Two controversies exist regarding the appropriate characterization of hierarchical and adaptive evolution in natural populations. In biology, there is the Wright-Fisher controversy over the relative roles of random genetic drift, natural selection, population structure, and interdemic selection in adaptive evolution begun by Sewall Wright and Ronald Aylmer Fisher. There is also the Units of Selection debate, spanning both the biological and the philosophical literature and including the impassioned group-selection debate. Why do these two discourses exist separately, and interact relatively little? (...) We postulate that the reason for this schism can be found in the differing focus of each controversy, a deep difference itself determined by distinct general styles of scientific research guiding each discourse. That is, the Wright-Fisher debate focuses on adaptive process, and tends to be instructed by the mathematical modeling style, while the focus of the Units of Selection controversy is adaptive product, and is typically guided by the function style. The differences between the two discourses can be usefully tracked by examining their interpretations of two contested strategies for theorizing hierarchical selection: horizontal and vertical averaging. (shrink)

Selectionist evolutionary theory has often been faulted for not making novel predictions that are surprising, risky, and correct. I argue that it in fact exhibits the theoretical virtue of predictive capacity in addition to two other virtues: explanatory unification and model fitting. Two case studies show the predictive capacity of selectionist evolutionary theory: parallel evolutionary change in E. coli, and the origin of eukaryotic cells through endosymbiosis.

The Covid-19 pandemic broke on a world whose grip on epistemic trust was already in disarray. The first months of the pandemic saw many governments publicly performing reliance on epidemiological and modelling expertise in order to signal that data would be the basis for justifying whatever population-level measures of control were judged necessary. But comprehensive data has not become available, and instead scientists, policymakers and the public find themselves in a situation where policy inputs determine the data available and vice (...) versa. This essay asks how we can live with what Amoore has termed ‘post-Cartesian doubt’ in situations of existential risk, and what kind of approach to science and data can answer the moral and human demands of a situation such as the Covid-19 pandemic. I suggest that science and policy could be able to control the pandemic better by addressing the sources of uncertainty and missing data not as gaps in the information landscape, but as individuals who are likely to be members of less-visible and less powerful groups including low-wage workers, the elderly, migrants, prisoners and others. This would shift both data use and policy toward an ethics of care, an embodied approach which asks what people need and how they behave in relation to each other, rather than how to manage population-level behaviour. This approach, I argue, is more appropriate for pandemic response than a utilitarian calculation of how many people each country should expect to lose as a result of the disease. (shrink)

Historical inductions, that is, the pessimistic metainduction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as noncogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic metainduction, for example, in the context of some medical studies.

In Philosophia Botanica, Carolus Linnaeus presented a calculation of the number of plant genera that may be distinguished based on his taxonomic concepts. In order to derive that number, he relied upon the organs of fructification, which represent the flower and the fruit, by selecting over 30 elements from them, and then assuming that each could vary by four dimensions. However, while Linnaeus was good in counting stamens and pistils, he and many of his followers who edited or translated Philosophia (...) Botanica were less careful, basing their calculations of the number of possible genera on flawed assumptions, or even introducing basic arithmetic errors. Furthermore, although mathematics was quite advanced in the eighteenth century, the gap between combinatorial and botanical thinking was too deep, preventing Linnaeus to seek a reasonable solution to the problem he raised. The authors demonstrate this by a historical analysis of 15 editions of Philosophia Botanica, plus many references to it, and conclude that the desired number almost always appeared in error during the past 265 years. The German botanist J. G. Gleditsch was the most successful with respect to Linnaeus’ original intention. Elementary mathematics demonstrates that if Linnaeus’ assumptions were taken seriously, then the possible number of genera would be astronomical. The practice he followed in Genera Plantarum shows, however, that the fructification dimensions served as a universal set for Linnaeus from which he chose only the relevant ones for describing a particular genus empirically. Based on the corrections and modifications implemented in reworked editions, we suggest an evolutionary network for the historical and modern versions or translations of Philosophia Botanica. (shrink)

Since their inception in the 1980s, complexity sciences have been described as a revolutionary new domain of research. By describing some of the practices and assumptions of its representatives, the present article shows that this field is an association of subdisciplines laying on existing disciplinary footholds. The general question guiding us here is: On what basis do complexity scientists consider their inquiry methods and results as valuable? To answer it, I describe five “epistemic argumentative regimes,” namely the ways in which (...) complexity scientists argue the credibility of their research, and five “ontological views,” that is the ways in which they interpret the material and formal causes of their study objects and models. Finally, the article proposes the term of “regime of evidence” to designate the specific combination of one ontological view with one or more epistemic argumentative regimes. (shrink)

