The landscape of historical research on early modern philosophy has changed dramatically since the publication of Eileen O'Neill's landmark essay, “Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History” (O'Neill 1997). In the past thirty years, increasing quantities of scholarly attention have shifted toward retrieving and reassessing the contributions of marginalized voices throughout the history of philosophy. Few interventions are as impactful within this growing field as Marcy Lascano's recent monograph comparing the metaphysical systems of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) (...) and Anne Conway (1631–1679). Lascano identifies three core metaphysical themes that are shared between both figures: monism, vitalism, and self-motion. In addition to these core themes, she presents a few more points of comparison—such as their shared dissatisfactions with mechanical philosophy—as well as some points of disconnect—such as the differing roles of God and teleology in their frameworks. Readers will find a clear overview of both authors’ metaphysical frameworks presented within a helpful model for comparative interpretation in ameliorative historical research. ... (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) argues that when someone throws a ball, their hand does not cause the ball to move. Instead, the ball moves itself. In this chapter, I reconstruct Cavendish’s argument that material things—like the ball—are self-moving. Cavendish argues that body-body interaction is unintelligible. We cannot make sense of interaction in terms of the transfer of motion nor the more basic idea that one body acts in another body. Assuming something moves bodies around, Cavendish concludes that bodies move themselves. Still, (...) Cavendish needs to explain why bodies appear to causally interact even if they do not really. Balls do not usually throw themselves without a helping hand. I offer a new reading of the way bodies respond to their external circumstances in terms of prerequisites or enabling conditions. (shrink)