Overview of the (non)conceptualism debate in Kant studies.

The main point of disagreement about Kant's approach of the problem of truth is whether it can be understood within the apparatus of contemporary philosophy as a coherence or a correspondence theory. By favoring a systematic consideration of Kant's argumentation in light of the available literature on the problem, this paper argues toward the latter alternative. It is sustained that the definition of truth as "the agreement of cognition with its object" is cogent throughout Kant's thought and that it is (...) finally approached not from an established theory, but as a problem to which a solution cannot be given within the boundaries of the critical-transcendental philosophy. Initially, the literature which locates Kant either as coherentist or correspondentist is taken into account. The latter is systematized into four groups: the ontological reading; the isomorphic reading; the "consequentialist" reading; the regulative reading. Secondly, the argumentation in the pre-critical period is approached. It is argued that a coherence theory lacks its confirmation already within it and that in the decade of 1750 Kant disposes of the isomorphic correspondence reading. Finally, the critical argumentation is considered. It is sustained that the critical approach takes truth as a fundamental problem which cannot be held by a "consequencialist" or regulative correspondence theory. (shrink)

O principal ponto de desacordo sobre a abordagem kantiana do problema da verdade é se ela pode ser compreendida nos moldes da filosofia contemporânea como coerentista ou como correspondentista. Primando por uma consideração sistemática da argumentação de Kant em confronto com a literatura existente sobre o problema, este trabalho defende a segunda alternativa. Sustentase a tese de que a definição da verdade como a “concordância do conhecimento com o seu objeto” é cogente em todo o percurso do pensamento kantiano e (...) que, nessa acepção, a verdade culmina por ser abordada não a partir de uma teoria estabelecida, mas como um problema cuja solução não pode ser dada nos limites da filosofia crítico-transcendental. Pondera-se, primeiramente, a literatura que situa Kant quer como coerentista quer como correspondentista e sistematiza-se a segunda alternativa em quatro grupos: a leitura ontológica, a leitura isomórfica, a leitura “consequencialista” e a leitura regulativa. Num segundo momento, em atenção ao período pré-crítico, argumenta-se que a alternativa coerentista deixa de se confirmar já nessa mesma época e que, na década de 1750, Kant descarta uma suposta teoria correspondentista isomórfica. Num último momento, considera-se a argumentação crítica e defende-se que a mesma concebe a verdade como um problema fundamental que não cabe ao tratamento de uma teoria correspondentista concebida de modo “consequencialista” ou regulativo. (shrink)

A comprehensive and practical study tool, introducing Kant's thought and key works and exploring his continuing influence.

Prolegomena §38 is intended to elucidate the claim that the understanding legislates a priori laws to nature. Kant cites various laws of geometry as examples and discusses a derivation of the inverse-square law from such laws. I address 4 key interpretive questions about this cryptic text that have not yet received satisfying answers: How exactly are Kant's examples of laws supposed to elucidate the Legislation Thesis? What is Kant's view of the epistemic status of the inverse-square law and, relatedly, of (...) the legitimacy of the geometric derivation of that law? Whose account of laws, the understanding, and space is Kant critiquing in the passage? What positive account of the relationship between laws, the understanding, and space is Kant offering in the passage? My answer to depends crucially on my answers to –. As I interpret Kant, he holds that a wide range of a priori laws—including geometric laws, the inverse-square law, and the universal laws discussed in the Analytic of Principles—are ‘grounded’ in categorial syntheses rather than the intrinsic nature of the space given to us in pure intuition. (shrink)

This paper tries to make sense of Kant's scattered remarks about conic sections to see what light they shed on his philosophy of mathematics. It proceeds by confronting his remarks with the source that seems to have informed his thinking about conic sections: the Conica of Apollonius. The paper raises questions about Kant's attitude towards mathematics and the way he understood the cognitive resources available to us to do mathematics.