After a brief introduction and orientation (section I), this dialogue between Levinasian and Beckerian thought is approached along the lines of two major themes concerning consciousness which emerge in very different contexts and registers in their work (sections II and III), and one tantalizing question that is raised with great force by the dialogue (section IV). The two themes revolve around the subtle dialectical interplay that runs throughout the thought of both Levinas and Becker – the switching between internality (...) and externality, non-rational and rational; otherness and sameness; life and death – an interplay that is summed up in the dialectic between non-reflexive and reflexive consciousness. The Beckerian and Levinasian notions of the non-reflexive consciousness (section II) relate to their respective and in many ways convergent claims about a non-rational primal human state characterized by global vulnerability, awe and guilt, especially before the face of the other. Their analyses of reflexive consciousness (section III) relate to their interpretations of the problematic ideal of the free, self-constituting and self-mastering individual, and the impetus located therein towards the repression of what is Other to the self. Finally (section IV), the question is raised as to whether (and to what extent), following Levinas, sources of compelling ethical value might be legitimately understood as emerging out of Becker’s conception of primordial human vulnerability. (shrink)

This article explores Levinas' critique of Western epistemology as centered on justification (i.e. a strictly rational, argumentative approach), thereby ignoring the permeable, open and inter-subjective element of the quest for knowledge. In a masterful play on words, Levinas proposes rather a shift from justification to justice, from argumentation to permeability to exteriority, and sets this shift at the foundation of any genuine journey to knowledge.

In this paper, I explore Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical dialectic on asceticism and its relation to otherness and closeness. In parallel, I argue that Levinas’s stance on asceticism constitutes a vehement criticism of the analytic insistence on onto-theology. In Levinas’s later works, particularly Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, he maintains that Christian asceticism (especially in the Orthodox and Protestant traditions) has mistakenly focused on ontotheology, i.e., on an incarnated God who comes to mind. On the one (...) hand, a number of continental thinkers argue that an individual can achieve direct communication with God through a symmetrical, reciprocal relation as a self-contained unit. Kierkegaard, for instance, claims that the subject’s isolation through asceticism is a necessary and sufficient condition to meet God. As each person is responsible directly to God and his responsibility is a matter of his faith, the religious life does not coincide with ethics and sometimes even appears as an absurdity if measured by ethical norms. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate that in Emmanuel Levinas’ thinking, justice is the necessary opening – and dissolution- of the “I” which makes fecundity – procreation – possible, and that in that same measure makes possible that the Logos transforms into a “desire to say” and the world into a “among us”. At the same time it wants to demonstrate that this notion of justice is directly related to the ideas of expression and nudity. Due to which the (...) “Other” imposes itself in front of the “same” , as man, singular and vulnerable, and that in the same measure it is linked to the notion of the Face and its particular mode of manifestation. In this respect, we propose that justice. As long as necessary condition, can fund an ethically constituted world, where an “erotic order” mandates over logic orderings. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to develop a system of corporate ethics based on an understanding and interpretation of the ethical demand of human beings who are in relation with each other according to Emmanuel Levinas' teachings and the responsibility the human being has to and for herself and others whom she encounters based on Paul Ricoeur's teachings on human action, text and hermeneutics. While the philosophies to which we will be referring may not overtly present a (...) normative ethic, we shall convey them in such a way that is reasonably germane to the development of our system of corporate ethics that would, indeed, demonstrate why (and, perhaps, how in some instances) the human being must act in response to the demand of the other whom she encounters. -/- We must not abandon the discussion as it relates to the economy but rather include it in a broader and more comprehensive dialogue about working to promote, support and protect the human dignity of all people using the advancements of technology to improve the human condition. The broader discussion must include but not be limited to developing a working definition of corporate ethics. To engage in discussions about the economy as an indicator for human success, we must speak openly and honestly about all stakeholders that participate and are affected by the economy. Without forsaking other stakeholders, we find the corporation - the entity whose actions have the farthest reaching and, in some cases, longer lasting impact on the human condition - to be an appropriate point of departure for this endeavor. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es indagar acerca de la noción de “pasividad” que caracteriza al sujeto en el proyecto ético de Emmanuel Levinas. Un sujeto que es y está entregado al Otro, más allá de toda decisión voluntaria y de cualquier relación fáctica. La “pasividad” es la noción que permite comprender la contextura de la subjetividad levinasiana, su modo de constituirse, de “realizarse”, así como algo que denominaremos su “condición segunda”. La pasividad aparece en el pensamiento de (...) Levinas como la noción que le permite articular su ética, en tanto que ésta se funda en una responsabilidad que acontece en el extremo abandono de las certidumbres del “si mismo”, del “yo”. (shrink)

Otherness was at the center of the Levinese project, and in his ethics theory. In doing so, Levinas moved his project away from ontology, epistemology, and reason, to a point where the others are confronted in all its "nudes," to the point where it is recognizable that it cannot be reduced. In this article, I will examine the concepts of responsibility and the connection of the other person's humanism from his major books.

La pesquisa pretende analizar las principales tesis presentes en el pensamiento de Paul Ricœur y Emmanuel Lèvinas, a propósito de la muerte y, a partir de sus postulados, establecer un diálogo del cual emerjan desavenencias y concomitancias respecto al tema.

