O objetivo do presente artigo é realizar uma análise da teoria da justiça como eqüidade de John Rawls em A Theory of Justice e no Political Liberalism, destacando seu modelo de complementaridade entre o deontológico e o procedimental com o teleológico e substancial, buscando responder algumas das críticas levantadas por autores comunitaristas à teoria rawlsiana de justiça e procurando apontar para suas semelhanças. Parto das críticas dos comunitaristas à teoria da justiça como eqüidade; posteriormente, analiso os aspectos teleológicos contidos em (...) seu modelo deontológico; em seguida, destaco a intrínseca relação entre o procedimental e o substancial; por fim, apresento as respostas às críticas comunitaristas à Rawls, destacando a especificidade de sua concepção de justiça. (shrink)

Rawls''s recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity (...) that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls''s comments on the division of a cake. (shrink)

Why is someone enduringly prized as a philosopher? To answer this question, this historical case study examines the intersecting careers of John Rawls and R. M. Hare. It looks at their writings, a complex chain of disagreements, the argumentative dimension. The essay moreover explores the clash of differing temperaments. Finally, themes in addition to ratiocination and personality are factored in: the leanings of the institutions that control access to intellectual endeavor; the public square—politics widely conceived—into which the two men were (...) thrown; and the cultural rivalry between England and America after World War Two. (shrink)

One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between (...) the findings concerning indecision in philosophy and the treatment of indecision in argumentation theory. By investigating what philosophical forms and norms of indecision are involved in argumentation theory, we can improve our understanding of the different uncertain evidential situations in argumentation theory. (shrink)

It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or (...) against them. Drawing on a defeasible logic framework, this paper sets up three models: one model for each proposal, as well as a third model capturing a mixed view on principles that combines them. It then explores the structural connections between the three models and establishes some equivalence results, suggesting that the seemingly different views captured by the models are closer than standardly thought. (shrink)

Understanding a normative concept like oppression requires attention to not only its harms but also the causes of those harms. In other words, a complete understanding of such a concept requires a proper causal explanation. This causal explanation can also inform and constrain our moral response to such harms. Therefore, the conceptual explanatory framework that we use to inform our moral diagnosis and our moral response become significant. The first goal of this dissertation is to propose complexity theory as the (...) proper framework for not only explaining a social phenomenon like oppression but also understanding the proper sites for social change. The second goal of this dissertation is to answer three interrelated questions about how we should respond, morally, to a chronic and complex social problem like racial or gender inequality: (1) Why do the current interventions to address these problems fail? (2) Do social movements play any unique role in addressing these problems? (3) What is our individual responsibility to participate in social movements? In response, I argue that the explanatory frameworks that we choose to understand the cause(s) of social problems can be the source of the inadequacy of our intervention. I argue that a proper social and moral intervention needs to capture the complex and dynamic nature of the social world. I also show that changing the explanatory framework allows us to see the unique role social movements play in making effective and sustainable social change possible. Finally, I conclude supporting such movements is a moral imperative. (shrink)

La teoría de la justicia de Rawls ha sido acusada de estar edificada sobre supuestos individualistas. Quienes realizan estas críticas asumen que una sociedad que adopte los principios y las formas de justificación rawlsianos será intrínsecamente inhóspita a la vida asociativa, al desarrollo de lógicas de pertenencia comunitaria y a los discursos de corte identitario. Este artículo se pregunta si esta acusación está debidamente fundamentada. Para ello distingue cuatro maneras en las que una teoría de la justicia puede ser considerada (...) individualista. Estas cuatro maneras son llamadas: individualismo metodológico, individualismo ontológico, individualismo ético e individualismo político. Se sostiene que no hace falta ser un individualista metodológico para ser un “rawlsiano sustantivo”, aunque sí es necesario para ser un “rawlsiano metodológico”. Luego se afirma que ni el individualismo ontológico ni el individualismo ético forman parte de los supuestos de la teoría de Rawls, pero que el individualismo político está en el corazón mismo de su teoría. (shrink)

