While according to the inferentialists, meaning is always a kind of inferential role, proponents of other approaches to semantics often doubt that actual meanings, as they see them, can be generally reduced to inferential roles. In this paper we propose a formal framework for considering the hypothesis of the.

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s (...) bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges can be raised against VT. First, some philosophers object that veridicalists erroneously ignore the informativeness of false messages. Secondly, it is not clear whether VT can adequately explain the information considered in hypothetical reasoning. In this sense, logical diagrams offer an interesting case of analysis: by manipulating (...) a logical diagram we can verify that a certain conclusion follows from a set of premises, but it cannot help us to determine the actual truth-value of a given set of propositions. Focusing on the latter challenge, in this paper I claim that logical diagrams set out potential counterexamples to VT and, consequently, pose a real challenge to this thesis. First, a veridicalist analysis of logical diagrams requires the assumption of metatheoretical properties which are not satisfied by some logical systems (and, consequently, are not satisfied by some systems of logical diagrams). So, VT does not fit well as a general framework for a theory of logical diagrammatic information. Secondly, based on semantic inferentialism, one can propose a normative interpretation of the inferential content of logical diagrams not exposed to the problems faced by VT. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that veridicalism cannot accommodate such a normative interpretation. In other words, normativism represents a real (though still underexplored) alternative to veridicality. Due to these reasons, I conclude that, until further research, we should adopt a more parsimonious standpoint and say that logical diagrams provide inferential information simply. (shrink)

Abstract This paper discusses the semantic theory presented in Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit . I argue that it is best understood as a special version of dynamic semantics, so that these semantics by themselves offer an interesting theoretical alternative to more standard truth-conditional theories. This reorientation also has implications for more foundational issues. I argue that it gives us the resources for a renewed argument for the normativity of meaning. The paper ends by critically assessing the view in both (...) its development and motivations. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9768-4 Authors Bernhard Nickel, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)