George Lakoff discusses how emotion metaphors reflect the discrete bodily states associated with each emotion. The analysis raises questions about the context for and frequency of use of emotion metaphors and, indeed, emotion labels, per se. An assumption implicit to most theories of emotion is that emotion language is just another channel through which people express ongoing emotion states. Drawing from recent evidence that labeling ongoing emotions reduces their intensity, we propose that a primary function of emotion language is regulatory (...) rather than expressive. (shrink)

Strong arguments have been formulated that the computational limits of disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) will, sooner or later, be a problem that needs to be addressed. Similarly, convincing cases for how embodied forms of AI can exceed these limits makes for worthwhile research avenues. This paper discusses how embodied cognition brings with it other forms of information integration and decision-making consequences that typically involve discussions of machine cognition and similarly, machine consciousness. N. Katherine Hayles’s novel conception of nonconscious cognition in (...) her analysis of the human cognition-consciousness connection is discussed in relation to how nonconscious cognition can be envisioned and exacerbated in embodied AI. Similarly, this paper offers a way of understanding the concept of suffering in a way that is different than the conventional sense of attributing it to either a purely physical state or a conscious state, instead of grounding at least a type of suffering in this form of cognition. (shrink)

Drawing on Latin treatises, letters, and autobiographical writings, this article outlines the changes in the—thoroughly somatic—learned medical understanding of the emotions (or “affectus/passiones...

What is the relationship between language, emotion concepts, and perceptual categories? Here I compare the strong Whorfian view of linguistic relativity, which argues that language plays a necessary role in the perception of emotions, to the alternative view that different levels of processing are relatively independent and thus, that language does not play a foundational role in emotion perception. I examine neuropsychological studies that have tested strong claims of linguistic relativity, and discuss research on categorical perception of emotional expressions, where (...) the two accounts have been directly tested against each other. As in other perceptual domains, there is little evidence that language plays a foundational role in the perception of emotion. (shrink)

In this article, we consider infants’ acquisition of foundational aspects of language and emotion through the lens of statistical learning. By taking a comparative developmental approach, we highlight ways in which the learning problems presented by input from these two rich communicative domains are both similar and different. Our goal is to encourage other scholars to consider multiple domains of human experience when developing theories in developmental cognitive science.

Metaphors can provide a conceptual framework for understanding complex topics and as such, they have frequently been used in COVID-19 discourse. As previous research indicates that conceptual metaphors can influence how people reason about complex topics, the metaphors used to communicate about the pandemic can influence how it is understood and how people respond. This paper investigates the influence of metaphorical framing on emotions and reasoning. An experimental study compares BATTLE and JOURNEY metaphor frames in a hypothetical text (adapted from (...) previous studies) about the pandemic. Our aim is to examine the influence of these frames on readers’ affective state, inferences about the attitudes of others and suggestions to stop the virus from spreading. The results suggest that compared to JOURNEY metaphors, BATTLE metaphors can negatively influence affective state and may influence people to suggest more restrictive solutions to reduce the spread of the virus. Yet, metaphors were not found to influence reasoning about the attitudes of others. We interpret these results in relation to previous studies, suggesting that metaphors may influence emotions and reasoning in some ways only. The results have implications for public communication surrounding the pandemic. Limitations and avenues for future research are discussed. (shrink)

The nature of emotion concepts and whether there are any that are universally “basic” remains controversial, as acknowledged in the article “Language and Emotion.” The suggestion that some emotions are embodied through a process of association between neural networks for bodily sensations and neural circuitry dedicated to linguistic metaphor is interesting, but speculative. However, it is a hypothesis that risks relegating speakers of languages that lack sophisticated metaphors to a lower level on some scale of linguistic evolution.