El presente reporte de investigación muestra, de manera sintética, los resultados de una pesquisa presentada en el 2012 para optar por el grado de Licenciatura en Docencia en la Universidad Estatal a Distancia. La exploración de los desafíos éticos en el contexto educativo costarricense desde el planteamiento de Martin Buber y Emmanuel Lévinas es lo que pretende formular la presente investigación, procurando aportar al diálogo nacional el insumo de un elemento filosófico innovador, tenor de un impulso en futuros planteamientos (...) educativos costarricenses que propicien un desarrollo humano cada vez más integral, donde la persona sea considerada en relación armónica con lo existente. Además, se presentan una serie de desafíos éticos que se desprenden de un análisis, en el cual confluyen diversas fuentes de información. La novedad radica en la confluencia de voces y la lectura ética de estos postulados desde el pensamiento de Martin Buber y Emmanuel Lévinas. La meta de la investigación postula un aporte al modelo educativo costarricense, así como a grupos gremiales de la educación y población en general, desde el enfoque de la filosofía del encuentro, desde el planteamiento del diálogo buberiano y el planteamiento de alteridad levinasiano, se puedan encontrar insumos necesarios para un replanteamiento -tanto desde el aspecto teórico como práctico- en el quehacer educativo nacional. (shrink)

Se brindan una serie de consideraciones prologales para justificar el establecimiento de una arquitectónica fenomenológica del tiempo en Emmanuel Levinas. El problema del tiempo se encuentra disperso en la obra levinasiana, en constante dialogo y confrontación con autores de la época, tanto de tradición fenomenológica como de tradición filosófica judía. El artículo recorre de manera proemial las diferentes etapas del pensamiento levinasiano y reconoce las periferias con las cuales el autor dialoga y confuta su propuesta, denominada como “Deformalización (...) del tiempo”. Se concluye quebrando una lanza por la necesidad de una investigación que constituya una arquitectónica como propuesta ante la irresuelta tarea del tiempo por parte del autor. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the philosophical meaning of pregnancy and maternity in the writ-ings of R. Soloveitchik and Emmanuel Lévinas. They both make a phenomenological enquiry into these phenomena, by looking on the biological aspect and the emotional aspects. R. Solove-itchik suggests a spiritual interpretation concerning the meaning of pregnancy, which is both biological and spiritual. He attempts to differentiate between the natural parenthood and the spiritual parenthood. Lévinas gives us the philosophical observation through the phenomenolog-ical research of (...) pregnancy, motherhood and parenthood. For him, this inquiry may be revealed as an ethical occurrence that demand responsibility. Perhaps this is one of the unique dimensions of modern Jewish philosophy, looking towards the religious texts with modern philosophical method and modern philosophy theories. Reading carefully the biblical story of Genesis on the notion of birth and maternity, raises textual questions and cultural questions. For Lévinas and R. Soloveitchik these questions can open the door to new philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se intenta poner de relieve cómo la comp- rensión levinasiana del tiempo contribuye a la recuperación del valor y del sentido del instante presente, el cual ha sido menospreciado hasta nuestros días en gran parte de la tradición filosófica en tanto concebido a partir del tiempo, pensado este último como duración. Se trata así pues de pensar el sentido propio del instante en sí mismo, en cuanto momento presente, independientemente del sentido fun- cional que se le (...) asigna como parte de un conjunto –la duración– que lo abarca y en el que se absorbe. Se tratará por lo tanto de imaginar otras metáforas para explicar el acaecer temporal, distintas de la del punto, de la línea o de la del flujo del devenir; metáforas a partir de las cuales el tiempo ha sido siempre comprendido como un continuo homogéneo. Estas representaciones abstractas del tiempo presentan un orden que reúne los instantes, pero carecen de la noción de un instante central: ese instante por excelencia que es el presente. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of articulating ethics with justice, as it would seem impossible to think the practical application of one without denying the other at the same time. Indeed, as Levinas puts it, justice is violence within ethics when trying to compare the incomparable. On the contrary, ethics is an asymmetrical and irreversible relationship between two, where justice seems to have no room at all. This work seek to provide an articulation between both immeasurable dimensions by a (...) renewed attention to the issue of temporality of ethics and by including the concept of impure, taken from the work of Jean Guitton, from which it is understood that both dimensions are co-implicated from the very difference that constitute them. (shrink)

Looking at responsibility within a Lévinasian sense, human beings are firstly seen not in the philosophically traditional sense, of being egocentric, but rather seen as ethical subjects based on “the other” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). The purpose of this paper is to examine the notion of responsibility as Lévinas conceptualized in the idea that human beings are responsible for not only themselves but for others. Lévinas within “Ethics as First Philosophy” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989) states that before all other forms (...) of being in the world there must be responsibility to the Other (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). Lévinas defines this to mean that before freedom of the subject, and their subjectivity, before self-consciousness, before the consciousness of consciousness, before being, and before relativity there is “responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75). Perhaps, Lévinas is saying that a human beings obligation comes before all of what follows from our being in this world, our obligation to the Other beginning with the “face to face” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75), interaction, which is our first and foremost responsibility, the responsibility to the Other. And to be ethical beings who begin with responsibility we rely on the fundamental relationship of others. This notion of responsibility appears when we encounter, in the face-to-face interaction, the unknowable other. However, does this responsibility extend to more than two individuals and to those outside our immediate proximity? For example, Lévinas states that it is the “face to face” notion of seeing one in distress, yet what if it is a group of people, and what if they are not in close proximity but on the other side of the world? What if they are on the other side of a screen that can also be artificial intelligence in our modern era. Are we still responsible? And if we are responsible, how does Lévinas’s concept of responsibility fit into that situation or is it limited? I want to examine responsibility in terms of proximity through a Lévinasian ethical lens and plurality, defined as more than two individuals, by questioning responsibility in terms of relationality, and vulnerability. I will be looking mainly at five authors Emmanuel Lévinas, Ernst Van Alphen, Judith Butler, Kevin Quashi, and Lisa Guenther, to answer the question of whether Lévinas’s definition of responsibility includes proximity, and plurality. (shrink)

