The relation between Kant’s conception of modalities in the Postulates of Empirical Thought and Hegel’s conception in the Logic of Essence has not been addressed in the current scholarship. I argue that there is in fact a close connection that becomes visible if the desideratum which is implied by Kant’s conceptions is understood. Thus, after an analysis of the Kantian modal postulates, the article shows that they are sufficient to characterize the necessity of Kant’s Grundsätze and, hence, a specific form (...) of synthetic propositions a priori. However, I will prove that they are insufficient to characterize Kant’s synthetic propositions a priori about transcendental philosophy. This insufficiency in the characterization of transcendental philosophy itself brings into the arena Hegel, who supplements the Kantian modalities with a self-reflexive form of transcendental modality. (shrink)

Hegel's Science of Logic makes the just not low claim to be an absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge. This project, which could not be more ambitious, has no good press in our post-metaphysical age. However: That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist, cannot be claimed without self-contradiction. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fundamental finiteness of knowledge. But can absolute knowledge be finite knowledge? This leads to the problem of a self-explication of logic (in the sense of Hegel) (...) and further, as will be shown, to a new definition of the dialectical procedure. The stringency of which results from the fact that always exactly that implicit content is explicated that was generated by the preceding explication step itself and is thus concretely comprehensible. At the same time, a new implicit content is generated by this act of explication, which requires a new explication step, and so forth. In the dialectical procedure reinterpreted in this way, dialectical arguments are not beheld, guessed at or even surreptitiously obtained, but are methodically accountable. Thereby dialectics is understood as a self-explication of logic by logical means and thus as a proof of the possibility of ultimate-grounding in the form of absolute and nevertheless finite – and thus also fallible – knowledge. (shrink)

This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...) of the self in time provides Ricoeur with a discursive basis for distinguishing his own position from that of Kant and other philosophers in the transcendental tradition. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es explicar la conexión entre reglas discursivas y normas morales en el marco de la ética del discurso. El trabajo comienza con un análisis de la diferencia entre acción y operación y con una reconstrucción del concepto de discurso. Luego es presentada la diferencia y la relación entre ley y obligación. La conclusión es que la conexión entre acción y discurso posible está implícita en la noción de responsabilidad moral.

a This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.a (TM) These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. (...) In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the booka (TM)s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (a defeasiblea (TM)) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail. (shrink)

semantic minimalism and moderte contextualism.

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true (...) but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning. (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot be (...) considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)

In this paper, I present different ways in which transcendental argumentation has been used in contemporary debates in moral philosophy to justify the normative authority of morality. My aim is to defend strong “retorsive” transcendental argumentation as a way to ground a sort of critical realism in metaethics, comparing transcendental arguments proposed by Karl-Otto Apel, Christine Korsgaard and Alan Gewirth – which are sometimes referred to as “constitutivist” arguments. In particular, I endorse an argumentative strategy that considers the merits of (...) the respective positions while overcoming the limits of each. Such a strategy aims at grounding transcendentally the metaphysical fact of human value, making explicit the ontological implications of transcendental argumentation, and showing that a justification of fundamental values alone can ultimately make it possible to ground basic moral principles. (shrink)

This paper has two aims, as an exposition of Jürgen Habermas's response to the work of Michel Foucault, and to engage in and assess this debate between two influential contemporary schools of Continental philosophy. Habermas locates Foucault's project in the history of several attempts at a totalizing critique of reason, attempts which are trapped in a performative self?contradiction. Habermas also argues that Foucault is still caught up in the conceptual straitjacket of the philosophy of the subject which his theory was (...) meant to overcome. He shows that Foucault's central notion of power is used in two different and ultimately irreconcilable ways ? as a transcendental as well as an empirical concept. Much of Habermas's critique is justified and could, indeed, be extended to Foucault's anti?realist relativism, but Habermas's own defence of rationalism is not without difficulties of its own. Thus his notion of knowledge?guiding interests commits him to a form of anti?realism and a transcendental concept of instrumental power which is almost as problematic in its consequences as the anti?realism of Foucault. (shrink)

