Axes 1 to 4, a colored SDD matrix for genomic findings was developed in which levels of obligation for disclosing a finding can be categorized. For Axes 5 and 6, systematic decision-making pathways were developed via the SDD matrix.ConclusionWe analyzed the SDD of genomic findings and developed subsequent systematic decision-making pathways of whether and how to disclose genomic findings to patients/research subjects and their relatives in an ethical manner. Our comprehensive framework may help physicians and researchers in genomic medicine make consistent ethical judgments regarding the disclosure of genomic findings. (shrink)

Over the past decade, there has been an extensive debate about whether researchers have an obligation to disclose genetic research findings, including primary and secondary findings. There appears to be an emerging (but disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose some genetic findings to some research participants. The contours of this obligation, however, remain unclear. -/- As this paper will explore, much of this confusion is definitional or conceptual in nature. The extent of a researcher’s obligation to return (...) secondary and other research findings is often limited by reference to terms and concepts like “incidental,” “analytic validity,” “clinical validity,” “clinical relevance,” “clinical utility,” “clinical significance,” “actionability,” and “desirability.” These terms are used in different ways by different writers to describe obligations in different sorts of cases. -/- Underneath this definitional confusion is a general notion, supported by much of the literature, that findings only need to be disclosed when they surpass certain presumably objective or measureable thresholds, such as medical importance or scientific reproducibility. The problem is that there is significant variability in the way that these terms and concepts are used in the literature and, as such, in defining the scope of an obligation to return findings that surpasses the relevant thresholds. -/- The goal of this paper is to analyze the definitional muddle underlying the debate about returning genetic research findings, with the hope of answering a few questions. First, what is the range of definitions being used in this debate? Based on an extensive literature review, Part 1 will lay out a range of articulated definitions for each relevant term, with the goal of categorizing them into a handful of distinct types. Part 2 explains the definitional redundancy and confusion in the current literature, and, drawing from the terminological patterns identified in Part 1, outlines more cohesive building blocks to inform the development of future disclosure frameworks.Our minimum goal in articulating these conceptual building blocks is to promote clearer articulations of, and distinctions between, future disclosure frameworks. More ambitiously, we suggest which definitions and conceptualizations we consider most appropriate to use in future disclosure frameworks. Here, we seek to balance benefits to participants through the disclosure of important information with the minimization of undue burdens on individual researchers and the research enterprise more generally. -/- Our analysis builds upon the central philosophical distinction between concepts and conceptions. The basic idea is that the “concept” of X refers to the general (and relatively uncontroversial) structure/shape of X, while various “conceptions” of X are more particular, filled out, and controversial elaborations of the concept. In other words, “concepts” of X will be formal representations of X, while “conceptions” of X will be substantive interpretations of the key elements and relationships operating within that formal framework. (Implicit in this distinction is an important point about the nature of disagreement – namely, that in order for two or more parties to “disagree” about X as opposed to simply talk past one another, there must be at least enough shared agreement about X to know that the parties are referring to the same thing. A concept of X provides this point of common agreement, while competing conceptions of X mark the areas where disagreement arises.) In this paper, we will employ this distinction in a fundamental way to clarify exactly where the primary disagreements arise in the debate over disclosing genetic research findings. -/- We propose that, underlying all the seeming confusion and disagreement, there are three central and widely agreed upon concepts at work in this debate—validity, value, and volition. The first two concepts concern the nature of the information itself. An obligation to disclose only exists when findings are valid and have value but there are competing conceptions of how to determine or define validity and valuableness. The third concept—volition—pertains not to the information but rather to the person to whom it will be disclosed. Does that person want or not want the information, and what is the best way of determining this? Here, too, competing conceptions arise. Our key point, though, is that almost all of the ethical disagreement arises because of competing conceptions of these three concepts. Understanding and appreciating this key point can help to refocus the substantive debate by providing some common ground to start from in determining how best to interpret these shared concepts. This refocusing can, ideally, produce more productive debate and facilitate some progress in resolving it. (shrink)