Misrecognition from other individuals and social institutions is by its dynamic or ‘logic’ such that it can lead to distorted relations-to-self, such as self-hatred, and can truncate the development of the central capabilities of persons. Thus it is worth trying to shed light on how mis recognition differs from adequate recognition, and on how mis recognition might differ from other kinds of mistreatment and disregard. This paper suggests that mis recognition (including nonrecognition) is a matter of inadequate responsiveness to the (...) normatively relevant features of someone (their personhood, merits, needs etc.), and that if the kind of mistreatment in question obeys the general dynamic or ‘logic’ of mutual recognition and relations-to-self, then it may be called ‘misrecognition’. Further, this article considers the multiple connections between misrecognition and human fallibility. The capacity to get things wrong or make mistakes (that is, fallibility) is first of all a condition of misrecognition. Furthermore, there are two lessons that we can draw from fallibility. The first one points towards minimal objectivism: if something is to count as a mistake or incorrect response, there must accordingly exist a fact of the matter or a correct response. The other lesson points towards public equality: if our capacity to get things right on our own is limited, then public, shared norms will probably help. Such norms are easier to know and follow than objective normative truths, and they may contain collective cumulative wisdom; and of course the process of creating public norms embodies in itself an important form of mutual recognition between citizens. (shrink)

Societies in transition aiming at positive peace have the crucial task of redefining the moral relationships among their members. Once a violent conflict ends, children are both members of the society who have suffered, and those who will inherit the results of the transition. Children are victims, witnesses and at times perpetrators of crimes, but also part of the moral community and potentially key actors in peace processes: which would be the morally right attitude towards children in post-conflict scenarios? I (...) argue that exposure to violent conflict grounds a ‘special’ moral status that children are entitled to have recognized, while its impact on their lives results in severe denials of their moral worth. However, acknowledging their moral status and recognizing their past and present sufferings, through mechanisms of transitional justice in particular, has the potential to change their status within society without denying their moral worth. I thus suggest that the morally right attitude of societies in transition should be sensitive to children’s claims of moral ‘recognition’, where recognition can act as the informing principle behind the morally right attitude towards them, and ‘transitional justice’ as the set of theories and mechanisms to possibly translate that attitude into practice. (shrink)

The publications of Taylor (1994) and Honneth (1995) have ignited a renewed interest in the Hegelian theme of recognition. But recognition has not only positive aspects, as there are also negative connotations to recognition seen as misrecognition. What might be termed negative recognition argues that there is more to recognition than simple misrecognition. This article aims to show that negative recognition reaches beyond misrecognition and non-recognition. The paper argues that there are at least four versions of negative recognition. These are (...) misrecognition, non-recognition, de-recognition, and pathological mass-recognition. The examples used to illustrate the existence of these four forms of negative recognition have been drawn from the world of work and general politics. The conclusion enhances the negative side of the ‘recognition thesis’ as recently outlined by Martineau et al. (2012) and others. (shrink)