Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific (...) reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated. (shrink)

With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy’s great ...

The subject of the paper is a contemporary interpretation of J.S. Mill’s elimination method using selected concepts of Zdzisław Pawlak’s decision logic. The aim of the interpretation is to reformulate the original rules of Mill’s induction so that they correspond more precisely to his concept of cause as a complex sufficient condition. In the first part of the paper, we turn to Mill’s writings and justify the thesis that in his understanding the cause is an aggregation of circumstances, and not (...) a single circumstance; next, we point out that Mill’s original canons do not allow causes-aggregations to be singled out from empirical data. In the second part of this paper, we present such aspects of Z. Pawlak’s decision logic that serve as the basis for the formalisation of the method of eliminative induction. We describe exhaustively the schema of induction that involves a gradual - divided into three stages - simplification of a set of implications corresponding to the observed dependencies [system of potential causes, effect]. The simplification is deductive because it maintains consistency within the set of implications. We show that such schema is ideal for isolating complex causes, ultimately described using complex conditional formulas of decision logic. (shrink)