Ce livre propose, à partir du constat de difficultés importantes et de paradoxes dans la conception heideggérienne de la vérité comme décèlement (aletheia), une nouvelle interprétation du fameux « tournant » qui sera compris comme la nécessité d’une structure d’inversion réciproque des rapports fondatifs. Contre tous les replis subjectifs ou les fixations sur des subsistances illusoires, cette structure « tournante » (à la racine du cercle herméneutique) montre comment aucune vérité ne s’établit sans sortie hors de soi, sans être provoquée (...) par ce qui la met en question et qu’ainsi, contrairement à ce que croyait Levinas, la pensée de Heidegger ne consacre pas un enfermement dans le même, mais constitue une invitation à la différence. Le philosophe de Messkirch élabore une « logique » du questionnement et l’exigence d’un étonnement impliquant une attention sans cesse renouvelée qui visent à réveiller la vocation du savoir ─ compris comme une des plus hautes formes de respect ─ bien plus qu’à s’étourdir de vaines mises en abîmes. Cet ouvrage, bien qu’il témoigne d’une attention scolaire, ne veut pas être un commentaire destiné aux seuls spécialistes, mais constitue l’effort, à partir d’une certaine autonomie philosophique, de présenter la pensée heideggérienne à ceux qu’elle devrait intéresser, de l’arracher aux préjugés dans lesquels elle est souvent emprisonnée et d’en défendre le meilleur. (shrink)

Does art have ethical possibilities? Can literature disclose our responsibilityfor other people? This short text aims to unfold some nuances of responsible and irresponsible art as they appear in Emmanuel Levinas's sparse remarks on aesthetics. We examine some common ways of conceiving Levinas's thoughts in literary studies, followed by a closer discussion of his ideas on the possibilities of art in "Reality and Its Shadow" and his late interviews on Vasily Grossman and Sacha Sosno.

El artículo muestra la estrecha conexión existente entre el concepto de ética y el de tiempo mesiánico en la filosofía de Emmanuel Lévinas. Esto significa que la respuesta ética se da en un tiempo discontinuo en el que –además de romper la continuidad del tiempo ininterrumpido del progreso– el sujeto se convierte en el mesías que responde al sufrimiento del otro. Para lograr este propósito, el trabajo muestra la crítica de Lévinas a la historia ontológica como olvido de lo (...) singular; posteriormente presenta la posición intermedia entre la perspectiva ontológica y la mesiánica representada en el punto de vista de Bergson, para mostrar luego cómo –para Lévinas– es en la tradición judía donde es posible encontrar una respuesta ética al sufrimiento del otro en el ahora del tiempo mesiánico. (shrink)

The ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is typically associated with a punishing conception of responsibility rather than freedom. In this chapter, our aim is to explore Levinas’s often overlooked theory of freedom. Specifically, we compare Levinas’s account of freedom to the Kantian (and Fichtean) idea of freedom as autonomy and the Hegelian idea of freedom as relational. Based on these comparisons, we suggest that Levinas offers a distinctive conception of freedom—“finite freedom.” In contrast to Kantian (...) autonomy, finite freedom constitutively involves standing in certain social relations with others. And in contrast to Hegelian relational freedom, the social relations involved in finite freedom are not defined by mutual recognition, but by feelings of separation and even antagonism. Along the way, we promote a reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity as a Hegel-style story of Bildung (development), and show how, on Levinas’s view, freedom can develop or mature in the life of the individual. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to (...) call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy. (shrink)

PDF with introduction and front and back materials. Abstract: A provocative examination of the consequences of Levinas’s and Adorno’s thought for contemporary ethics and political philosophy. This book unfolds a dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor W. Adorno, using their thought to address contemporary environmental and social-political situations. Eric S. Nelson explores the “non-identity thinking” of Adorno and the “ethics of the Other” of Levinas with regard to three areas of concern: the ethical position of nature (...) and “inhuman” material others such as environments and animals; the bonds and tensions between ethics and religion and the formation of the self through the dynamic of violence and liberation expressed in religious discourses; and the problematic uses and limitations of liberal and republican discourses of equality, liberty, tolerance, and their presupposition of the private individual self and autonomous subject. Thinking with and beyond Levinas and Adorno, this work examines the possibility of an anarchic hospitality and solidarity between material others and sensuous embodied life. -/- “This is an extremely impressive, original, and thorough treatment of two key twentieth-century thinkers and their applicability to the most pressing social and political issues of our time.” — Jeffrey A. Bernstein, author of Leo Strauss on the Borders of Judaism, Philosophy, and History -/- “This book is an excellent and timely contribution to political and environmental philosophy, located around a nuanced historical and philosophical approach to Levinas and Adorno. It will be of great interest to anyone concerned with these figures or with the current moment.” — Martin Shuster, author of Autonomy after Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity. (shrink)

