Hay una tendencia dentro del debate sobre el conceptualismo y el no-conceptualismo kantiano a pasar por alto la estética de Kant. El objetivo central de este artículo es ofrecer un análisis sobre la interpretación no-conceptualista de Heidemann en torno a la teoría kantiana de los juicios de gusto. En primer lugar, se discuten los argumentos que Heidemann ofrece acerca del carácter cognitivo de los juicios de gusto. En segundo lugar, se analiza el supuesto no-conceptualismo implicado en la experiencia estética de (...) lo bello. En tercer lugar, se ofrece una interpretación alternativa sobre el vínculo entre la teoría de Kant sobre los juicios de gusto y el debate en torno al -conceptualismo. Se defiende la tesis según la cual los juicios de gusto no poseen valor cognitivo, pero permiten comprender aspectos centrales de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento. (shrink)

How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...) to develop arguments for the latter approach. We focus on a criticism of Jesse Prinz’s AIR theory of consciousness. We have chosen Prinz’s theory because it incorporates features of both the content and processing approaches, and discussing it will therefore allow us to compare the advantages and downsides of both. Our argument will focus in particular on the notion of intermediate-level. We will discuss how Prinz characterizes the intermediate-level according to a content approach, and argue that such a characterization is inadequate. Finally, we will argue in favor of processing approach to the problem of consciousness, which also accounts for the massive interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in the brain. Even though consciousness remains an unsolved riddle, we claim that this is the best path towards a solution. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality , transparency , subjectivity or reflexivity . However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible (...) for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime. (shrink)