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  1. Frames of reference in the spatial representation system.David J. Bryant - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):241-242.
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  • Generative versus nongenerative thought.Michael C. Corballis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):242-243.
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  • Evolution and physiology of “what” versus “where”.David Ingle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):247-248.
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  • Spatial development.David R. Olson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):249-249.
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  • Kinaesthetic illusions as tools in understanding motor imagery.J. P. Roll, J. C. Gilhodes & R. Roll - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):220-221.
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  • Consciousness beyond the comparator.Victor A. Shames & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-697.
    Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.
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  • Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”.Neal R. Swerdlow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):699-700.
    Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
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  • Decomposing intentionality: Perspectives on intentionality drawn from language research with two species of chimpanzees. [REVIEW]William Bechtel - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):1-32.
    In philosophy the term intentionality refers to the feature possessed by mental states of beingabout things others than themselves. A serious question has been how to explain the intentionality of mental states. This paper starts with linguistic representations, and explores how an organism might use linguistic symbols to represent other things. Two research projects of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, one explicity teaching twopan troglodytes to use lexigrams intentionally, and the other exploring the ability of several members ofpan paniscus to learn lexigram use (...)
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  • Biological and Social Constraints on Cognitive Processes: The Need for Dynamical Interactions Between Levels of Inquiry.William Bechtel - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 20 (sup1):133-164.
    For most philosophers of psychology and cognitive science, inquiry into human cognitive activity begins at the level of intrapersonal processes. A central question is whether these processes are sufficiently autonomous from more basic neurophysiological processes to be investigated in their own terms, or whether all explanations must be in neurophysiological terms. Some philosophers have insisted on the relative autonomy of the cognitive level. One currently quite popular view, eliminative materialism, however, holds that the explanations that have been advanced at the (...)
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  • Representations of movement and representations in movement.Giuseppe Pellizzer & Apostolos P. Georgopoulos - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):216-217.
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  • Motor simulation.Adam Morton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):215-215.
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  • The functional architecture of visual attention may still be modular.Carlo Umiltà - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):82-83.
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  • The control of consciousness via a neuropsychological feedback loop.Todd D. Nelson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):690-691.
    Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.
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  • Consciousness is for other people.Chris Frith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):682-683.
    Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.
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  • Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience.David R. Hemsley - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):683-684.
    It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.
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  • Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds.S. L. Hurley - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):684-685.
    Perspective and reflection have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.
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  • Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?Howard Eichenbaum & Neal J. Cohen - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):680-681.
    Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.
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  • Reticular-thalamic activation of the cortex generates conscious contents.James Newman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):691-692.
    Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.
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  • The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture.Jeffrey A. Gray - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):659-76.
    Drawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis (...)
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  • Identifying objects in conventional and contorted poses: contributions of hemisphere-specific mechanisms.Bruno Laeng, Jinesh Shah & Stephen Kosslyn - 1999 - Cognition 70 (1):53-85.
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  • Talking to yourself about what is where: What is the vocabulary of preattentive vision?Jeremy M. Wolfe - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):254-255.
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  • Moving beyond imagination.Robert Dufour, Martin H. Fischer & David A. Rosenbaum - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):206-207.
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  • Call it what it is: Motor memory.Joaquin M. Fuster - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):208-208.
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  • Peripheral and central correlates of attempted voluntary movements.S. C. Gandevia - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):208-209.
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  • Involvement of primary motor cortex in motor imagery and mental practice.Mark Hallett, Jordan Fieldman, Leonardo G. Cohen, Norihiro Sadato & Alvaro Pascual-Leone - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):210-210.
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  • The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery.Marc Jeannerod - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):187-202.
    This paper concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using a specific type of representational activity, motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imaging and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a (...)
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  • No threat to modularity.Yosef Grodzinsky & Uri Hadar - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):70-71.
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  • Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):694-695.
    In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.
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  • Information synthesis in cortical areas as an important link in brain mechanisms of mind.Alexei M. Ivanitsky - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):686-687.
    To explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP component amplitude and signal detection indices were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness and its (dis)contents.Jeffrey A. Gray - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):703-722.
    The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the (...)
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  • Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science.William Bechtel - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (1):1-25.
    The notion of levels has been widely used in discussions of cognitive science, especially in discussions of the relation of connectionism to symbolic modeling of cognition. I argue that many of the notions of levels employed are problematic for this purpose, and develop an alternative notion grounded in the framework of mechanistic explanation. By considering the source of the analogies underlying both symbolic modeling and connectionist modeling, I argue that neither is likely to provide an adequate analysis of processes at (...)
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  • Distinguishing the linguistic from the sublinguistic and the objective from the configurational.Scott D. Mainwaring - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):248-249.
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  • To dream is not to (intend to) do.Jean Requin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):218-219.
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  • Do object affordances represent the functionality of an object?Ruzena Bajcsy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):202-202.
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  • Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?José-Luis Díaz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):679-680.
    Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.
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  • Is spatial information imprecise or just coarsely coded?P. Bryan Heidorn & Stephen C. Hirtle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):246-247.
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  • There is more to location than prepositions.David C. Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):239-239.
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  • Motor images are action plans.Wolfgang Prinz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):218-218.
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  • On the limitations of imaging imagining.Christopher A. Buneo & Martha Flanders - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):202-203.
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  • Modularity need not imply locality: Damaged modules can have nonlocal effects.Edgar Zurif & David Swinney - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):89-90.
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  • The localization/distribution distinction in neuropsychology is related to the isomorphism/multiple meaning distinction in cell electrophysiology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):87-88.
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  • Local and distributed processes in attentional orienting.Michael I. Posner - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):78-79.
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  • Septohippocampal comparator: Consciousness generator or attention feedback loop?Marcel Kinsbourne - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):687-688.
    As Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.
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  • Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings.George N. Reeke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):693-694.
    Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.
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  • Motor memory – a memory of the future.David H. Ingvar - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):210-211.
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  • Cognitive and motor implications of mental imagery.Romeo Chua & Daniel J. Weeks - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):203-204.
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  • Mind – your head!R. P. Ingvaldsen & H. T. A. Whiting - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):685-686.
    Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own (...)
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  • “Shallow Draughts Intoxicate the Brain”: Lessons from Cognitive Science for Cognitive Neuropsychology.Karalyn Patterson & David C. Plaut - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):39-58.
    This article presents a sobering view of the discipline of cognitive neuropsychology as practiced over the last three or four decades. Our judgment is that, although the study of abnormal cognition resulting from brain injury or disease in previously normal adults has produced a catalogue of fascinating and highly selective deficits, it has yielded relatively little advance in understanding how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business. We question the wisdom of the following three “choices” in mainstream cognitive neuropsychology: (a) single‐case (...)
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  • Neuropsychological inference with an interactive brain: A critique of the “locality” assumption.Martha J. Farah - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):43-61.
    When cognitive neuropsychologists make inferences about the functional architecture of the normal mind from selective cognitive impairments they generally assume that the effects of brain damage are local, that is, that the nondamaged components of the architecture continue to function as they did before the damage. This assumption follows from the view that the components of the functional architecture are modular, in the sense of being informationally encapsulated. In this target article it is argued that this “locality” assumption is probably (...)
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  • No perception without representation.Donald D. Hoffman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):247-247.
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