The moral philosophy of Levinas offers a stark prospectus of impossibility for corporate ethics. It differs from most traditional ethical theories in that, for Levinas, the ethical develops in a personal meeting of one with the Other, rather than residing in some internal deliberation of the moral subject. Levinasian ethics emphasizes an infinite personal responsibility arising for each of us in the face of the Other and in the presence of the Third. It stresses the imperious demand we experience to (...) be open to, prepared for and impassioned with that which we may not know, or recognize, about ourselves or about the Other. Such a demand transcends our intellectual and/or rational potential; it involves us in a carnal and somatic bodily experience of otherness. If we are to speak of Levinasian ethics in a business context, it cannot be a matter of corporate ethics but only a matter of individual managerial ethics. What such an ethics would be like is yet to be outlined. This paper proposes a series of questions and suggestions that will explicate some key terms of a practice organized around a Levinasian vocabulary of otherness, responsibility, proximity, diachrony and justice. (shrink)

No núcleo da leitura efetuada por Emmanuel Lévinas do projeto de uma "ontologia fundamental", concretizado por Martin Heidegger em Ser e Tempo , encontramos uma severa crítica à noção de "compreensão do ser". Lévinas não considera essa expressão senão o solo de uma filosofia sobremaneira incapaz de dimensionar a questão do outro. O objetivo deste artigo é, com base em reflexões de Heidegger acerca da expressão "sentido do ser" - reunidas em diversas passagens de seus Contributos à filosofia -, analisar (...) a pertinência e os limites dessa crítica levinasiana, estabelecendo, com isso, alguns elementos sobre o quais se pode fundar um debate, que historicamente nunca existiu, entre Lévinas e o segundo Heidegger.The most important aspect of the reception of Martin Heidegger's project of a "fundamental ontology", which can be found in Being and Time , by Emmanuel Lévinas lays in the critique of the concept of "comprehension of being". This expression is for Lévinas nothing else but a cornerstone of a philosophy which cannot deal adequately with the question of the other. The aim of this article is to estimate properly the relevance as well as the limits this critique by the means of the interpretation of some passages of Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy which handle with the concept of "comprehension of being" By showing this we hope to identify elements which could consolidate a philosophical debate - which historically never took place - between Lévinas and the later Heidegger. (shrink)

In recent years, the concept of a ‘prohibition against representation’ and its ethical andpolitical implications for artistic practices past, present and future have been subjected torenewed critical scrutiny. While this interdiction derives from the Second Commandmentgiven by God to Moses, forbidding the creation of graven images or idols, it hasfrequently been invoked in secular contexts, and has acquired special resonance inongoing debates about the difficulty of adequately representing the event which hasbeen called the Holocaust or Shoah. The persistent claim that (...) the Nazis’ persecution ofthe Jews and other communities remains beyond or unsusceptible to representation,and more specifically the assertion that it cannot or should not be recuperated withinimages, are often informed by a particular understanding of the Bilderverbot . However, certain survivors and scholarshave queried whether it is legitimate or helpful to reactivate this injunction in theaftermath of such atrocities. Jorge Semprun, Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy andothers have variously criticised this move, along with associated rhetorics of ‘ineffability’,as confused and obscurantist, politically misleading and morally suspect.1Nancy, theauthor of one of the most forceful critiques in this vein, warns that the allegation thatrepresentation of the Holocaust is illegitimate rests on a misunderstanding ormisapplication of the original religious prohibition which he seeks to correct;‘“representation of the Shoah”’, he concludes, ‘is not only possible and licit, but in fact also necessary and imperative’. (shrink)

This contribution shows how the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has been confronted autobiographically with National-Socialism (1933-1945) and how his personal experience and the experience of the Jewish people under Hitlerism were translated in his philosophical understanding of ‘being’ as ‘il y a’ (in English: ‘there is’). The Holocaust provides a unique negative point of entry to understand Levinas’ ontological category which is as such not understandable since in the il y a, there is no longer a subject that stands before (...) the objectivity of reality. On the contrary, the il y a is exactly the category that expresses a situation where the subject itself has no longer the ‘right’ to exist as such but still does not stop to exist. This violence of being is exactly what Hitlerism wanted to do in creating the Holocaust and submitting the Jewish people to it. This makes understandable how the whole philosophy of Levinas is an effort to overcome the il y a through a moral answer to the Holocaust. (shrink)