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Philosophical theories of consciousness: Contemporary western perspectives

Uriah Kriegel

In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press (2007)

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Neural correlates of consciousness reconsidered.Joseph Neisser - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):681-690.details It is widely accepted among philosophers that neuroscientists are conducting a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, or NCC. Chalmers conceptualized this research program as the attempt to correlate the contents of conscious experience with the contents of representations in specific neural populations. A notable claim on behalf of this interpretation is that the neutral language of “correlates” frees us from philosophical disputes over the mind/body relation, allowing the science to move independently. But the experimental paradigms and explanatory canons (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 13 citations
Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 42 citations
Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint.Sam S. Rakover - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):143-152.details Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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