This research revisits the conceptual foundations and definitions of ‘game’, distinguishing it from ‘sport’ and ‘play’ through an etymological and philosophical lens. Given the vast range of ‘game’ in everyday use and the enormous diversity of the activities called games, Wittgenstein argued that games cannot be defined at all but have only ‘Family Resemblances’. Philosophers such as Bernard Suits have rejected Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no commonality among all games. But in recent years, some researchers have questioned Suits’ failure (...) to refute Wittgenstein’s claim that games are definable on the basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialist stance. Our analysis incorporates the interplay of etymology, historical context and philosophical discourse, clarifies the incompleteness of Suits’s definition, and addresses Meier’s physical-skill-fixed logical difficulties regarding conceptual models of ‘game’. By proposing a nuanced Venn diagram illustrating the intersections and divergences among play, game, and sport, we offer a redefinition that integrates the intrinsic motivations and societal influences underlying these activities. This redefinition emphasizes the voluntary goal-oriented, rule-constrained and non-utility nature of games while acknowledging the complex relationships between play, games, and sports within a broader socio-historical framework. (shrink)

Scott Kretchmar recently put forth a new definition of what it is to play a game. Unfortunately, it must be rejected. In this paper, I show that this new definition is far too broad by discussing an activity that is not an instance of playing a game but is wrongfully ruled as one on this new definition.

One of the most pressing points in the philosophy of sport is the question of a definition of sport. Approaches towards sport vary based on a paradigm and position of a particular author. This article attempts to analyse and critically evaluates a recent definition of sport presented by Jim Parry in the context of argument that e-sports are not sports. Despite some innovations, his conclusions are in many ways traditional and build on the previous positions. His research, rooted in the (...) conceptual analysis, starts with a stipulation that sport is paradigmatically Olympic sport. He defines it then as an ‘institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill’ i.e., identifies six necessary elements of sport: human (not animals), physical (not chess), skill (not jogging), contest (not mountaineering), rule-governed (not ‘field sports’), institutionalized (not hula-hooping). Our claim is that this definition, despite its methodological clarity, is not accurate and does not sufficiently represent sport outside the Olympic context. First, to say for something to be a sport it is necessary to be a contest leads to a narrow concept of sport. Secondly, Parry’s account lacks the emphasis on game and play-like structures that are inherently present in sport (even in the Olympic sport), namely non-necessity, non-ordinariness, arbitrariness and gratuitousness. We try to direct the attention precisely on these structures and offer an alternative account of sport understood as a modern ‘hard core’ sport that nevertheless reaches important congruences with Parry’s definition. The originality of this contribution lies in presenting the essential qualities of modern ‘hard core’ sports, which, although sometimes hidden in the modern emphasis on high level performances, competition, and results, play an important role in the question how sport ought to be played and approached. (shrink)