In The Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus defends an innovative and sophisticated convergence version of public reason liberalism. The crucial concept of his argumentative framework is that of “social morality”, intended as the set of rules apt to organize how individuals can make moral demands over each other. I claim that Gaus’s characterization of social morality and its rules is unstable because it rests on a rejection of the distinction between the normative and the descriptive. I argue that such (...) rejection is motivated by certain practical aims Gaus wishes his theory to achieve. His method and his idea that morality needs to be understood both as the dictate of impartial reasoning and as a social and historical fact come from the need for his theory to perform the task of settling the problem of order. I discuss Gaus’s philosophical attitude and, finally, distinguishing between “therapeutic” and “evaluative” approaches, I present some points of discussion for understanding the role and scope of political philosophy in general. (shrink)

While there may be several practical concerns regarding the practice of corporate lobbying of government officials, there is the more basic question of a corporation’s moral right to do so. I argue that group agents such as corporations have no moral rights, and thereby cannot have the right to lobby. There may be a basis for some legal rights for corporations, but I argue that lobbying cannot be one of the legal rights, even by reference to the rights of the (...) individuals that make up the corporation. I end the paper by a discussion of how this argument applies to all private organizations, including public interest organizations. (shrink)

This paper examines the latest developments in feminist critiques of the seminal Theory of Justice, written by John Rawls, the late preeminent American moral philosopher. Rawls is recognized as one of the most influential moral political philosophers of the twentieth century and is increasingly relevant because of his discussions on pluralist societies. With the current diverging of liberal, conservative and libertarian philosophies among Americans, as well as the fragmentation of parties to accommodate an increasingly diverse public, a clear philosophy and (...) understanding of liberal theory is necessary for its future in American politics. The current pressure to address the needs of oppressed groups such as women and sexual minorities has created a philosophical tipping point. What is to be considered equality, how the government should involve itself, and how this will be done feasibly and throughout generations need answers defined on all sides of the discussion. Gender and sexual inequality, when considering what should be done, is one of the most significant challenges because of its effect on the traditional family, on centuries of preconceived notions of gender and sexuality, and the heavy commitment it may take to extinguish. To analyze the social contract approach and the theory of justice as fairness, I will examine and then follow Rawls’ own method of the original position to determine in which manner the family should be situated within society to result in the best accordance to the two principles. Furthermore, the arguments on the reasonability of religion in a political conception will be used to promote a fair and stable society. The overall aim is to develop a Rawlsian solution to gender equality in society that is both fair and sustainable in a pluralistic society. Focusing on the role of the family in society, I argue that Rawls’ fundamental concept of justice – “justice as fairness” – does not develop a clear and convincing stance on how gender equality will be produced in a pluralistic society. Debate has risen between feminist and liberal philosophers in distinguishing the relationship between Rawls’ two principles of justice and their intervention in family hierarchy, duties, and responsibilities. The two principles are known as: First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. The distinction between an indirect and direct interaction between principles of justice and the basic structures of society will shape the way the political arena promotes equality. This is the case, provided that the procedure in which Rawls utilizes is fair in itself, which has come into contention among feminist thinkers. Once the family is situated in the original position, the feasibility of the theory will be discussed within the parameters of a property-owning democracy as well as, more specifically, a deliberative democracy. This solution should bring a reflective justification for the principles abilities to deal with injustices outlined by feminists. (shrink)

The techniques that some large multinational corporations use to reduce their tax liability have come under increasing public scrutiny in recent years, alongside governmental investigations and international commitments aimed at curbing opportunities for tax avoidance. Although discussion of tax avoidance activities, and their regulatory responses, is often conducted with reference to moral concepts, philosophical analysis of the ethics of multinational tax avoidance remains limited. In particular, the virtue ethics tradition that emphasises the agent and the performance of specific roles has (...) not been considered in detail. This paper examines how the contemporary virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre can be applied to the issue of multinational tax avoidance, and considers the role that accountants play in these activities. It argues, firstly, that MacIntyre’s approach provides a more useful philosophical analysis of the issue and, secondly, that the main parties involved are likely to agree with the main tenets of this approach. The paper also contributes by reconceptualising, using MacIntyre’s scheme, the issue of tax avoidance in relation to Donald Cressey’s ‘fraud triangle’. (shrink)

