Discussions in sociological theory often focus on ontological questions on the nature of social reality. Against the underlying epistemological realism, I argue for a constructivist notion of theory: Theories are webs of concepts that we use to guide empirical observations and to make sense of them. We cannot know the real features of the social world, only what our theoretical perspectives make us see. Theories therefore represent social phenomena by highlighting certain features and relating them in a logical system. In (...) this system, theoretical sentences can be considered true if they meet two conditions: They are consistent with the theory at hand and adequately map empirically observable relations between objects denoted by theoretical constructs. Truth is therefore relative to a perspective; it is not objectively determinable. Theories should be assessed not for their ontologies but for what they allow us to see and how they connect to empirical observations. (shrink)

Standard defenses of ontological individualism are challenged by arguments that exploit the dependence of social facts on material facts—that is, facts that are not about human individuals. In this article, I discuss Brian Epstein’s “materialism” in The Ant Trap: granting Epstein’s strict definition of individualism, I show that his arguments depend crucially on a generous conception of social properties and social facts. Individualists, however, are only committed to the claim that projectible properties are individualistically realized, and materialists have not undermined (...) this claim. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Richard Lauer’s “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” (2019) and an attempt to contribute to the meta-social ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part, I will give a rough sketch of Lauer’s general project and confront his pragmatist approach with a fundamental problem. The second part of my reply will provide a solution for this problem rooted in a philosophy of the social sciences in practice.

The article realizes the analysis of B. Epstein’s social ontology. Social ontology is teaching on basic principles of constructing of social reality, founded on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary strategies of investigations of the social world. There are five leading programs in contemporary social ontology: “CIIF-program” of J. Searle, “Cambridge program” of T. Lawson, “Tufts program” of B. Epstein, “critical realism” and “the other institutionalism”. “Tufts program” is one from them. Social ontology tries to make progress on clarifying all of these in (...) the context of specific topics: group intentions, laws, corporations, property, institutions, social groups. To begin an inquiry in social ontology, we need to choose which entities to work out the ontology of, that is, where to focus our attention in analyzing the social world. B. Epstein supposes his own model of re-conceptualization of framework of social ontology: two concepts play here a leading role, - “grounding” and “anchoring”. “Anchoring” and grounding”: these are two fundamental aspects to the building of the social world. Correspondingly, social ontology consists of two distinct projects. The grounding project is the inquiry into the conditions for the social facts to obtain. There are facts in the world are metaphysically sufficient reasons, - that is, grounds, - but it is more exact social facts of some kind. The anchoring project is the inquiry into what puts those conditions in place. Also it should be realized research concerning the grounding conditions for social facts. The last work of B. Epstein “The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of Social Sciences” is devoted to criticism of ontological individualism in philosophical analysis of social knowledge. (shrink)

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological (...) theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article. (shrink)

The article responds to Richard Lauer’s (2019) “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” The article concurs that “social ontology matters” for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology (...) as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 150-174, June 2022. This article offers a reassessment of the main import of Peter Winch’s philosophy of the social sciences. Critics argue that Winch presented a flawed methodology for the social sciences, while his supporters deny that Winch’s work is about methodology at all. Contrary to both, the author argues that Winch deals with fundamental questions about methodology, and that there is something substantial to learn from his account. Winch engages (...) methodological questions without being committed to social ontology. Instead, Winch’s work on methodology is best described as a descriptive metaphysics of social inquiry. This alternative reading clarifies the close link between Winch’s argument for the autonomy of the social sciences and R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history. (shrink)

Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existence and significance of an analogy between biological phenomena and socio-cultural phenomena (the “biology-culture analogy”). Mesoudi (2017) seems to argue that it is the accuracy of the analogy, and the magnitude of accurate instances of this analogy at work, which provides warrant for an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, and, thus, for CET. An implication of this is that if there is evidence to suggest (...) that the analogy is not accurate, or that there aren’t many cases where it is accurate, this would constitute evidence to reject an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. As such, opponents of CET raise objections highlighting the weakness of the biology-culture analogy. These objections, in turn, have standard replies in the literature that serve to reinforce the realism of the biology-culture analogy. Curiously, this situation would appear to support a position in the philosophy of social science called “Ontology Matters” (Lauer 2019). It is the view that social ontology can contribute to the empirical success of the social sciences (among which I include CET) by providing an accurate account of what there is in the domain of the social world which can be used to generate better explanations and/or predictions of social phenomena. If ontology matters, in this sense, perhaps this can help to clarify and resolve the dispute regarding the realism of the biology-culture analogy. In turn, perhaps this can help us determine what warrant there is for CET. However, I think this situation is indicative of severe confusion and misunderstanding as to the significance of the biology-culture analogy. This confusion is caused by inattention to two things. First, the useful distinction between it’s methodological, epistemological, and ontological significance. Second, the abstract (ontologically minimalist) nature of Darwinian evolution by natural selection. By drawing attention to these two things, I hope to take the sting out of, and deflate the significance of, disputes regarding the accuracy of the analogy, for both proponents and opponents of CET, as well as to bring into contact a classical dispute in the philosophy of social science with some relevant aspects of theoretical biology. (shrink)

The article discusses the problem of the naturalistic methodology of social ontology. Following Katherine Hawley's (2018) analysis, the author considers three approaches: conceptual analysis, the ameliorative (or normative) approach, and inference to the best explanation (from best social science to social ontology). Hawley concludes that only the first two can provide a viable naturalistic social metaphysics, and the latter cannot. The author, drawing on the notion of naturalistic limitations of social ontology, shows that only a conclusion to the best explanation (...) can lead to a consistent realistic social ontology; this methodology avoids the problem of being rooted in concepts that do not have an empirical basis, which contradicts realism, and also does not imply normative prescription, which also contradicts the realistic description of the world. The problem critics attribute to inference to the best explanation - the lack of a predictively strong theoretical core of social theory from which to infer social ontology - can be resolved by satisfying three criteria (Turner, 2007): physical realizability, computability, and cognitive realism. The author proposes to implement them through the introduction of naturalistic restrictions into game theory. Formal models of coordination described by a correlated equilibrium - coupled with evolutionary explanations of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the causal processes that make formally described coordination possible - may provide the desired theoretical core from which ontology can be derived. (shrink)

Social ontology studies the nature and properties of social reality while social metaontology examines the relationship between ontology and the social sciences, which is often treated as a normative question. However, social sciences themselves contain ontological theses, raising the descriptive question of how these internal ontologies relate to the rest of the social sciences. This paper argues that important parts of sociology have an anti-foundationalist metaontology. This descriptive claim is used to build a normative argument against foundationalism and is supported (...) by examining the works of Durkheim and Weber and how their metaontological beliefs continue to influence many sociologists. (shrink)