Philosophical work on science and values has come to engage with the concerns of society and of stakeholders affected by science and policy, leading to socially relevant philosophy of science and socially engaged philosophy of science. This special issue showcases instances of socially relevant philosophy of science, featuring contributions on a diversity of topics by Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott, and Ingo Brigandt.

This paper concerns a project to right a wrong, an epistemic as well as social wrong. The wrong? Science was to serve all humankind; that is what Francis Bacon and the other founders of modern science had promised and what a long line of their successors had signed on to. But by the twentieth century it had become clear that this science was regularly serving some of humankind far more than others and was even, quite frequently, actually harming those others (...) rather than helping them. The problem lay with the knowledge that science offered about those others: the damaging ‘information’ that was really ignorance in disguise. But the problem also lay with the systematic ignorance science allowed, even encouraged, about those others: the helpful, uplifting knowledge about them that the science could have offered but did not. And the project to right the wrong? A transformation of the science-provided pattern of knowledge and ignorance engineered to achieve a more egalitarian result (what I call an epistemological-agnotological reengineering project). Of course, there are many groups of others relevant here. I will focus my attention in the present paper on only two of them: women, and men of colour (especially Black men).. (shrink)

Science is based onfacts—facts that are systematically gathered by a community of enquirers through detailed observation and experiment. In the twentieth century, however, philosophers of science claimed that the facts that scientists “gather” in this way are shaped by the theories scientists accept, and this seemed to threaten the authority of science. Call this theold worries about science.By contrast, what seemed not to threaten that authority were other factors that shaped the facts that scientists gather—for example, the mere questions scientists (...) pursue. Call this theold nonworries about science.What I suggest is that the old nonworries are turning out to be far more worrisome than the old worries, and I use recent goings-on such as the “Death of Evidence” protests in Canada, the “replication crisis,” and the ongoing feminist critiques of science to illustrate my case. All this raises interesting new questions for philosophers of science to tackle. (shrink)