This paper provides one of the many ways of doing historiography, specifically concerning Indian philosophy. After making some general observations on the limitations of a historian and a historiographer in general—it would provide a brief analysis of the historiography of Indian philosophy by looking at the recent attempts at periodization. The development of 'Indian philosophy' as a label to a concept, issues concerning the use of darśana for its representation, and reeking it as a space of strange intellectual landscape by (...) contemporary scholars are discussed subsequently. While using historiography implicitly as a methodological tool, an attempt is made to probe into the contemporary conception of Indian philosophy. Though it doesn’t claim to provide any determinate conclusions regarding either periodization or conceptualization of Indian philosophy, the paper emphasizes the need to probe these concerns further and the need to use a historiographical approach to such a study. (shrink)

The paper starts with some textual distinctions concerning the concept of God in the metaphysical framework of two classical schools of Hindu philosophy, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Then the author focuses on the functional and pedagogical aspects of prayer as well as practical justification of “religious meditation” in both philosophical schools. A special attention is put on the practice called īśvarapraṇidhāna, recommended in Yoga school, which is interpreted by the author as a form of non-theistic devotion. The meaning of the central (...) object of this concentration, that is puruṣa-viśeṣa, is reconsidered in detail. The subject matter is discussed in the wider context of yogic self-discipline that enables a practitioner to overcome ignorance ( avidyā) and the narrowness of egotic perspective (asmitā), recognized in the Hindu darśanas as the root-cause of all suffering or never-fulfilled-satisfaction ( duḥkha). The non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism assumed by the adherents of Sāṃkhya-Yoga redefines the concept of “God” ( īśvara) as primarily an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for spiritual pedagogy. (shrink)

An oft-quoted Hadith purports that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to seek knowledge, even if it is to be found as far away as China.1 However, the plethora of knowledge that was discovered there generally has yet to be unraveled by Western academics. If the intellectual tradition of Chinese Muslims may appear to be of minor consequence to the larger field of Islamic studies, this is in part because of our failure to assess their influence. The abundant resources for (...) understanding the Islamic sciences in China have barely been grazed and are awaiting our thorough analytical peregrination. This essay attempts to evaluate (1) the most recent work that explores this intellectual tradition, The Sage Learning of Liu .. (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure the question of how Wilhelm Halbfass, Daya Krishna, and Jitendranath Mohanty have conceptualized tradition in relation to “Indian” philosophy. They have all reacted to, and criticized, homogeneous and static conceptions of Indian philosophies, and by articulating different ways of apprehending tradition they have tried to come to terms with such limiting images. My reading of their texts has been informed by a questioning of how they, in turn, conceptualize tradition. Most of all (...) this is related to the tendency, on the one hand, to stress that tradition is open-ended and dynamic but at the same time to speak of tradition as one singular and universalizable phenomenon .. (shrink)

One defining feature of the Hindu religious worldviews is a belief in the impermanence of the body and its perception as a source of suffering due to a misguided attachment of the self to its corporeal manifestation. This view is expressed in several important traditions, including classical yoga, which perceives the physical body as an impediment to attaining liberation and irrelevant in the state of liberation.However, the perception of the physical body in liberation is going through ontological changes in early (...) medieval Haṭhayoga texts. The dichotomy between embodied and disembodied states of the body when one is liberated is the focus of this article. In several medieval yoga texts dating between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries, the ontological immortal state of living liberation is more similar to physical death. Often the exact text holds both views of embodied and disembodied states simultaneously with no overt inconsistency. I argue that these tensions and contradictions can be explained in two ways: by looking at the assessed timeline of the texts and by reflecting on their sectarian and social origin. (shrink)

How does one teach dissent in a classroom which is a disciplinary space? As a pedagogue whose work is to instil philosophical and critical thinking in students, in this article I reflect on the modalities of teaching dissent versus teaching about dissent. While it is very possible that teaching about dissent may create a model for students to emulate, teaching dissent must involve a proactive learning process within the classroom that may depend on the ethical and compassionate stand of the (...) teacher. I draw from Indian philosophical traditions of argumentation and the tradition of debate and teaching to posit a methodology of two forms of dissent called Vimati, intellectual dissent and Upeksha, performative dissent. One notes that conceptualisations such as doubt, questioning, evidence, and advocacy are some of the epistemic ideas from Indian philosophical systems that can be adapted to contemporary pedagogy. Additionally, a form of performative dissent that involves ‘turning away’ from norms becomes a form of performative dissent. Such dissent is described through texts as practices in the lived worlds of people in the stories of epics and folk traditions. Finally, I conclude with similar concepts gleaned from contemporary thinkers in India to emphasise the ethical values of compassion and love that make teaching dissent possible. (shrink)

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem (...) remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend. (shrink)