The aim of this paper is to raise the question of aging as an ontological question. In critical dialogue with Heidegger’s exploration of the question of being, the first half of the paper argues that fundamental ontology, due to the way it relies on a methodological operationalization of the ontological difference, will remain blind to the ontological generativity of the differences that aging makes. I introduce the term gerontological difference as a name for this kind of difference. The second half (...) of the paper explores the quasi-transcendental play of gerontological difference. Drawing on Foucault, Guenther and Agamben, I suggest that this play might be described in archaeological terms by tracing _the historical a priori_ in which age distinctions are operationalized biopolitically. Drawing on Derrida and Nancy, I argue that this archaeological view of the quasi-transcendental play of gerontological difference must be supplemented with a view of aging as material _différance_. According to this understanding of the quasi-transcendental play of gerontological difference, aging is an ontologically generative event that organizes intercorporeal tangles of coexistence and opens emergent fields of possible experience. (shrink)

We have recently stated the reasons why we claim that biological ageing is undesirable. Räsänen has responded to our article by arguing that this process has certain desirable aspects and, therefore, our position is inconsistent. Räsänen develops two arguments to defend his position. We will call the first the argument from the totality of the ageing process and the second the argument from the reduced goods of the ageing process. In this reply, we will give reasons to show that both (...) arguments fail. The first, on the one hand, starts from a dubious conception of ageing and, on the other hand, even accepting this conception, its reformulation is morally empty. The second incurs in an absurd conclusion. (shrink)

Brain age prediction is a relatively new tool in neuro-medicine and the neurosciences. In research and clinical practice, it finds multiple use as a marker for biological age, for general health status of the brain and as an indicator for several brain-based disorders. Its utility in all these tasks depends on detecting outliers and thus failing to correctly predict chronological age. The indicative value of brain age prediction is generated by the gap between a brain’s chronological age and the predicted (...) age, the brain age gap (BAG). This article shows how the clinical and research use of brain age prediction tacitly pathologizes the states that it is sensitive to. It will be argued that the tacit character of this transformation conceals the need for its explicit justification. (shrink)

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three (...) most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument. (shrink)

Both Medawar and Hamilton contributed key ideas to the modern evolutionary theory of ageing. In particular, they both suggested that, in populations with overlapping generations, the force with which selection acts on traits declines with the age at which traits are expressed. This decline would eventually cause ageing to evolve. However, the biological literature diverges on the relationship between Medawar’s analysis of the force of selection and Hamilton’s. Some authors appear to believe that Hamilton perfected Medawar’s insightful, yet ultimately erroneous (...) analysis of this force, while others see Hamilton’s analysis as a coherent development of, or the obvious complement to Medawar’s. Here, the relationship between the two analyses is revisited. Two things are argued for. First, most of Medawar’s alleged errors that Hamilton would had rectified seem not to be there. The origin of these perceived errors appears to be in a misinterpretation of Medawar’s writings. Second, the mathematics of Medawar and that of Hamilton show a significant overlap. However, different meanings are attached to the same mathematical expression. Medawar put forth an expression for the selective force on age-specific fitness. Hamilton proposed a full spectrum of selective forces each operating on age-specific fitness components, i.e. mortality and fertility. One of Hamilton’s expressions, possibly his most important, is of the same form as Medawar’s expression. But Hamilton’s selective forces on age-specific fitness components do not add up to yield Medawar’s selective force on age-specific fitness. It is concluded that Hamilton’s analysis should be considered neither as a correction to Medawar’s analysis nor as its obvious complement. (shrink)

In a 2020 paper, 37 authors, all researchers and students in aging biology, pointed out a general lack of consensus in their field, “even on the most fundamental questions”. They evoked a “problem”, for which a solution has yet to be found. But what exactly does this lack of consensus specifically refer to and why should it be inherently problematic? Here, I would like to explore three distinct philosophical reactions when dealing with this issue. First, I will assess the extent (...) to which this lack of consensus can be taken as evidence that science, in a sense, needs philosophy. Then, I will examine how it may be related to the particular nature of the aging phenomenon, which both science and philosophy can help describe and understand. Finally, I will show that this lack of consensus could also be considered, not as a problem, but as an opportunity to question the role of pluralism and the importance of ambiguity in science in general, and in aging biology in particular. (shrink)

While aging research and policy aim to promote ‘health’ at all ages, there remains no convincing explanation of what this ‘health’ is. In this paper, I investigate whether we can find, implicit within the sciences of aging, a way to know what health is and how to measure it, i.e. a theory of health. To answer this, I start from scientific descriptions of aging and its modulators and then try to develop some generalizations about ‘health’ implicit within this research. After (...) discussing some of the core aspects of aging and the ways in which certain models describe spatial and temporal features specific to both aging and healthy phenotypes, I then extract, explicate, and evaluate one potential construct of health in these models. This suggests a theory of health based on the landscape of optimized phenotypic trajectories. I conclude by considering why it matters for more candidate theories to be proposed and evaluated by philosophers and scientists alike. (shrink)