Children learn from people and about people simultaneously; that is, children consider evidentiary qualities of human actions which cross traditional domain boundaries. We propose that Knobe's moral asymmetries are a natural consequence of this learning process: the way gather evidence for causation, intention, and morality through early social experiences.

The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted Y (...) changing without a change in X as evidence that Y does not influence X. Both of these strategies make sense if one believes the variables to be temporally dependent. We discuss the implications of these results for interpreting previous findings. More broadly, given that many real-world environments are characterized by temporal dependency, these results suggest strategies that children may use to learn the causal structure of their environments. (shrink)

It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people’s moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the (...) relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people’s moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. It is argued that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first. (shrink)

Research on young children in environmental education (EE) has focused on unstructured play in, or experiencing, nature. Little attention has been paid to young children’s stewardship efforts, or to the relation of such efforts to young children’s learning and capacity to contribute to their communities and local nature. This perspectives paper draws on the first author’s experience guiding pre-k and kindergarten children (4–6 years old) in outdoor educational projects in Santo Domingo (SD), Dominican Republic, in which the children produced a (...) park guide and a short film. In addition to becoming resources for the local community, these products are an example of children’s civic contributions. In “return on investment” language, guiding young children in outdoor experiences and reflecting on the experience represent the investment and the park guide and other products, and importantly, children’s recognition of their ability to make contributions to their community, represent the return on investment. Based on our observations that young children can make significant contributions to their communities when given the opportunity, this perspectives paper argues for a research agenda and investment in opportunities for young children to contribute to their socio-ecological communities. To support our perspective, we first review and critique the prevailing and emerging paradigms of early childhood EE, following which we briefly describe the Santo Domingo (SD) project, and close by integrating past work with the first author’s experience to argue for the importance of including young children in stewardship efforts. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Knobe's laudable conclusion that we make sense of our social world based on moral considerations requires a development account of human thought and a theoretical framework. We outline a view that such a moral framework must be rooted in social interaction.