Is transcendental pragmatics a matter of ultimate foundation or a matter of holism? Transcendental pragmatics as developed by Karl-Otto Apel has been the object of various criticisms. Against the fallibilists' claim (Albert) that argumentation is at last either dogmatic, axiomatic or circular, the transcendental pragmatists have given an argument that ultimate foundation ('Letztbegründung') cannot be proved to be impossible. But this clarification of their claims leaves open the questions whether their method can establish universal statements, and whether they prove statements (...) which are synthetic a priori. Against the claim of the reconstructive scientist (Habermas) they have to restate their view, and take into account an element of fallibilism. Here we encounter a first element of holism. With regard to the question whether there can be ultimate foundation without ultimate foundation of the method of ultimate foundation holism breaks in. The distinction between a vicious and a transcendental circle, used against Albert, is of no use in the establishment of the transcendental circle. (shrink)

Language-Game vs. Complete Language. The article formulates a criticism of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which, in its substance, I would like to think, is fairly the same as the (hermeneutic) criticism issued by Apel and Habermas in the sixties. Contrary to these philosophers, however, I try to make the point by focusing on the distinction between language game and language, respectively between intralanguage relations of 'family resemblance' (between language games) and interlanguage translation relations. The notion of a 'complete language' is introduced (...) - 'completeness' of a language being, roughly, its possibility in principle of being translated into any (other) language - and the criticism of Wittgenstein is formulated as the allegation that he does not, or will not, acknowledge such a concept of completeness. So far the contents of the first part of the article. The rest of it assembles some hints, remarks and reminders which bear upon the question of the 'completeness' of a language. These considerations include comments on the conditions of translatability, on the performative (agent's) knowledge or 'intention-in-action' of the acting person, on Habermas' concept of communicative competence and on the notion of a responsible subject of action. It is alleged that to speak of 'translation' and 'reporting an event' as language games is misleading. (shrink)

The author of the article assumes that any human activity is normative. In the case of philosophical discourse, the normative ground is its indispensable condition, which makes it possible to compare the foundations of philosophy and other scientific disciplines. The norm (law) has, on the one hand, descriptive content related to the description of the noumenal world, and, on the other, prescriptive content related to the counterfactuality of what ought to be. The author emphasizes that the functional aspect of a (...) norm is that it is a means of socially integrating the behavior of people and social groups into a whole. Due to the requirements and requirements of society, social groups are transformed into standards, models, standards of modal and obligatory behavior of the representatives of these groups, performing the function of motivation, orientation and legitimacy. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on a narrower understanding of discourse as speech, dialogue, discussions, which presuppose argumentation based on certain principles, rules, rules and regulations. This interpretation of discourse is peculiar to representatives of the ethics of discourse (K.-O. Apel, Y. Habermas, D. Böhler, V. Kulman, G. Gronke, etc.). Within ethics, principles, imperatives, rules, norms and guidelines both normalize the discourse and substantiate this discourse. Adherence to these principles, rules, norms, and guidelines ensures the normative coherence of discourse as the instance of consensus building on the basis of revealing the performative contradiction of the statement. The normative coherence of discourse is also the basis for its functioning as a meta-institution of justification of social (moral, legal) norms and legitimation of institutions of deliberative democracy in a society of communication and dialogical civilization. Summarizing, the author formulates generalized requirements-guidelines that make it possible to implement the principles, norms and rules of discourse as a meta-institutional instance of society. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, mi objetivo es ofrecer un análisis de la posible comparación entre la filosofía de Fichte y la pragmática trascendental de Apel. A pesar de algunas coincidencias importantes, la comparación no resulta completamente satisfactoria. En realidad, el pensamiento de Fichte corresponde al paradigma moderno de una filosofía de la conciencia. Por consiguiente, su reflexión trascendental no pretende descubrir las condiciones intersubjetivas del discurso, sino las condiciones subjetivas del pensamiento. Según Fichte, el fundamento último de la filosofía no (...) se encuentra en la dimensión pragmática del lenguaje o en una comunidad ideal de comunicación, sino más bien en la unidad de la autoconciencia subjetiva en el pensamiento, el conocimiento y la acción. In this paper, my aim is to offer an approach to the possible comparison between Fichte's idealism and Apel's transcendental pragmatics. Despite some relevant similarities, the comparison of these philosophical theories is not completely satisfactory. Indeed, Fichte's thought corresponds to the modern paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness. Therefore, his transcendental reflection does not intend to discover the intersubjective conditions of discourse, but the subjective conditions of thought. According to Fichte, the ultimate foundation of philosophy cannot be found in the pragmatic dimension of language or ideal community of communication, but in the unity of subjective self-awareness in thinking, knowledge and action. (shrink)