The boundary problem is related to the binding problem, part of a family of puzzles and phenomenal experiences that theories of consciousness (ToC) must either explain or eliminate. By comparison with the phenomenal binding problem, the boundary problem has received very little scholarly attention since first framed in detail by Rosengard in 1998, despite discussion by Chalmers in his widely cited 2016 work on the combination problem. However, any ToC that addresses the binding problem must also address the boundary problem. (...) The binding problem asks how a unified first person perspective (1PP) can bind experiences across multiple physically distinct activities, whether billions of individual neurons firing or some other underlying phenomenon. To a first approximation, the boundary problem asks why we experience hard boundaries around those unified 1PPs and why the boundaries operate at their apparent spatiotemporal scale. We review recent discussion of the boundary problem, identifying several promising avenues but none that yet address all aspects of the problem. We set out five specific boundary problems to aid precision in future efforts. We also examine electromagnetic (EM) field theories in detail, given their previous success with the binding problem, and introduce a feature with the necessary characteristics to address the boundary problem at a conceptual level. Topological segmentation can, in principle, create exactly the hard boundaries desired, enclosing holistic, frame-invariant units capable of effecting downward causality. The conclusion outlines a programme for testing this concept, describing how it might also differentiate between competing EM ToCs. (shrink)

思考是我们 思考是我们 惯用 的一种工具，以至于 的一种工具，以至于 的一种工具，以至于 我们总认为思考是 我们总认为思考是 我们总认为思考是 理所当然的 理所当然的 , 却很少用这个工 很少用这个工 具来审视自己，问 具来审视自己，问 具来审视自己，问 具来审视自己，问 一些类似 一些类似 一些类似 "是什么 是什么 "、"为什么 为什么 "和“怎么样” 和“怎么样” 和“怎么样” 等有关 思考的本质和机制问 思考的本质和机制问 思考的本质和机制问 思考的本质和机制问 思考的本质和机制问 题，比如 ，比如 ，比如 "智力从何而来？ 智力从何而来？ 智力从何而来？ "，"意识究竟是什么？ 意识究竟是什么？ 意识究竟是什么？ 意识究竟是什么？ 意识究竟是什么？ "，或者 ，或者 "我为什么要问题？ 我为什么要问题？ 我为什么要问题？ 我为什么要问题？ 我为什么要问题？ " 现在 《大 脑海绵理论》 脑海绵理论》 脑海绵理论》 一书邀请读者探索这些 一书邀请读者探索这些 一书邀请读者探索这些 一书邀请读者探索这些 一书邀请读者探索这些 看似陌生的 看似陌生的 看似陌生的 问题，并进入自己 问题，并进入自己 问题，并进入自己 问题，并进入自己 问题，并进入自己 大脑 中更深的概念领域 中更深的概念领域 中更深的概念领域 中更深的概念领域 去 寻找答案。 寻找答案。 寻找答案。.

La reseña se traduce de su original "A novel perspective on thinking about thinking: Review of Mindsponge Theory".

The expanding integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in various aspects of society makes the infosphere around us increasingly complex. Humanity already faces many obstacles trying to have a better understanding of our own minds, but now we have to continue finding ways to make sense of the minds of AI. The issue of AI’s capability to have independent thinking is of special attention. When dealing with such an unfamiliar concept, people may rely on existing human properties, such as survival desire, (...) to make assessments. Employing information-processing-based Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics on a dataset of 266 residents in the United States, we found that the more people believe that an AI agent seeks continued functioning, the more they believe in that AI agent’s capability of having a mind of its own. Moreover, we also found that the above association becomes stronger if a person is more familiar with personally interacting with AI. This suggests a directional pattern of value reinforcement in perceptions of AI. As the information processing of AI becomes even more sophisticated in the future, it will be much harder to set clear boundaries about what it means to have an autonomous mind. (shrink)