An examination of Emmanuel Levinas’ writings on money reveals his distance from—and indebtedness to—a philosophical predecessor, Georg Simmel. Levinas and Simmel share a phenomenological approach to analyses of the proximity of the stranger, the importance of the face, and the interruption of the dyadic relationship by the third. Money is closely linked to the conception of totality because money is the medium that compares heterogeneous values. Levinas goes beyond Simmel in positing an ethical relation to money (...) permitting transcendence. (shrink)

Since 2001, Continental philosophical studies of evil suggest that we are forced to rethink the category of evil as we face acts of terrorism on a global scale. In light of this suggestion, this article traces the idea of the “inscrutability of evil” as a common lens through which we associate the category of evil with the phenomena we identify as evil. This idea finds its first modern formulation in Kant’s theory of radical evil. I argue that Hannah Arendt and (...) Emmanuel Levinas follow Kant in identifying evil as an inscrutable phenomenon. While they all agree that evil cannot be rationalized, integrated into reason, or understood within the framework of theodicy, for Kant, evil is inscrutable because it is grounded in freedom; for Arendt, evil is inscrutable because it is “banal;” and for Levinas, evil is inscrutable because it is “excessive” and “useless.” My analysis demonstrates that inscrutability is an essential marker of the concept of evil since it is found in all three accounts as a feature of evil, even though in each account a different type of evil is at stake (moral, political, and existential). (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most elaborately discussed moral philosophers of recent decades, and his philosophy has many adherents. I believe, however, that the scholarly literature on his work...

Genealogies in philosophy can be tricky and even a little dangerous. Lines of influence and inheritance run much more linearly on paper than in reality. I am often reminded of Robert Frost's "Mending Walls" and the attention that must be paid to what is being walled in and what is being walled out. In other words, William James and Emmanuel Levinas are not natural conversation partners. I have always read James as a fellow traveler of Edmund Husserl, and (...) placed both in a line of thought that might share Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Dilthey as forebears. In this genealogy, Levinas appears with an asterisk, or after one. Maurice Natanson described Husserlian phenomenology as an elderly grandparent who comes down to dinner just a little bit too early, making everyone uncomfortable. Seating Levinas next to James brings to mind some similar scene. What basic premises or positions do James and Levinas share? Is Levinas a Jamesian pragmatist? Is he a radical empiricist? Does James offer an ethics that parallels or even complements Levinas's rigorous ethical phenomenology? (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas objects to traditional theodicy. But his objection to theodicy is so untraditional that God’s existence is incidental to it. The primary problem with theodicy, he argues, is not evidential but ethical. The primary problem with theodicy is not that its claims are false, but that its claims are offensive. In laying out Levinas's unusual view, I first sketch out the specifically ethical nature of theodicy’s offense: failing to acknowledge suffering. Next I discuss Levinas unusual (...) account of this suffering, which theodicy fails to acknowledge. I then show how Levinas’ accusation against traditional theodicy does not hinge upon positive claims for the existence of God. I show how Levinas’ ethical objection to theodicy serves equally well as an objection to the negative existence claims of atheism. For atheism, too, has an overlooked “atheodicy” which fails to acknowledge suffering, and so may similarly offend. -/- I then shift from the theoretical to the practical. I treat the insights gained regarding theodicy and its offenses not as ideas considered but as a strategy lived. I offer a profile of the biblical figure of Esau, whose remarkable reaction to God’s malicious absence involved no consolation, sense of grievance, or resentment of his brother Jacob, God’s beloved. I conclude that the brothers’ eventual rapprochement demonstrates a deep spiritual affinity between atheist and theist. Both live out their lives under "a gospel not to be preached". And the end of such preaching suggests a way forward in our own God-centered disputes. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we will propose a new Portuguese translation of “Thinking about death on the basis of time [Penser la mort à partir du temps], a conference made by Emmanuel Levinas; in the second part we will discuss temporality and duration (with special reference to Bergson) as important concepts to understand the underlying ideas of the 1976 conference. -/- Na primeira parte deste trabalho proporemos uma nova tradução de “Pensar a morte a partir (...) do tempo [Penser la mort à partir du temps]”, uma conferência proferida por Emmanuel Levinas; na segunda parte discutiremos a temporalidade e a duração (especialmente referindo Bergson) como conceitos importantes para compreender as ideias que subjazem à conferência de 1976. (shrink)

This chapter proposes that encountering the Other through the face can be conditioned by social and built technologies. In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” Emmanuel Levinas relates his experience as a prisoner of war, held in a forced-labor camp in Nazi Germany. He contrasts being denied his humanity by other humans, “called free” (DF, 152), while being recognized as human—indeed as a friend—by a dog the prisoners named Bobby. The episode suggests that though the concept (...) of the face applies to humans, the face is not enough for facing, at least not in the setting of the camp. By contrast, the prisoners seem able to face and be faced by Bobby, even if Levinas remains inconclusive about whether the face applies to animals elsewhere. It follows that the face is operating less like a property, and more like a capacity, a mode as Levinas calls it. But what conditions encountering an Other in this mode? If the face is neither sufficient for facing, nor prior to it, then what conditions facing (or effacing)? I propose that social structures, techniques, architectures, professional roles, and so on matter in coming to face (or efface) the Other. I conclude this from analyzing human-animal encounters in a scientific space of exception: the animal lab. Building on empirical accounts of animal research, I propose that animal research is populated by what I call “technologies of effacement.” These include: (1) built architectures; (2) entering and exit procedures; (3) protective garments and equipment; (4) identification and labeling techniques; and (5) experimental protocols. These technologies serve other manifest ends, but they operate to condition encounters between humans and animals in the lab: they help block the face of humans and animals. (shrink)

