According to David Hume our idea of a necessary connection between what we call cause and effect is produced when repeated observation of the conjunction of two events determines the mind to consider one upon the appearance of the other. No matter how we interpret Hume's theory of causation this explanation of the genesis of the idea of necessity is fraught with difficulty. I hope to show, looking at the three major interpretations of Hume's causal theory, that his account is (...) contradictory, plainly wrong, or inherently impossible to verify. (shrink)

La relación entre ideas e imágenes en sus distintas formulaciones filosóficas a lo largo de la modernidad es uno de los elementos clave para la definición de unas y otras, tanto en la teoría epistemológica como en la estética. Este artículo se centra en el estudio de la teoría de las ideas abstractas de Hume, basada en su concepción de las ideas como imágenes. Investigo así sus raíces en la obra de Berkeley, para analizar seguidamente la pretensión humeana de presentar (...) una teoría por completo nominalista. Aquí, el concepto de semejanza, central para la definición de una imagen visual, se revelará como uno de los núcleo de su teoría. The relation between ideas and images, in their different philosophical formulations since the Enlightenment, is one of the key elements of their definitions both in Epistemology as well as in Aesthetics. This paper concentrates on Hume's theory of abstract ideas, based on his conception of ideas as images. I investigate first the roots of his theory in the works of Berkeley, to analyse further Hume's contention that his theory is completely nominalist. Here the idea of similarity, essential for the definition of a visual image, will show itself as the core of his theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of Hume's Law that sees him as dismissing all possible arguments from is to ought on the basis of a comparison with his famous argument on induction.

In 1739 Hume bequeathed a bold view of the self to the philosophical community that would prove highly influential, but equally controversial. His bundle theory of the self elicited substantial opposition soon after its appearance in the Treatise of Human Nature. Yet Hume makes it clear to his readers that his views on the self rest on respectable foundations: namely, the views of the highly regarded Irish philosopher, George Berkeley. As the author of the Treatise sees it, his account of (...) the self draws on Berkeley’s conception of language, especially his views on singular terms. But Hume, as impressed as he is with Berkeley’s account of language, deems it necessary to defend this view against possible criticism. In the process Hume modifies Berkeley’s views. My paper is a critical investigation of Hume’s defense of Berkeley on language and an attempt to highlight the extent to which Hume departs from the views of his Irish colleague. -/- . (shrink)

Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions , nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris (...) paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise. (shrink)

Hume claims that education is ‘disclaimed by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion’ (T 1.3.10.1) and that it is ‘never... recogniz'd by philosophers’ (T 1.3.9.19). He is usually taken to be referring here to indoctrination. I argue, however, that his main concern is with association and those philosophers who emphasize the epistemic dangers of the imagination. These include Locke, Hutcheson and Descartes, but not Hume himself. Hume praises education, highlighting its role in the formation of general (...) rules, and in fostering social conditions that encourage the growth of knowledge and moral virtue. (shrink)

Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is (...) some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’. (shrink)

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Este artículo analiza la teoría humeana del conocimiento del mundo externo. Defiende que la misma supone una defensa del realismo directo propio del sentido común y una crítica de cualquier tipo de realismo representacional así como del fenomenismo. Esta defensa es escéptica porque Hume considera que la premisa básica de tal realismo, el carácter específicamente semejante de los cuerpos y nuestras percepciones de ellos, no tiene otro fundamento que la naturaleza de nuestra imaginación y, además, contradice la razón, a la (...) vez que señala que esta última facultad es incapaz de erigir un sistema preferible a aquel sistema vulgar. (shrink)