This paper presents an exercise in the formalization of political principles, by taking as its theme the concept of distributive justice that Karl Marx advanced in his Critique of the Gotha Programme. We first summarize the content of the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Next, we transcribe the core of Marx’s presentation of the concept of distributive justice. Following, we present our formalization of Marx’s conception. Then, we make use of that formal analysis to confront Marx’s principle of distributive justice (...) with John Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, and the principles of distributive justice that derive from it. Finally, we discuss methodological issues relative to, and implications of, the way of formalizing political principles introduced here. (shrink)

An interdisciplinary theoretical framework is proposed for analysing justice in global working conditions. In addition to gender and race as popular criteria to identify disadvantaged groups in organizations, in multinational corporations (MNCs) local employees (i.e. host country nationals (HCNs) working in foreign subsidiaries) deserve special attention. Their working conditions are often substantially worse than those of expatriates (i.e. parent country nationals temporarily assigned to a foreign subsidiary). Although a number of reasons have been put forward to justify such inequalities—usually with (...) efficiency goals in mind—recent studies have used equity theory to question the extent to which they are perceived as fair by HCNs. However, since perceptual equity theory has limitations, this study develops an alternative and non-perceptual framework for analysing such inequalities. Employment discrimination theory and elements of Rawls’s ‘Theory of Justice’ are the theoretical pillars of this framework. This article discusses the advantages of this approach for MNCs and identifies some expatriation practices that are fair according to our non-perceptual justice standards, whilst also reasonably (if not highly) efficient. (shrink)

Rawls ‘s political liberalism abandons the traditional political‐theory objective of providing a philosophical account of liberal democracy. However, Rawls also aims for a liberal political order endorsed by citizens on grounds deeper than what he calls a “modus vivendi” compromise; he contends that a liberal political order based upon a modus vivendi is unstable. The aspiration for a pluralist and “freestanding” liberalism is at odds with the goal of a liberalism endorsed as something deeper than a modus vivendi compromise among (...) competing comprehensive doctrines. A liberalism that is supported “for its own sake” rather than as a compromise must necessarily be based on some conception of the good, of the sort that political liberalism eschews. (shrink)

The relevance of different concepts of computer software (henceforth SW) rights is analysed from the viewpoint of divergent sociopolitical doctrines. The question of software rights is considered from the ontological assumptions, on one extreme, to the relevance of current practical applications of SW rights (such as copyright and patent), on the other extreme. It will be argued (from a non-descriptive/non-cognitive account) that the current expression of SW rights in Western societies (namely copyright, excluding patent) can be seen to be fair (...) from the viewpoint of the theses of agreed rights and universalisability. Finally, given that such practice is neither immoral, nor irrelevant-but fair (based on the ad ignorantiam argument)-we have good reason to respect it rather than violate or demolish it. (shrink)

The nub of the following argument is that there is a conflict between the idea of (liberal) neutrality on the one hand, and an intuitively plausible idea of political representation on the other. The conflict arises when neutrality is seen as a condition for political legitimacy: neutralist political representation is only legitimate insofar as the representative does not advance political ideas based on conceptions of the good that are not endorsed by the whole of the (reasonable) polity. However, we often (...) encounter examples of political representation that do not live up to this demand but nevertheless seem legitimate. Hence, neutralists should explain either why this counterintuitive notion of representation does not follow from neutrality or explain what representatives are meant and allowed to do in such a political arrangement. A plausible neutralist rejoinder to this is to say that legitimacy is not dependent on neutrality for all political decisions. Neutrality is important (only or predominantly) regarding a certain body of political decisions, viz., using the Rawlsian idiom, 'constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.' However, such a two-levelled approach is not without its problems. I argue that a skein of theoretical and practical challenges to the two-levelled approach undermines, or at least weakens, this attempt to solve the problem about representation and neutrality, and that the two-levelled approach is unclear in certain key aspects. The aim of the article is, however, quite modest. It is not to challenge neutrality per se ; rather, it is a call for further clarification of the issues pertaining to the relationship between neutrality and representation. (shrink)