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  1. Routes to relevance: Philosophies of relevant logics.Shawn Standefer - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (2):e12965.
    Relevant logics are a family of non-classical logics characterized by the behavior of their implication connectives. Unlike some other non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic, there are multiple philosophical views motivating relevant logics. Further, different views seem to motivate different logics. In this article, we survey five major views motivating the adoption of relevant logics: Use Criterion, sufficiency, meaning containment, theory construction, and truthmaking. We highlight the philosophical differences as well as the different logics they support. We end with some (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591.
    This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of (...)
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  • Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction.Colin R. Caret & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4789-4800.
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  • Proof-theoretic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4879-4903.
    Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall (...)
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