While knowledge represents a valuable commodity, not all forms of knowledge are afforded equal status. The politics of knowledge, which entails the privileging of particular ways of knowing through linkages between the producers of knowledge and other bearers of authority or influence, represents a powerful force driving knowledge development. Within the health research and practice community, biomedical knowledge (i.e. knowledge pertaining to the biological factors influencing health) has been afforded a privileged position, shaping the health research and practice community's view (...) of health, illness and appropriate intervention. The aim of this study is to spark critical reflection and dialogue surrounding the ways in which the politics of knowledge have constrained progress in addressing mental health and illness, one of today's leading public health issues. I argue that the hegemony of biological knowledge represents an ethical issue as it limits the breadth of knowledge available to support practitioners to ‘do good’ in terms of addressing mental illness. Given the power and influence inherent within the nursing community, I propose that nurses ought to engage in critical reflection and action in an effort to better situate the health research and practice community to effectively address the mental health of populations. (shrink)

This article outlines a philosophy of science in practice that focuses on the engineering sciences. A methodological issue is that these practices seem to be divided by two different styles of scientific reasoning, namely, causal-mechanistic and mathematical reasoning. These styles are philosophically characterized by what Kuhn called ?disciplinary matrices?. Due to distinct metaphysical background pictures and/or distinct ideas of what counts as intelligible, they entail distinct ideas of the character of phenomena and what counts as a scientific explanation. It is (...) argued that the two styles cannot be reduced to each other. At the same time, although they are incompatible, they must not be regarded as competing. Instead, they produce different kinds of epistemic results, which serve different kinds of epistemic functions. Moreover, some scientific breakthroughs essentially result from relating them. This view of complementary styles of scientific reasoning is supported by pluralism about metaphysical background pictures. (shrink)

We contribute to the exploration of diversity in interdisciplinary science by elaborating the notion of epistemic commitments to address researchers’ different views of knowledge that matters and how these views are embedded in research practices and networks. Based on previous science and technology studies and science-policy literature, we define epistemic commitments as reflexive commitments to regimes of relevant research. Drawing on an in-depth enquiry in the case of biodiversity studies in France, we describe four regimes of research, each of them (...) bringing together certain disciplinary approaches and technologies, certain scenarios about environmental changes and certain contributions to decision making and management. We distinguish between an environmentalist regime, a management-oriented regime, a function-based regime, and an ecoengineering regime. We give insights into how researchers’ commitments to these regimes are shaped, stabilized, and maintained over time, suggesting the coevolution of research practices, practical contributions, and environmental scenarios. We emphasize pluralism rather than hegemony of a type of knowledge over the others. Our results show that environmental research’s diversity does not result only from the complexity of reality itself but is also embedded in various views of scientific advancement, future scenarios, and useful contributions to environmental governance. (shrink)

Revue Spirite: Journal d’Études Psychologiques, 1858, Vol. 1, 356 pp.. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 1882-1883, Vol. 1, 336 pp. Journal of Parapsychology, 1937, Vol. 1, 307 pp. Much has been written about the various existing research styles and approaches in science. An example is Alistair Crombie’s Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition, in which the author presented a widely cited classification that included axiomatic, experimental, and taxonomic approaches to the study of nature, among others. Similarly, (...) many approaches coexisted during the nineteenth-century in the study of the human experience, as seen in the field of psychology. This brought debates and conflicts between case and experimental studies, as seen in the German and French traditions, respectively and between the use of introspection and studies based on the study of observable phenomena. As Danzinger has argued the situation was not simply one of differing approaches, but also one of different assumptions and different social research styles and practices. (shrink)

Evo-Devo exhibits a plurality of scientific “cultures” of practice and theory. When are the cultures acting—individually or collectively—in ways that actually move research forward, empirically, theoretically, and ethically? When do they become imperialistic, in the sense of excluding and subordinating other cultures? This chapter identifies six cultures – three /styles/ (mathematical modeling, mechanism, and history) and three /paradigms/ (adaptationism, structuralism, and cladism). The key assumptions standing behind, under, or within each of these cultures are explored. Characterizing the internal structure of (...) the cultures is necessary for understanding how they collaborate or compete, and how they are fragmented or integrated, in the rich interdisciplinary /trading zone/ (Galison 1997) of Evo-Devo. Evo-Devo is an important example of how science can progress through a radical plurality of perspectives and cultures. (shrink)