In this paper, I present different ways in which transcendental argumentation has been used in contemporary debates in moral philosophy to justify the normative authority of morality. My aim is to defend strong “retorsive” transcendental argumentation as a way to ground a sort of critical realism in metaethics, comparing transcendental arguments proposed by Karl-Otto Apel, Christine Korsgaard and Alan Gewirth – which are sometimes referred to as “constitutivist” arguments. In particular, I endorse an argumentative strategy that considers the merits of (...) the respective positions while overcoming the limits of each. Such a strategy aims at grounding transcendentally the metaphysical fact of human value, making explicit the ontological implications of transcendental argumentation, and showing that a justification of fundamental values alone can ultimately make it possible to ground basic moral principles. (shrink)

In this article the author tries to give an answer - from the point of view of the transcendental pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics - to the title question, which was raised by the Unesco conferences entitled `Universal Ethics' in Paris (27 March 1997) and Naples (December 1997). The article should be understood as a supplement to the empiristic-comparative responses of S. Bok and H. Küng, and especially to the communitarian approach of M. Walzer, proposed at the first conference. Unlike (...) traditional rationalism, this approach does not try to deduce concrete moral norms from axiomatic first principles; it begins with transcendental reflection on the undeniable moral presuppositions of argumentative discourse (which is not circumventable in philosophy). The approach first deduces from these presuppositions only the ideal procedures for the moral discourses through which all concrete moral problems ought to be solved, if possible. The second step provides a strategic-counter-strategic supplementation principle for those cases where undistorted moral discourses are not possible. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. (shrink)

Summary Kuhlmanns critique of fallibilism is refuted. It is shown that he wins the dispute, because his fallibilist adopts Kuhlmanns language, which does not even permit to state the position of falliblism properly.

This text reconstructs the Kohlberg/Gilligan controversy between a male ethics of justice and a female ethics of care. Using Karl-Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics, the author argues for a mediation between both models in terms of a reciprocal co-responsibility. Against this backdrop, she defends the circular procedure of an exclusively argumentative-reflexive justification of a normative ethics. From this it follows for feminist ethics that it cannot do without either of the two types of ethics. The goal is to assure the evaluative (...) variety of different types of an ethics of the good without endangering the normative boundaries of a deontological discourse ethics. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo se aborda el argumento elaborado por Ludwig Wittgenstein en las Philosophische Untersuchungen acerca de la imposibilidad de un lenguaje privado. El objetivo de dicho abordaje reside en la presentación de una serie de argumentos, reconstruidos a partir de la pragmática trascendental del lenguaje, que demuestran también de una manera acabada la imposibilidad de concebir un lenguaje semejante. La importancia de los razonamientos de la pragmática trascendental consiste en que explicitan una forma de tener en cuenta el (...) propio proceso argumentativo que está ausente en los planteos de Wittgenstein. Así, luego de presentar la importancia y las particularidades del argumento de Wittgenstein se desarrolla la interpretación que es posible esgrimir desde la pragmática, así como una distinción que debe establecerse cuando se abordan cuestiones referidas al lenguaje. Por último se extraen algunas conclusiones.: This article addresses the argument developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophische Untersuchungen about the impossibility of a private language. The objective of this approach is to present a series of arguments, reconstructed from the point of view of transcendental pragmatics of language, which also demonstrate in a finished way the impossibility of such a language. The importance of the transcendental pragmatics reasonings is that they explicitly state a way of considering the very process of argumentation that is absent in Wittgenstein’s statements. After presenting the importance and particularities of Wittgenstein’s argument, the interpretation that can be employed from pragmatics is developed, as well as a distinction that must be made when dealing with issues related to language. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. (shrink)