In this paper, I discuss the possibility of reading the description of promise presented by Reinach in The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law under the light of Husserl’s Ideas I. In order to present my argument, first, I briefly present the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl in Ideas I highlighting eidetic reduction. Second, I present the Reinachian description of social acts emphasizing the act of promising. Third, and finally, I try to demonstrate that the Reinachian description of the social (...) act of promising is the description of a universal and necessary relation, a synthetic and a priori statement and corresponds to the idea of promise. (shrink)

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we (...) then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief. (shrink)

H.-J. Glock has made important contributions to discussions of rationality, reasons, and rules. This chapter addresses four conceptions of rationality that Glock identifies. One of these conceptions of rationality is that rationality consists in responsiveness to reasons. This chapter goes on to consider the idea that reasons became prominent in normative ethics because of their usefulness in articulating moral pluralism. The final section of the chapter connects reasons and rules and contends that both are ineliminable.

The problem of the relation and difference between things and objects is one of the most decisive issues for the conception of the real. These words are usually used interchangeably – and not only in their everyday usage. There are some contemporary philosophical positions that consider almost “everything” as an object; on the other hand, there are proponents of a strict separation of objects and things. How did it happen that the concept of thing (res) and object (obiectum) not only (...) began to theoretically “compete” with each other but also sometimes came to represent differently conceived realities, and even occasionally came to represent an identical conception of reality? This article, on the one hand, discusses the philosophical strategies that reveal the difference between objects and things and enable such a conception of reality which takes into account the Kantian distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit. On the other, it reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s project of modal ontology. Agamben’s take on the question What is real? is oriented toward the modus of being and could be traced back to the recognition of the difference between objects and things as well as the “restoration of the life of things themselves.”. (shrink)

Leibniz frequently uses the notion of expression, but it is not easy to see just how he understood that relation. This paper focuses on the particular case of the expression of God, which is prominent in the 'Discourse on Metaphysics'. The treatment of expression there suggests several questions. Which substances did Leibniz believe expressed God? Why did Leibniz believe those substances expressed God? And did he believe that all substances expressed God in the same way and for the same reasons? (...) In answering those questions the paper distinguishes two views about expression in the 'Discourse', considers Leibniz's reasons for holding that substances express their causes, and argues that Leibniz's views about emanative causation are important for understanding the unity of his apparently distinct views here. The paper concludes by looking briefly at how the 'Discourse' fits into the evolution of Leibniz's views on this issue over time. (shrink)

Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...) potentiality. This rejection was motivated by an acute sense of the mind’s fallible subjectivity. While conditioned by recent historical events, the 17th century’s pervasive sense of subjectivity also reveals a heavy debt to Hellenistic philosophy, which had been recently rediscovered. But whereas Hellenistic thought, mistrustful of theoria, only reifies conscience, early modern thinking, more mistrustful of praxis and seeking its grounding in theoria, goes a step further and reifies consciousness. Partly modeled on theological ideas, the resulting concept of consciousness is plagued by paradoxes that have becomes notorious for their intractability. But essentially the same model of consciousness underwrites contemporary theory, embroiling contemporary debates in the same controversies that dominated the 17th century. Sidestepping these difficulties by returning to the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind would be a tall order, but it is not impossible. Alfred North Whitehead's theory of consciousness offers an example. His novel theory of time enables Whitehead to rehabilitate the Aristotelian concept of passive mind in a wholly naturalistic way. (shrink)

En este artículo sondearemos los modos de conciencia de un sujeto que intenta desencadenarse de la voluptuosidad y del dolor, dado que la conciencia que posibilita el descubrimiento de la voluntad en cuanto cosa en sí es fruto del éxtasis de su negación. Testimonios personales del filósofo aunados con referentes platónicos y kantianos entre la conciencia empírica y la mejor, ayudarán a esclarecer el desencadenamiento de la metafísica de la voluntad. In this article we shall delve into the conscience moods (...) in a subject who intends to unchain from voluptuosness and pain, inasmuch as the conscience that makes it possible the discovery of will as the thing in itself is the fruit of its negation ecstasy. Personal testimonies of the philosopher together with Platonic and Kantian referents between the empirical conscience and the better conscience will help to elucidate the unleashing of will metaphysics. (shrink)

Opis danych i programów komputerowych za pomocą liczb jest epistemologicznie użyteczny, ponieważ pozwala określać granice różnego typu obliczeń. Dotyczy to w szczególności obliczeń dyskretnych, opisywalnych za pomocą liczb obliczalnych w sensie Turinga. Matematyczny fakt istnienia liczb rzeczywistych innego typu, tj. nieobliczalnych, wyznacza minimalne ograniczenia technik cyfrowych; z drugiej strony jednak, wskazuje na możliwość teoretycznego opracowania i fizycznej implementacji technik obliczeniowo silniejszych, takich jak obliczenia analogowe-ciągłe. Przedstawione w artykule analizy prowadzą do wniosku, że fizyczne implementacje obliczeń niekonwencjonalnych wymagają występowania w przyrodzie (...) wielkości nieskończonych aktualnie. Za fizycznym istnieniem takich wielkości przemawiają wprawdzie pewne argumenty fizyki teoretycznej, nie są one jednak ostateczne. (shrink)

Da bi ocenil Fregejev prispevek k utemeljitvi moderne logike se je avtor v svojem prispevku vrnil v preteklost, do Leibnizove lingua characteristica. Vzporednic ni težko najti: odprava dvoumja v govorici in zgradba enoznačnega jezika na tej osnovi, možnost razrešitve spoznavne moči s kalkulom, kar ločuje leibnizoviko tradicijo od kartezijanske. Srž obeh teorij je en in isti boj znanstvenega govora z govorico, razlika pa je v načinu, kako prehod k zapisu udejani ideal calculus ratiocinator. Različni načini, kako so elementi tega boja (...) med seboj povezani, lahko nudijo tudi osnove za premero specifike družbene razsežnosti obeh pristopov. (shrink)