En este trabajo trato de abordar el concepto de marco mental como clave para entender la concepción que la neuropolítica tiene de la deliberación pública y la democracia. En un primer lugar expondré los puntos centrales de las teorías de Jonathan Haidt y George Lakoff sobre el marco mental y la deliberación pública. Después pondré en relación la idea del marco mental con el concepto de marco referencial de Taylor. Finalmente, analizaré críticamente el modelo de deliberación pública y de democracia (...) que cabe extraer del concepto de marco mental en la neuropolítica.In this article I address the concept of «mental frame» as the key to understand the conception neuropolithics has on moral deliberation. Firstly, I will expose the core points of Jonathan Haidt y George Lakoff’s theories on mental frame and public deliberation. Then, I will put in relation the idea of mental frame with Charles Taylor’s concept of «referential frame». This will allow us, finally, to critically analyze the model of public deliberation and democracy that can be drawn from the concept of moral frame in neuropolitics. (shrink)

Many scholars often use the terms “metaphors,” “analogies,” and “models” interchangeably and inadvertently overlook the uniqueness of each word. According to recent cognitive studies, the three terms involve distinct cognitive processes using features from a familiar concept and applying them to an abstract, complicated concept. In the field of science and religion, there have been various objects or ideas used as metaphors, analogies, or models to describe the science–religion relationship. Although these heuristic tools provided some understanding of the complex interaction, (...) they failed to address the broad nature of science and religion as well as the multifarious relationship between the two in a sociocultural context. Unlike the previous candidates, the concept of language, including the notions of linguistic worldview, linguistic identity, dialects, power, and bilingualism, offers a unique and comprehensive window through which science, religion, and the relationship between the two are seen with clarity. (shrink)

This comment challenges essentialist “brain biased” interpretations of emotions from a historical perspective. humanities research shows that the embodying of emotions is historically contingent. Emotion metaphors do not so much reflect what is happening in our brain or in other parts of the body: they reflect what people think/thought is/was happening in and outside their body.

“Language and Emotion” showed a number of nonobvious ways in which the nature of emotion can be studied via the way that emotions are expressed, mostly unconsciously, in language. The results given there have come mostly from cognitive linguistics, structured neural computation, and embodied cognition taken together. The references given, survey those results and their empirical basis. The commentators have each made contributions to our ultimate understanding of emotion, each from a different field with a different set of assumptions and (...) research techniques. But they are not up on contemporary embodied cognitive linguistics. As a result, most missed points made in the article. The good news is that each got a chance to introduce their own research to our readership. (shrink)

Lakoff describes an account of conceptual representation based in part on metaphor. Though promising, this account faces several challenges with respect to learning and development.

This comment questions the logic and evidence base of Lakoff’s (2016) account of metaphor, embodiment, and the so-called neural theory of language. It calls for proper attention to linguistic and cultural diversity and opposes biophysical reductionism.

The place of emotions in aesthetic response has long been a topic in contemporary philosophical theorizing. One aspect of the debate in particular seems to have become a recalcitrant problem: when experiencing fiction, we experience emotional reactions towards what we know not to exist. Is this rational? In fact, is it even possible? This article deals with the so‐called “paradox of fiction” from the viewpoint of ancient poetics. In the first section, I survey some of the main arguments proposed to (...) (dis)solve the paradox in analytic philosophy. In the second and the third sections, I address what I consider two problematic assumptions of existing analytic approaches: their prescriptive, “essentialist” attitude and their exclusive focus on matters of content. By offering a brief sketch of the ancient principles of “likelihood” and “vividness”, I argue that they provide a direct and cognitively realistic answer to the paradox insofar as they account for the neutralization of doxastic features in imaginative acts and ground affective responses to fiction in the phenomenon of “aesthetic immersion”, explained in experiential, rather than representational, terms. (shrink)

It has been argued that metaphor and emotion processing are tightly linked together. Here we explore whether neuroscientific evidence supports this claim.

The question of how literature can evoke emotions is a familiar one, as is the idea that a good work of literature arouses the right emotion in the right place through our capacity for sympathy. However, there is no consensus on how this works, partly because there is no agreement on the nature of emotions. One figure that contributes to both of these topics is Robert Musil. As a thinker and as a novelist, he had both a theory of emotions (...) and a novelistic treatment of them. His novels are notable, however, for the way in which they do not appeal to the reader’s capacity for sympathy, owing partly to the formlessness of his characters. Yet it is precisely the gap he creates between fiction and emotional reality that allows for a richer investigation of the relationship between emotions and literature. (shrink)