Romantic partnerships are typically among the most important goods in our lives. But love sometime ends, and so too do relationships. Divorcing partners are particularly vulnerable to being wronged and harmed. The aim of this paper is to develop an ethics of divorce, by establishing that divorce is a condition for the possibility of the distinct value of romantic partnerships. Different sets of rights are specified here: the divorcee's right to explanation, the right to participation and the right to transitional (...) goods; and the divorcer's right to relational freedom. Violations of these rights indicate the distinct wrongs and harms of divorce. The paper then explains the corresponding duties in divorce that might avoid these wrongs and mitigate these harms, and highlights the distinct status of these duties: while they continue to be special, they are residual duties grounded in the fact that the partners once committed to their partnership. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate the similarities and differences between the ways we relate to the other in ethics and in love through an engagement with the thinking of K.E. Løgstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. My point of departure will be a reading of a novel by Maja Lucas, Mother, which brings out the important and complicated nature of the relation between ethics and love. My main concern, however, is to investigate how Løgstrup’s and Levinas’s different conceptions of natural love point (...) to differences in their understanding of the ethical relationship to the other. (shrink)

The experience of feeling safe even in the midst of trials and temptations seems to be a central feature of the Christian faith. In this article I will try to solve some possible difficulties in understanding this kind of absolute safety by discussing some problems noted by philosophers in connection with the related statements by Socrates that a good man cannot be harmed, and by Wittgenstein that he sometimes feels absolutely safe, that nothing can injure him whatever happens. First, I (...) will investigate whether there is an invalid prediction implied in this feeling of absolute safety: how can someone know that nothing will hurt him or her? Second, I will examine whether this experience of complete safety is dependent upon impossible requirements, such as to be a good man or an impeccable Christian. Third, I will consider the character of the people who claim absolute safety as portrayed by different philosophers: do these people really need to be so cold and inhumanly detached from the world for them to be able to say that nothing can hurt them? I will argue that if, instead of asking how someone can claim absolute safety, we ask to what someone commits him- or her-self in making this claim, these difficulties disappear. (shrink)