In the philosophical works of Emmanuel Levinasʼs early career, it is in a phenomenology of Eros that he claims to have uncovered the site of what he calls ʻtranscendenceʼ. This is no small claim. According to the argument of the later Totality and Infinity (1961), the history of Western philosophy is to be thought as the history of the ʻphilosophy of the sameʼ. Within this polemical generalization almost the whole of Western philosophy is characterized as a totalizing discourse which (...) aims to reduce everything to the categories of a thematizing consciousness. Conceptual structures are employed (or presupposed) in order to make diverse phenomena commensurable within a system, and according to Levinas this operation always constitutes a reduction of what is ʻotherʼ to the order of the ʻsameʼ. In agreement with a certain transcendentalism which is itself implicated in Levinasʼs critique, these structures of thought are then equated with consciousness itself; the thematizing project is one of mastery in which noemata will of necessity conform to noesis, in which the object is constituted for and by the subject. The experience of transcendence, so rare in this version of philosophyʼs history, is the experience of whatever is and truly remains other than me, recalcitrant to mastery through conceptualization and to the transcendental project of the subject to construe everything as originating from within itself. If, then, it is first of all in the erotic relation that the possibility of the experience of transcendence is said to arise, Eros can in no sense be dismissed as an unimportant or peripheral theme for Levinas, and a full investigation is warranted, especially given the current interest in Levinasʼs work, interest which is not limited to the discipline of philosophy. Furthermore, as the notion of Eros is closely associated, textually and conceptually, with what Levinas calls ʻthe feminineʼ, critical attention has been excited amongst feminist scholars of various persuasions, with claims – both positive and negative – being made for Levinasʼs significance as a resource for feminist philosophy and feminist politics. If assertions of a ʻLevinasianʼ feminism, no matter how qualified, tend to rest on the idea that Levinasʼs phenomenology of Eros, and analyses of ʻthe feminineʼ mark a break in or a new departure from a ʻmasculinistʼ tradition, this article seeks, in part, to argue to the contrary. (shrink)

This study presents a reconsideration of Levinas’s concept of the feminine. This reconsideration facilitated by a philosophically informed analysis of Levinas’s Talmudic readings on that subject. The innovation of this research is based on the methodology which combined the two corpuses of Levinas’ writings as important parts of his thought. Two main phenomena are derived from Levinas’ Talmudic readings and arouse main principles of his ethics. In the hearth of the discussion on Eros stated the differentiation (...) of feminine and masculine in Levinas’ thought, and its implication of gender and Ethics of otherness. In the center of Levinas’ terminology of maternity stated his phenomenology of pregnancy, and its ethical implication on responsibility to the other. The extreme responsibility committed to the subject since there is a immanent conflict between parents and their child. The characters of Leivnas’ discussion which described here are obligating the reconsideration of the philosophical question: are Levinas’ concepts of the feminine exclusive to the women? -/- The subjects of Levinas’s exploration of the feminine, in this view, emerge from his Talmudic readings, but his phenomenological analysis of those very subjects goes beyond what can be found in those readings. Analyzing the meaning of the difference between the sexes—the topic of one of the Talmudic readings—leads Levinas to a wider phenomenological treatment of the status of woman that does not bypass the feminine voice. Delving into the Talmudic concept of rodef (persecutor) as applied to the relationship of fetus and mother leads Levinas to a phenomenological analysis of the concept of maternity and readiness to accept responsibility (even suffering) for the Other. Those two discussions lead us to a rereading of Levinas’s essay “Phenomenology of Eros” and enable us to rebut the charge that in that essay Levinas presents only a masculine voice. Levinas’s concept of “responsibility” will be seen to resemble the feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan’s concept of “care.” We must then reconsider whether Levinas’s concept of the feminine is exclusively the domain of women. -/- . (shrink)

The article seeks to reclaim a type of fear lost in silent omission in education, yet central to the development of an ethical subject. It distinguishes the fear described by Martin Heidegger through the concept of befindlichkeit and fear for the other as an essential moment for ethics articulated by Emmanuel Levinas. It argues that the latter conception of fear has inverted the traditional assumption of the ideal ethical subject as fearless. It then examines how Levinas’s interpretation (...) of fear might contribute to the discussion on fear and responsibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It concludes that fear for the other reveals our tremendous capacity to suffer for the other, which is an aspect of the emotional life that has not been identified in the general educational discourse. This inattention manifests itself as a categorical omission in which the existence of fear for the other is not recognized and impedes the ability of educators to address ethics as it is deeply lived. (shrink)

This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into constructive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —commonalities that, moreover, put both thinkers in step with some of the concerns driving (...) current treatments of social cognition in philosophy and cognitive science. They can make a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. Each in their own way challenges the internalist and cognitivist presuppositions informing the currently dominant “Theory of Mind” paradigm driving much social cognition research. Moreover, their respective views receive empirical support from a number of different sources. (shrink)

