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Are we studying consciousness yet?

In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press (2008)

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  1. Everything, More or Less: A Defence of Generality Relativism. [REVIEW]Peter Fritz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (4):623-627.
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  • How to measure metacognition.Stephen M. Fleming & Hakwan C. Lau - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • The conjunction of non-consciously perceived object identity and spatial position can be retained during a visual short-term memory task.Fredrik Bergström & Johan Eriksson - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1):85-108.
    Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness (...)
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  • Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology.Philipp Berghofer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5747-5768.
    Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience’s distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to (...)
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  • Interocular suppression prevents interference in a flanker task.Qiong Wu, Jonathan T. H. Lo Voi, Thomas Y. Lee, Melissa-Ann Mackie, Yanhong Wu & Jin Fan - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:152768.
    Executive control of attention refers to processes that detect and resolve conflict among competing thoughts and actions. Despite the high-level nature of this faculty, the role of awareness in executive control of attention is not well understood. In this study, we used interocular suppression to mask the flankers in an arrow flanker task, in which the flankers and the target arrow were presented simultaneously in order to elicit executive control of attention. Participants were unable to detect the flanker arrows or (...)
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  • The unconscious mind: From classical theoretical controversy to controversial contemporary research and a practical illustration of the “error of our ways”.Myron Tsikandilakis, Persefoni Bali, Jan Derrfuss & Peter Chapman - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102771.
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  • Conscious Perception and the Prefrontal Cortex A Review.Matthias Michel - 2022 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (7-8):115-157.
    Is perceptual processing in dedicated sensory areas sufficient for conscious perception? Localists say ‘Yes—given some background conditions.’ Prefrontalists say ‘No: conscious perceptual experience requires the involvement of prefrontal structures.’ I review the evidence for prefrontalism. I start by presenting correlational evidence. In doing so, I answer the ‘report argument’, according to which the apparent involvement of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness stems from the requirement for reports. I then review causal evidence for prefrontalism and answer the ‘lesion argument’, which purports (...)
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  • Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.Daniel Revach & Moti Salti - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96 (C):103229.
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  • (1 other version)Calibration in Consciousness Science.Matthias Michel - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-22.
    To study consciousness, scientists need to determine when participants are conscious and when they are not. They do so with consciousness detection procedures. A recurring skeptical argument against those procedures is that they cannot be calibrated: there is no way to make sure that detection outcomes are accurate. In this article, I address two main skeptical arguments purporting to show that consciousness scientists cannot calibrate detection procedures. I conclude that there is nothing wrong with calibration in consciousness science.
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  • Visibility Is Not Equivalent to Confidence in a Low Contrast Orientation Discrimination Task.Manuel Rausch & Michael Zehetleitner - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Confidence Tracks Consciousness.Jorge Morales & Hakwan Lau - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.
    Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence ratings (...)
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  • The Structure of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1193-1236.
    What is a bias? Standard philosophical views of both implicit and explicit bias focus this question on the representations one harbours, for example, stereotypes or implicit attitudes, rather than the ways in which those representations are manipulated. I call this approach representationalism. In this paper, I argue that representationalism taken as a general theory of psychological social bias is a mistake, because it conceptualizes bias in ways that do not fully capture the phenomenon. Crucially, this view fails to capture a (...)
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  • Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing.Ian Phillips - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):419-451.
    Block () highlights two experimental studies of neglect patients which, he contends, provide ‘dramatic evidence’ for unconscious seeing. In Block's hands this is the highly non-trivial thesis that seeing of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur outside of phenomenal consciousness. Block's case for it provides an excellent opportunity to consider a large body of research on clinical syndromes widely held to evidence unconscious perception. I begin by considering in detail the two studies of neglect to which (...)
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  • Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest, by Peter Carruthers. [REVIEW]Matthias Michel - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (4):619–623.
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  • The Visual Experience of Kinds.Andrei I. Marasoiu - 2013 - Dissertation, Georgia State University
    Do perceiving subjects represent kind properties in the content of their conscious visual experience when they see and recognize instances of those natural kinds? In Part 1 of my thesis I clarify this question, in Part 2 I answer it, and in Part 3 I raise a problem for previous answers. Part 1 conceives of conscious experience in an internalist way, and the unified conscious episode does not exclude having beliefs about what one sees. Following Siegel and Bayne, Part 2 (...)
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