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  1. The Normative Significance of Conscience.Kyle Swan & Kevin Vallier - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-21.
    Despite the increasing amount of literature on the legal and political questions triggered by a commitment to liberty of conscience, an explanation of the normative significance of conscience remains elusive. We argue that the few attempts to address this fail to capture the reasons people have to respect the consciences of others. We offer an alternative account that utilizes the resources of the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy to explain why conscience matters.
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Contemporary Intolerance: Why We No Longer Take Martin Luther King, Jr. Seriously.Aaron Preston - 2022 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 34 (1):99-145.
    ABSTRACT A growing body of research suggests that political polarization in the United States is at a forty-year high, and that it is rooted less in disagreements over policy than in hostile attitudes toward political opponents. Such attitudes explain the manifest increase of intolerant behavior in American culture and politics in recent years. But what explains the attitudes themselves? One significant contributor may have been the rise of scientism in the early twentieth century, which undermined the metaphysical, epistemic, and institutional (...)
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  • Eradicating Theocracy Philosophically.Pouya Lotfi Yazdi - manuscript
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  • Courting Epistemology: Legal Scholarship, the Courts, and the Rationality of Religious Belief.Jonathan Fuqua & Shannon Holzer - 2014 - Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 3 (2):195-211.
    What we here show is two-fold. First, there is in certain sectors of the legal community a trend to pronounce negatively on the epistemic credentials of religious belief: many hold that religious belief as such is simply irrational. Our second claim is simply that religious belief need not be irrational: it is perfectly possible for religious believers to have epistemically justified religious beliefs. We discuss here several implications of our two-fold claim. The most important of these is simply that religious (...)
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