Emmanuel Lévinas est le philosophe de la non-indifférence; il n’est en aucune sorte un philosophe indifférent. Son inquiétude personnelle et engagement politique ont trouvé une expression philosophique dans une quête à deux versants. Dans le versant ontologique, il cherche à montrer que même si l’homme est l’événement de compréhension de l’être, tout l’homme et toute signification ne se réduisent pas à la compréhension de l’être seul. Dans le versant politique, il s’interroge sur la possibilité de soumettre la tendance totalitaire (...) de toute politique à une recherche de justice qui ne dépend pas finalement de la politique même. Mais ces deux versants n’en font qu’un. La découverte d’une signification qui excède la compréhension de l’être – l’éthique – fournit en même temps la source de renouvellement de la justice. Ainsi, par cette double question, Lévinas nous présente les fils conducteurs de notre enquête: une signification au-delà de la compréhension de l’être et sa portée éthique, que nous appelons «langage» et que nous explorons dans la perspective de son importance politique. Les études analytiques dans lesquelles les notions de politique et de langage fonctionnent comme clef d’interprétation mutuelle débouchent sur une critique centrée sur deux problèmes: l’impossibilité d’interpréter la signifiance de l’autre et le danger inhérent à la conception d’une justice dépassant l’Etat. (shrink)

In this work, I have compared the views of Hans Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas on various concepts of culture and understanding of the ‘man’ within the framework of Western civilization with the help of three of their essays. In two lectures of Gadamer—‘Culture and Peace’, delivered at Salzburg in 1980, and ‘Man and His Hand in Modern Civilization’, delivered in Munich in 1978—and several essays by Emmanuel Levinas such as ‘The Philosophical Determination of the Idea (...) of Culture’ (1983). If both authors are critical of the rational based on the technique and calculation of the concept of culture inherited from the Enlightenment, and further, if this concept is embodied in the bourgeois and later in industrial societies, as retraced in the first chapter, the authors differently see the way out of the dehumanizing crisis of the modern era. (shrink)

This article takes as its subject matter the juridico-political space of the prisoner of war (POW) camp. It sets out to determine the nature of this space by looking at the experience of war captivity by Jewish members of the Western forces in World War II, focusing on the experience of Emmanuel Levinas, who spent 5 years in German war captivity. On the basis of a historical analysis of the conditions in which Levinas spent his time in (...) captivity, it argues that the POW camp was a space of indifference that was determined by the legal exclusion of prisoners from both war and persecution. Held behind the stage of world events, prisoners were neither able to exercise their legal agency nor released from law into a realm of extra-legal violence. Through a close reading of Levinas’s early concept of the ‘there is’ [il y a], the article seeks to establish the impact on prisoners of prolonged confinement in such a space. It sets out how prisoners’ subjectivity dissolved in the absence of meaningful relations with others and identifies the POW camp as a space in which existence was reduced to indeterminate, impersonal being. (shrink)

El artículo presenta un estudio de la visión antropológica de Martin Buber (1878-1965) y Emmanuel Levinas(1906-1995), la postura de ambos procura un “volver al ser humano”, el primero desde la óptica del pensamiento dialógico y el segundo a partir del planteamiento de alteridad. Los autores describen un itinerario antropológico con una innegable influencia de la tradición judía, (hasidista y mesiánica),en contraposición a las posturas totalizantesde la filosofía moderna(Hegel, Heidegger), es por esta razón que se considera oportuno establecer un (...) paralelismo entre ambos para desvelar las desavenencias, pero enfocando las concomitancias en torno a la pregunta ¿Qué es el hombre?El artículo asume como objetivo reconocer las “cercanías” y “lejanías” entre los autores, a partir de nociones clave como: “Yo-Tú” buberiano y “Visage” levinasiano, la búsqueda del sentido de lo humano desde la intersubjetividad y reciprocidad frente a la extrañeza y radical alteridad. El artículo concluye exponiendo un pensamiento que responde a la vida, donde la ética se manifiesta como filosofía primera. (shrink)

The universe is full of beings. Throughout the history of philosophy and of human thought many have sought ways to articulate this multiplicity and unity of being. The result, in western philosophy at least, was the birth of Metaphysics in general, and Ontology in particular. In the past, the discourse on being became very abstract such that it had no resemblance to being as encountered every day. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), set out to re-orient being towards the lived experience. He called (...) his being Da-sein, which literally means “being there”. Heidegger emphasized that being as expressed in Da-sein lacked authenticity and was plagued with anxiety. To correct the defective Da-sein, Heidegger proposed taking Da-sein back to its origin. Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), too set out to bridge the gap between the being of ontology and the being of the lived experience. Levinas went further than Heidegger by en-fleshing Da-sein. In the end Levinas developed a philosophy of the Face. The Face for him was where beings met. To be in the world then was to be a Face in interaction. This interaction is sufficient-reason for the self-expression of the Face on both sides of the encounter. With this encounter, the Face has a choice, either to withdraw or to stand ground and throw itself out there. In this, paper I will interpretatively juxtapose Heidegger’s Da-sein and Levinas’ Face. I will affirm the work of these two philosophers and draw my own inferences from their conclusions. The specific inferences that I will draw are: (a) To be is to be in contradiction. (b) There is a cosmic sympathy among beings. (c) Everyday being is infinite and Transcendent. I am aware that there was an active dialogue between Heidegger and Levinas, with the latter taking exception to the political implications of the former’s philosophy. In this paper, I will stick to elements of their thoughts from which I to draw specific conclusions. (shrink)

