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  1. Nudging and Participation: A Contractualist Approach to Behavioural Policy.Johann Jakob Häußermann - 2020 - Philosophy of Management 19 (1):45-68.
    As behavioural economics reveals, human decision-making deviates from neoclassical assumptions about human behaviour and people fail to make the ‘right’ welfare-enhancing choice. The purpose of Sunstein and Thaler’s concept of ‘nudge’ is to improve individual welfare. To provide normative justification, they argue that the only relevant normative criterion is whether the individual is ‘better off as judged by themselves’, so that the direction in which people are to be nudged is defined by their own preferences. In light of behavioural findings, (...)
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  • Nudging for Changing Selves.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (Thaler & Sustein 2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the ‘as judged by themselves‘ (or AJBT) test to answer this question (5, Thaler & Sunstein 2008). In a recent paper, L. A. Paul and Sunstein (Paul & Sunstein ms) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in (...)
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  • Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Economics.Guilhem Lecouteux - 2015 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):117.
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  • From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond.Adrien Barton & Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):341-359.
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  • Die politische Quacksalberei des libertären Paternalismus.Thomas Schramme - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (1):531-558.
    Der libertäre Paternalismus befürwortet Eingriffe in die Entscheidungsfindung von Bürgern, ohne ihnen Optionen völlig nehmen zu wollen. Vielmehr soll die Lenkung des Willens durch Schubser geschehen. Im folgenden Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass der libertäre Paternalismus auf tönernen Füßen steht. Ich bediene mich dabei des polemischen Bilds von Quacksalbern. Dieses Bild passt zu meinem argumentativen Vorgehen, da ich erstens zeigen will, dass der libertäre Paternalismus falsche Diagnosen über vermeintliche Krankheiten der Willensbildung stellt, und zweitens, dass er die falsche Therapie empfiehlt. (...)
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