This paper aims at giving an account of the philosophy of norms of Georges Canguilhem in the framework of his philosophical vitalism. According to Canguilhem, vitalism is not a metaphysical or ontological theory, but rather a general attitude or a perspective about life and living beings, both understood employing the axiological concept of ‘normativity’. This notion allows Canguilhem to enlarge the concept of life beyond the field of biological phenomena, encompassing also phenomena of the social world, included technique and scientific (...) knowledge and rationality. Canguilhem’s perspective relocates human activities within a vitalistic conception of life, which redefines the meaning of human reason by putting it in relation to values and norms. (shrink)

Se explican dos ideas capitales de la epistemología de Bachelard y su relación mutua: la ciencia es fenomenotécnica, la ciencia inventa sus conceptos La producción de fenómenos con arreglo a esos conceptos certifica su idoneidad.We explain two main ideas of Bachelard’s philosophy of science and their mutual relation. Science produces phenomena and creates its own concepts. Production of phenomena according to these concepts certifies their aptness.

A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant’s exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant’s critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood; and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant‘s new conception of theodicy, (...) I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant’s second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of ‘metaphysical evil’, and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant’s claim in this regard. (shrink)

Is anthropology a science? To put the question today amounts to a reply in the negative. The representatives of the ‘true’ sciences are not alone in suggesting a conjunctural or crippling lacuna which would preclude membership by right of the prestigious world, which, however, the name ‘humanistic sciences’ seems to demand. We should remember that some years ago Claude Lévi-Strauss caused a shudder to run through his discipline by describing it as a ‘flattering imposture’. Since then denigration has spread constantly, (...) and it no longer consists of deploring a slowness, an equivocation or a handicap which we would have the hope of remedying: it is definitely a fatality which we are from now on invited to confirm. (shrink)

This paper elucidates the philosophical origins of the conception of plants as machines and analyses the contemporary technical and ethical consequences of that thinking. First, we explain the historical relationship between the explicit animal machine thesis of Descartes and the implicit plant machine thesis of today. Our hypothesis is that, although it is rarely discussed, the plant machine thesis remains influential. We define the philosophical criteria for both a moderate and radical interpretation of the thesis. Then, assessing the compatibility of (...) current botanical knowledge with both interpretations, we find that neither withstands scrutiny. We trace how biological and agricultural sciences have historically relied upon thinking of plants as machines and how they continue to do so today through rhetoric centred on breeding, biotechnology, and production. We discuss some of the most important legal and ethical consequences of obscuring the vitality of plants. Finally, we explore less reductive and destructive ways of thinking about, and using, plants. (shrink)

For centuries, philosophy has been considered as an intellectual activity requiring complex cognitive skills and predispositions related to complex (or critical) thinking. The Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach aims at the development of critical thinking in pupils through philosophical dialogue. Some contest the introduction of P4C in the classroom, suggesting that the discussions it fosters are not philosophical in essence. In this text, we argue that P4C is philosophy.

“Being is an ocean in perpetual agitation,Of this ocean people perceive but the waves.On the apparent surface of the ocean, hidden in them,Look at the surging waves arising from secret depths!”One of the leitmotifs of the literature of Iranian Sufism is the “quest for the Orient” (istishraq). It is an Orient that is neither localized nor localizable in the realm of positive geography. It escapes our normal perception; it is the mystic Orient, point of Origin and of Return, located at (...) the “heavenly pole” of the cosmic North. It figures in that geographia imaginalis that is perceived only by the power of the imagination. It is located, then, beyond the devastated lands of this sensible world, lands that incarnate troubled and dispersed hearts for Iranian Sufism. (shrink)

Today, the linguistic approach offers us an irreplaceable method for the direct study of the constitutive processes of social phenomena (A. Delobelle, 1981). In fact, each social phenomenon is basically inhabited or interpreted by language. It is language processes that give its ramifications to the social and form disstinct sub-groups in it. This is why, when these processes are observed in their formal dynamics, outside their vehiculated “contents,” it is as though we find ourselves faced with the very functioning of (...) the social: as though we have in it a typically experimental terrain for the direct study of social phenomena. (shrink)

El concepto de "inmanencia" ha adquirido una creciente relevancia en el campo filosófico contemporáneo. Dos destacados pensadores franceses, Gilles Deleuze y Franfois Jullien, le han otorgado un lugar fundamental en sus investigaciones. El propósito de este artículo es indagar el diálogo, poco explorado aún, entre ambos autores. Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo propone los siguientes ejes de análisis: primero, comparamos los usos de la expresión "absolutización de la inmanencia", acuñada por el sinólogo a fin de relativizar la trascendencia en el pensamiento (...) chino y luego empleada por Deleuze en el marco de la creencia en este mundo. En segundo lugar, examinamos las críticas que Jullien le dirige a Deleuze respecto a la relación entre la filosofía y la sabiduría. En tercer lugar, confrontamos sus perspectivas divergentes sobre la inmanencia en tanto "plano" (Deleuze) y como "fondo" (Jullien). Finalmente, ponemos de manifiesto la dificultad presente en ambos autores para pensar la idea de inmanencia. The concept of "immanence" has acquired substantial relevance within the contemporary philosophical field. Two influential french thinkers, Gilles Deleuze and Franfois Jullien, have conferred this concept a fundamental standing in their research. The purpose of this work is to explore the dialogue between both authors as this exploration has not been concluded. Our hypothesis puts forward the following axes of analysis. First, we shall compare the usage of the expression "absolutization of immanence" coined by the sinologist in order to put in perspective the idea of transcendence in Chinese thought. This expression was then applied by Deleuze within the frame of the belief in this world. Second, we shall examine Jullien's critique of Deleuze concerning the relationship between Philosophy and Wisdom. Third, we shall confront the divergent perspectives on immanence: as "plane" (Deleuze) and as "buttom" (Jullien). Finally, we shall show the difficulty to ponder the idea of immanence in both authors. (shrink)

In the Essay Bergson defines personal expression as free. A free act is the expression of the conception of life found in a person’s experience of life. Given that it is different for everyone, it cannot be expressed in language. That is why Bergson considers that the act which is the most free is one that is done without any reason. It can be said that Bergson himself felt the need to ground his conception of responsibility. In the Cours II (...) he states two conditions of responsibility: freedom and discernment. The identity of a person which ensures that freedom is based in the conception of duration found in the Essay. In Matter and Memory Bergson tries to resolve the question of discernment with the help of his theory of memory. Bergson succeeded in solving the problems related to reason and to fanciful decision and solidly established the notion of responsibility while renewing the theory of freedom originally found in the Essay. (shrink)