El propósito de Levinas coincide con el intento moderno de recuperación de la verdad y del sentido aunque en una dirección y contenidos distintos. Si en Hegel la Aufhebung tendía a la Totalidad y lo Mismo , para Husserl será esencial la apertura de Mundo que tiene lugar ya en la experiencia de conciencia del ego trascendental, mientras que Heidegger, por su parte, primará la pregunta por el Ser. El intento de Levinas, en cambio, no será recomponer la (...) relación entre el yo, por un lado, y el mundo, lo absoluto, las cosas o el ser, por el otro, sino la recuperación de la relación entre yo-y-otro. No es un simple cambio en la dirección o en el contenido del sentido de la reflexión filosófica, sino un intento serio de encontrar una nueva significación, «otra manera que ser» que no termine siendo otro proyecto más de integración y síntesis. Lo que propone Levinas es una auténtica salida para la que traza el itinerario que va del ser al otro, recurriendo sencillamente a la experiencia que cotidianamente se nos impone a cada uno de nosotros con un peso incontestable, a saber: la presencia de las diferencias, de lo asimétrico, en definitiva, la manifestación del otro en tanto que otro. Es esta experiencia heterónoma ordinaria, esta vivencia diaria de la alteridad como dato primordial del fenómeno de la intersubjetividad el ámbito que ha intentado explorar nuestro autor. ¿Acaso es esta responsabilidad así sentida conjugable con una experiencia filosófica universal? ¿La responsabilidad puede llevarse hasta el límite de la substitución por el otro, hasta la de-posición del Yo sin identidad? ¿Qué tipo de relación puede darse con algo absolutamente asimétrico, exterior, previo e irreductible? ¿De dónde viene esa asignación apremiante de responsabilidad que llega hasta arrojarme en la obsesión y el asedio? ¿Cómo puede ser éticamente plausible un mandato tan traumatizante y violento que termina por convertir al sujeto en rehén, sustituido ya por los otros? ¿Es posible conciliar la libertad y la autónoma decisión del sujeto con una consideración de la subjetividad como «heme aquí», absoluta pasividad expuesta a los otros y vulnerabilidad de una piel que se ofrece al ultraje y la herida?. En definitiva: ¿es la subjetividad algo de lo que partimos o a lo que llegamos? (shrink)

Este artículo se propone indagar acerca de la distinción entre el Decir y lo Dicho en la obra de Emmanuel Levinas. Esta distinción sirve a Levinas para proponer una comprensión ética del lenguaje, en la que la significación y la expresión sean capaces de superar las limitaciones y determinaciones del lenguaje sistemático de la ontología, del ser y las esencias. Sobre la base de que el “lenguaje de la ontología” es impertinente para comprender, expresar o comunicar esa (...) “experiencia ética” fundamental del encuentro “cara a cara” con el Rostro del Otro: la experiencia misma de la significancia misma, Levinas propone una comprensión pre-ontológica del lenguaje. Esta comprensión pre-ontológica sería capaz de dar respuesta a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál es el lenguaje, la palabra propia, de ese sujeto pasivo, de ese sujeto que es rehén del Otro , que está sujeto a él? ¿Cuál es el lenguaje del dar-se, qué palabra puede hacerse cargo de lo que es siempre in-apropiable? ¿Cómo será ese lenguaje que intenta decir lo otro del ser, ese lenguaje capaz de “traducir” la significancia que se da en la experiencia ética originaria, aquella en la que la “unicidad insustituible de una persona se expone a otra persona”? En este sentido, proponemos que el Decir es, con respecto a lo dicho, su tener-lugar, la posibilidad misma de comunicación y expresión, en la que se expone la condición pasiva del sujeto. Por otra parte, en la medida en que el Decir es la expresión de la significancia que adviene en la proximidad con el Otro, el Decir es siempre testimonial.This text proposes an inquiry regarding the distinction between the Saying and the Said in Emmanuel Levinas works. Levinas uses this distinction to propose an ethical understanding of language, where significance and expression are capable of overcoming the limitations of ontology`s systematic language, of the being, and the essences. On the basis of that “the language of ontology” is impertinent to understand, express, or communicate this “ethical experience” fundamental for the “face to face encounter” with the Face of the Other: the experience of significance itself, Levinas proposes a pre-ontologic understanding of language. This pre-ontologic understanding would be capable of answering the following questions: What is the language, the word itself of that passive subject, that subject who is a hostage of the Other who is attached to him? Which is the language of giving oneself, which word can take charge of what is always non appropriable? What kind of language will it be that tries to say the other of the being, that language able to “translate” the significance given in the original ethical experience, that where the “irreplaceable uniqueness of a person is being exposed to another person”? In this respect, we propose that the Saying is, regarding the said, its having-occurred, the possibility itself of communicating and expressing, where the passive condition of the subject is exposed. On the other hand, in the measure that the Saying is the expression of the significance which occurs in the proximity with the Other, the Saying is always testimonial. (shrink)

Exemplified especially by Heidegger and Levinas, the phenomenology of death expresses first, the impossibility of the death experience, second, the authenticity of Dasein starting from the horizon opened by the possibility of death, and third, the relevance of the death of the other to the discovery of one’s own death. This article tries to take a step further, showing the link between the authenticity of Dasein and the desire for immortality manifested in this authenticity. By overturning Heidegger’s theses and (...) by affirming both the necessity of an authentication of death itself—in accord with Socrates’s death example—and the legitimacy of the meditation on death, this text links the need for immortality, which is phenomenologically visible, with the Christian faith in the resurrection, which is visible only for theology. (shrink)

