The author begins by sketching the characteristics or elements of every tradition. Some reasons are then suggested for the propensity of so many authors to contrast statutes with other, allegedly more traditional kinds of law. However, it is argued that statutes are deeply embedded, along with customary and judge‐made law, in the highly traditional practices of law and that this matters much more than is commonly suspected. The thesis being defended here is not merely that law includes traditions along with (...) rules, principles, maxims, and so on, but rather that legal systems should be understood as traditions, albeit highly complex ones. Not only are ancient legal systems (the Talmudic, for example) held to be traditional; modem legal positive orders are viewed as being traditional too. Finally, the concept of “communities of interpretation” is applied to the contemporary posited statutes which are believed by many to be a distinguishing feature of modem legal systems. (shrink)

The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their presentation undergoes phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of decision making.

Reviewed work: Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Teilband 3, Recht, ed. Werner Gephart and Siegfried Hermes. Tu¨bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2010. ISBN 978-3-16-150358-0, xxix þ 811 pp. € 299.00. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, I/22–3.

The principle of limited liability is one of the defining characteristics of modern corporate capitalism. It is also, we argue in this article, a powerful structural source of moral hazard. Engaging in a double conceptual genealogy, we investigate how the concepts of moral hazard and limited liability have evolved and diffused over time. We highlight two parallel but unconnected paths of construction, diffusion, moral contestation, and eventual institutionalization. We bring to the fore clear elective affinities between both concepts and their (...) respective evolution. Going one step further, we suggest that both concepts have come to be connected through time. In the context of contemporary capitalism, limited liability has to be understood, we argue, as a powerful structural source of moral hazard. In conclusion, we propose that this structural link between limited liability and moral hazard is an important explanatory factor of the systemic instability of contemporary capitalism and, as a consequence, of a pattern of recurrent crises that are regularly disrupting our economies and societies. (shrink)