This article argues for the elimination of the concept of life worth living from philosophical vocabulary on three complementary grounds. First, the basic components of this concept suffer from multiple ambiguities, which hamper attempts to ground informative evaluative and classificatory judgments about the worth of life. Second, the criteria proposed to track the extension of the concept of life worth living rest on unsupported axiological assumptions and fail to identify precise and plausible referents for this concept. And third, the concept (...) of life worth living is not shown to serve any major evaluative or classificatory purpose besides those served by already available axiological concepts. By eliminating the concept of life worth living, philosophers will free themselves of the task of addressing ill-posed axiological questions and ground reflection about the worth of life on more rigorous conceptual foundations. (shrink)

Advances in perinatology have permitted the survival of fragile neonates. Quality of life has been considered a key element in medical decision-making. In this review we analyse the role of Q...

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of requests formercy killings by patients and their relatives. Under certain conditions,the patient may prefer death to a life devoid of quality. In contrast to thosewho uphold this quality of life approach, those who hold the sanctity oflife approach claim that life has intrinsic value and must be preservedregardless of its quality. This essay describes these two approaches,examines their flaws, and offers a golden path between the two extremepositions.We discuss (...) the halachic and the secular views, arguing for a balancebetween the sanctity of life and the quality of life. We argue that, indeed,such a balance exists in practice, and that life is important, but it is not sacred. Life can be evaluated, but quality of life is not the solecriterion. (shrink)

En la actualidad se defiende con mucha frecuencia la llamada humanización de la muerte" como alternativa frente al vitalismo médico y ante cualquier defensa de la eutanasia voluntaria activa. Esta postura se justifica asumiendo una diferencia moral significativa entre "hacer algo" y "dejar que algo ocurra", entre "matar" y "dejar morir". En la presente comunicación presentaré un esbozo de los fundamentos sobre los que descansa tal distinción a la vez que cuestionaré su relevancia moral cuando se aplica a situaciones eutanásicas (...) complejas.Today, so-called "humanisation of death" is frequently defended as an alternative to medical vitalism and to any defence of active voluntary euthanasia. This position is justified by the assumption of a difference between "doing something" and "allowing something to happen", or between"killing" and "letting someone die". This paper presents an outline of the foundations on which this distinction lies, and questions its moral relevance when applied to complex situations of euthanasia. (shrink)

This paper examines the few, but important legal and coronial cases concerning withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from severely disabled or critically impaired infants in Australia. Although sparse in number, the judgements should influence common clinical practices based on assessment of “best interests” but these have not yet been adopted. In particular, although courts have discounted assessment of “quality of life” as a legitimate component of determination of “best interests,” this remains a prominent component of clinical guidelines. In addition, this (...) paper highlights the lack of uniform clinical guidelines available to medical professionals and parents in Australia when making end-of-life decisions for severely ill infants. Thus, it is argued here that there is a need for an overarching prescriptive uniform framework or set of guidelines in end-of-life decision-making for impaired infants. This would encourage greater transparency, consistency, and some degree of objectivity in an area that often appears subjective. (shrink)