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  1. Creativity in Science and the ‘Anthropological Turn’ in Virtue Theory.Ian James Kidd - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-16.
    I argue that philosophical studies of the virtues of creativity should attend to the ways that our conceptions of human creativity may be grounded in conceptions of human nature or the nature of reality. I consider and reject claims in this direction made by David Bohm and Paul Feyerabend. The more compelling candidate is the account of science, creativity, and human nature developed by the early Marx. Its guiding claim is that the forms of creativity enabled by the sciences are (...)
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  • Fairness in Knowing: Science Communication and Epistemic Justice.Fabien Medvecky - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics 24 (5):1393-1408.
    Science communication, as a field and as a practice, is fundamentally about knowledge distribution; it is about the access to, and the sharing of knowledge. All distribution brings with it issues of ethics and justice. Indeed, whether science communicators acknowledge it or not, they get to decide both which knowledge is shared, and who gets access to this knowledge. As a result, the decisions of science communicators have important implications for epistemic justice: how knowledge is distributed fairly and equitably. This (...)
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  • Why did Feyerabend Defend Astrology? Integrity, Virtue, and the Authority of Science.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (4):464-482.
    This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third “pluralist” reading is judged more persuasive, (...)
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