In this paper I show that Proclus is an adherent of the Classical Model of Science as set out elsewhere in this issue (de Jong and Betti 2008), and that he adjusts certain conditions of the Model to his Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics. In order to show this, I develop a case study concerning philosophy of nature, which, despite its unstable subject matter, Proclus considers to be a science. To give this science a firm foundation Proclus distills from Plato’s Timaeus (...) the basic concepts Being and Becoming and a number of basic propositions, among others the quasi-definitions of the basic concepts. He subsequently explains the use of these quasi-definitions, that are actually epistemic guides, in such a way that he obtains a connection between a rational and an empirical approach to the natural world. A crucial task in establishing the connection is performed by the faculty of doxa and by geometrical conversion. The result is that Proclus secures a universal, necessary and known foundation for all of philosophy of nature. (shrink)

In late antiquity, in the context of the jagged tradition of Neo-Platonism,Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the specific science that is traced out in itare indicated with the current denominations of meta ta physika andtheologikē pragmateia, which are seen as consistent with one anotherand closely interconnected. In this connection, the Metaphysics, in thewake of previous philosophical readings, is considered as a treatise on“theological science” — the most elevated among the sciences — and thedenomination meta ta physika is seen in a specifically theological (...) sense.According to a widespread Neo-Platonic reading, the science thematizedin the Metaphysics is “metaphysics” in that it is theological science,an epistemic discourse on divine realities, which, within the ordo rerum,transcend the physical ones, and, therefore, according to the ordo cognoscendi,must be studied after the latter. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on some aspects of the Neoplatonist literary-metaphysical theory, which has clearly been expressed in the anony­mous Prolegomena to Plato’s philosophy and further confirmed in Proclus’ exegesis of the Timaeus. Thus, this contribution, examines and compares several passages from the Prolegomena and from Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus with a view to showing that it is legiti­mate to speak of a certain cosmogony of the Platonic dialogue that is analogous to that of the macrocosm. Moreover, the analogy (...) between macrocosm and microcosm makes it possible to further investigate the similarity between the λόγος-ζῷον of the Demiurge and that of Timaeus, on the one hand, and the reality which the λόγος expresses, on the other. This similarity turns out to be both structural/morphological and content-related/semantic. Thus, by combining the natural and theo­logical science, the analysis of the “generation” of the macrocosm and microcosm brings out the strongly analogical nature of Plato’s dialogues, which is particularly visible in the Timaeus. (shrink)

One of the hardest questions to answer for a (Neo)platonist is to what extent and how the changing and unreliable world of sense perception can itself be an object of scientific knowledge. My dissertation is a study of the answer given to that question by the Neoplatonist Proclus (Athens, 411-485) in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. I present a new explanation of Proclus’ concept of nature and show that philosophy of nature consists of several related subdisciplines matching the ontological stratification (...) of nature. Moreover, I demonstrate that for Proclus philosophy of nature is a science, albeit a hypothetical one, which takes geometry as its methodological paradigm. I also offer an explanation of Proclus’ view of what is later called the mathematization of physics, i.e. the role of the substance of mathematics, as opposed to its method, in explaining the natural world. Finally, I discuss Proclus’ views of the discourse of philosophy of nature and its iconic character. (shrink)

In this article, based on the second book of Galen’s De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, we analyze scientific method of the famous anatomist and philosopher. We discuss experimental, logical and philosophical argumentation that Galen employs in his proof that the rational part of the soul situated in human brain. We study his polemics with Chrysippus, who declares that the rational part of the soul is located in the heart, and conclude that the treatise by Galen sets the standards of scientific (...) studies in antiquity, which combines medical, philosophical and moral components. (shrink)