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  1. Implicit visual learning and the expression of learning.Hilde Haider, Katharina Eberhardt, Alexander Kunde & Michael Rose - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):82-98.
    Although the existence of implicit motor learning is now widely accepted, the findings concerning perceptual implicit learning are ambiguous. Some researchers have observed perceptual learning whereas other authors have not. The review of the literature provides different reasons to explain this ambiguous picture, such as differences in the underlying learning processes, selective attention, or differences in the difficulty to express this knowledge. In three experiments, we investigated implicit visual learning within the original serial reaction time task. We used different response (...)
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  • On the source and scope of priming effects of masked stimuli on endogenous shifts of spatial attention.Simon Palmer & Uwe Mattler - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):528-544.
    Unconscious stimuli can influence participants’ motor behavior as well as more complex mental processes. Previous cue-priming experiments demonstrated that masked cues can modulate endogenous shifts of spatial attention as measured by choice reaction time tasks. Here, we applied a signal detection task with masked luminance targets to determine the source and the scope of effects of masked stimuli. Target-detection performance was modulated by prime-cue congruency, indicating that prime-cue congruency modulates signal enhancement at early levels of target processing. These effects, however, (...)
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  • Repeating a strongly masked stimulus increases priming and awareness.Anne Atas, Astrid Vermeiren & Axel Cleeremans - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1422-1430.
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  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW]David Pereplyotchik - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):434-448.
    Gennaro presents a version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness that differs from the version defended by Rosenthal . I explore several key differences between Gennaro's and Rosenthal's views, with an eye toward establishing that Rosenthal's Extrinsic Higher-Order Thought theory is preferable to Gennaro's Wide Intrinsicality View . Gennaro's attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the WIV rest on an unargued and implausible assumption to the effect that the higher-order intentional contents of self-representing conscious states are necessarily accurate. Gennaro (...)
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  • How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  • Differences in the detail: Metacognition is better for seen than sensed changes to visual scenes.Kendall D. Salzman, Kachina Allen & Ken McAnally - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 112 (C):103533.
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  • Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses.Kathinka Evers, Michele Farisco & Cyriel Pennartz - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 119 (C):103668.
    How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare (...)
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