This article covers the different stages of the constitution of the person that goes beyond selfishness and self-affirmation and is formed as the inseparable unity of the metaphysical subject that is expressed in the "Other-in-the same" and "Being-for-the-other". This leads one to say that the person is intrinsically relation and exteriority that is realized in the language that transcends the inner self. This relationship, considered internally as a footprint, and in the exterior as visage, invokes a third party that establishes (...) and holds it. The person is shown as an asymmetrical relationship that I call triadic. (shrink)

Grappling with the marginalization of the marginal in Western thinking, this paper sets up a dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy and Johann Baptist Metz’s political theology in order to learn from their thoughts on the suffering of victims. For both Levinas and Metz, the idea of theodicy as an explanation of suffering is linked to the ontological conception of time and history, and therefore useless and unjustifiable by nature. The essential question of this research is how to (...) give meaning to the concrete suffering of humanity in order to redeem history from the concept of an evolutionary progress which limits the possibility of hearing the cries of the victims of history. This article will show how Levinas’s and Metz´s rejection of traditional theodicy is closely related to the concepts of memory and history and, therefore, the paper will demonstrate how traditional theodicy becomes for both thinkers an ethical theodicy. Consequently, the ethical account of theodicy replaces the attempt to negotiate the goodness and power of God with the pain of human beings. From this perspective, ethics is shaped by a response to the cry of victims which summons the subject to understand freedom as limited and subordinated to ethical responsibility. In responding to suffering, philosophy and theology can meet beyond idealism and dogmatism. (shrink)

On 26 July 2016, Satoshi Uematsu murdered 19 and injured 26 at a caregiving facility in Sagamihara, Japan, making it the country’s worst mass killing since WWII. In this article, I offer an analysis of the Sagamihara 19 massacre. I draw on the work of Julia Kristeva and Emmanuel Levinas to argue that claims about disability experience are insufficient to justify normative projects. In short, disability is normatively ambiguous.

Emmanuel Levinas’s work seemingly places a great emphasis on language leading some commentators towards a Kantian reading of him where moral consideration would be based on the moral patient’s capacity for reason with language functioning as a proxy for this. Although this reading is possible, a closer look at Levinas’s descriptions of language reveal that its defining characteristic is not reason but the capacity to express beyond any thematized contents we would give to the Other. This expressivity (...) (which Levinas calls face) would confront me with their singularity, infinity, and interiority tying me to them in a relation of responsibility. And the “content” of such an expression is a vulnerability and exposure tied to their mortality which continually entreats me though I cannot take it away. It is by means of this bare expression of an exposure to death as the core of language that it will become possible for non-human mortal beings to have what Levinas calls language. This possibility, although not explicitly addressed by Levinas, is at least left open by his account of Bobby the dog as well as his agnosticism over a snake’s face. (shrink)

Drawing upon the practice of caregiving and the insights of feminist care ethics, I offer a phenomenology of caregiving through the work of Eva Feder Kittay and Emmanuel Lévinas. I argue that caregiving is a material dialectic of embodied response involving moments of leveling, attention, and interruption. In this light, the Levinasian opposition between responding to another's singularity and leveling it via parity-based principles is belied in the experience of care. Contra much of response ethics’ and care ethics’ respective (...) literatures, this dialectic suggests that they are complementary in ways that productively illuminate themes of each. I conclude by suggesting that when response and care ethics are thought together through the experience of caregiving, such labors produce finite responsibility with infinite hope. (shrink)

Most readers believe that it is difficult, verging on the impossible, to extract concrete prescriptions from the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Although this view is largely correct, Levinas’ philosophy can, with some assistance, generate specific duties on the part of legal actors. In this paper, I argue that the fundamental premises of Levinas’ theory of justice can be used to construct a prohibition against capital punishment. After analyzing Levinas’ concepts of justice, responsibility, and interruption, I (...) turn toward his scattered remarks on legal institutions, arguing that they enable a sense of interruption specific to the legal domain. It is here that we find the conceptual resources most important to my Levinasian abolition. I argue that the interruption of legal justice by responsibility implies what I call the principle of revisability. The principle of revisability states a necessary condition of just legal institutions: To be just, legal institutions must ensure the possibility of revising any and all of their rules, principles, and judgments. From this, the argument against capital punishment easily follows. Execution is a legal act, perhaps the only legal act, that cannot be undone. An application of the principle of revisability to this fact leads to the conclusion that legal institutions cannot justly impose capital punishment. After defending these points at length, I conclude with some observations on the consequences of the principle of revisability for law more generally. (shrink)

This paper investigates the fundamental idea at stake in current bioeconomies such as Europe's Bio-Based Economy (BBE). We argue that basing an economy upon ecology is an ambivalent effort, causing confusion and inconsistencies, and that the dominant framing of the damaged biosphere as a market-failure in bioeconomies such as the BBE is problematic. To counter this dominant narrative, we present alternative conceptualisations of bio-economies and indicate which concepts are overlooked. We highlight the specific contradictions and discrepancies in the relation between (...) economy and ecology, and then work towards outlining a genuine and consistent conceptualisation of the BBE. The philosophical perspective of Emmanuel Levinas is employed to develop a more profound understanding of the tensions at stake; Levinas' work is compared with that of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's work on bioeconomics, and found to be of complementary value. Our hypothesis is that, rather than the impossible, absolute amalgamation of economy and ecology striven for today, a principal heterogeneity between humankind and nature must be acknowledged if a bioeconomy that truly operates within the carrying capacity of planet Earth is to be achieved. (shrink)