Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. No Match Point for the Permissibility Account.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.
    In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Can the Lottery Paradox Be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution Of? -- A Question for Kroedel.Franz Huber - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):333-342.
    Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation